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COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE REPUTATION-BUILDING BEHAVIOR OF STATES, 1918-1988

By

JEAN SEBASTIEN RIOUX

A Dissertation submitted to the
Department of Political Science
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded:
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Ann Arbor, MI 48103

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
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
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
Donald D. Horward
Outside Committee Member

Douglas W. Lemke
Committee Member

James Lee Ray
Committee Member

Paul R. Hensel
Committee Member

Approved:

Henry   Glick, Chair, Department of Political Science

This dissertation is the end product of years of work. It is dedicated to my wife, Sophie Marcil, and to my father, Jacques E. Rioux, without whose love and support I would not have completed my graduate studies. *Merci du fond de mon coeur!*

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I would like to thank several people for their invaluable help in enabling me to complete this project. First, thanks to my adviser, Pat James, for his tutelage. Pat was always there for me, despite the inconveniences of distance and of his busy schedule. Secondly, special thanks are due to Doug Lemke for being my sounding board, my editor, and my friend and fellow oenophile. Doug is the best colleague in the world.

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ABSTRACT

The analogy that states in the international system act as firms in a market previously has been made by Kenneth Waltz in *Theory of International Relations* (1979). Here, the analogy is explored further in an attempt to model crisis behavior as the reputation-seeking behavior that firms exhibit in the marketplace while attempting to establish a brand name. In an anarchic international system, states need to convey information as to their true type and intentions. Often, this information is hard to convey because of the assumption that, in fact, it is preferable to *not* reveal one's type. However, over time states can develop a reputation based on past, observable behavior. The type of behavior which acts as a reputation-building device is crisis behavior over time. In this project, a model of crisis behavior is developed in which the diplomatic reputation of states in the Twentieth Century international system is measured.

The Diplomatic Reputation model has four components. First, it is a function of the frequency of crisis involvement of states. Second, it is a function of the risk-taking exhibited by states in these crises, measured by the severity of the crises. Third, it is a function of the states' performance in crises. Finally, since both the actors

and the international system change over time, reputation-building also is a function of time.

Initial empirical tests using International Crisis Behavior data support the reputation-building model of crisis activity. The major findings of this project are twofold. First, a new measure called Diplomatic Reputation is developed to model the crisis behavior of states. The model shows that states act *as if* they were building reputations, but empirical analyses *do not* support some of the hypotheses predicting lower crisis involvement for states with strong reputations. The second finding is that democracies exhibit different reputation-building behavior, in that they are involved in fewer crises, yet earn stronger reputations, thus uncovering further evidence that democracies exhibit different foreign policy behavior than non-democracies.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On Reputation

The Purest treasure mortal times afford is spotless reputation; that away, Men are but guilded loam or painted clay.

William Shakespeare
Richard II

In this dissertation, I define and measure a concept I refer to as the international, or diplomatic, reputation of states. I am interested in determining how state involvement in international crises affects involvement in future crises through the establishment of a diplomatic "reputation." Specifically, I speculate that states become involved in crises at certain times in order to develop a reputation as strong and/or quick to defend their interests. The original contributions of this study to the field of international relations are two-fold: first, a model of states' reputation-building behavior is presented and evaluated, and second, the consequences of states' foreign policy activity in the international system are examined in a new light.

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Reputation in General

Reputation is a concept related to, but distinct from, images and stereotypes. Reputations, like images and stereotypes, can be positive or negative impressions that others have of us. But while images are projections of the self based on an understanding of our social setting (Goffman 1959), reputations are an empirical assessment that others make of us. And while stereotypes are fixed conceptions that others have of us, as I attempt to demonstrate below, a reputation is an "earned good" (in the economic sense) based on other people's past experiences in dealing with us. Thus, a reputation can change over time.

At the individual level, reputations are an inseparable part of the self. *Webster's* (1991, 1001) defines reputation as our "overall quality or character as seen or judged by people in general." In this definition, reputation embodies the overall or net sum of other people's experiences with us. Other people judge us by the overall or net quality of interactions they have experienced with us. In the vernacular, reputation often carries a positive connotation, meaning a "good name," or "a recognition by [others] of some characteristic or ability" (*ibid.*). As shown in the chapter's epigraph, William Shakespeare wrote in *Richard II* that "[T]he purest treasure mortal times afford is spotless reputation; that away, Men are but gilded loam or painted clay." Thus, Shakespeare captured the essence of half of what constitutes a reputation: there are good ones; but there also are bad ones.

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For one person, the overall quality of interaction others have had with him may be positive. The statement "John is a reliable person" implies that other people's history of interaction with John netted him a positive reputation as someone who keeps his word. Conversely, if we hear that "Tom is a liar," the implication is that Tom has lied enough times to a sufficient number of people to net him this negative reputation.

In the business world, firms can also earn good and bad overall reputations. Some makes of automobiles carry a reputation for being reliable, such as Saturn, Honda or Nissan. Thus, enough people have driven these car brands for thousands of worry-free miles that the net result is a reputation for reliability. Other makes of cars have a reputation for spending more time in the garage than on the road, such as Triumph and Jaguar. The result is more of the former brands of cars on the road than the latter. Wealthy people still purchase Jaguars for their sleek look and refined luxury, but with the knowledge that they may break down often. Their second car may be a Honda.

Like individuals and firms, nation-states also have reputations. If we were to do an experiment (and they have been done) consisting of giving people "feeling thermometers" of some sort to rate countries according to an overall positive or negative reputation, we would see the same effects. Enough information circulates, and enough people travel and read newspapers, that overall impressions are formed

about countries. For example, in this hypothetical experiment, Americans would almost certainly rate Israel higher than Iran.[1]

In sum, the term "reputation" should be understood to have positive as well as negative connotations. In everyday usage, "reputation" tends to carry a positive connotation. But in reality, the term embodies the notion of a net sum of other people's experiences with another person or thing. Like an accounting ledger, reputation involves assets and debits.

The Different Types of Reputation

Individuals and organizations can have several different "reputations." Sally can have a reputation as a diligent employee at work, but her family can attribute to her a reputation for extreme sloppiness, and her friends may all say she is very caring. A professor can have a reputation as very tough and demanding, but also as a great lecturer or scholar. President Reagan while in office had a reputation as being out of touch and distracted, but also for being a staunch anti-Communist and for having an aggressive foreign policy. His Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, was hailed as a peacemaker in the West, but detested as a sell-out in his own country.

As alluded to earlier, people are not the only entities with reputations. Since reputations develop due to repeated interactions and shared information, firms can

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[1] Whether this is the result of 'Zionist propaganda' in the American media, as claimed by some commentators, is besides the point. Countries have overall reputations. See for example Mintz and Geva (1993), who find that democracies score higher on these feeling thermometer scales than autocracies.

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have reputations. And, like people, businesses can have various reputations. For example, they can develop reputations for making quality products, for being good places to work, or for taking care of their customers. The auto maker Saturn has a reputation for making good cars and for its excellent customer service. We have all seen the television advertisements in which Saturn owners reputedly drive hundreds of miles to attend company-sponsored picnics. Workers at the Saturn plants also enjoy the responsibility entrusted to them by management to control the assembly line. Although more systematic research ultimately might reveal some problems, impressionistic evidence suggests the auto maker enjoys a good all-around reputation with its workers and customers.

Other companies also are well-known for their good corporate citizenship. In 1982 and 1986, the pharmaceutical giant Johnson & Johnson faced potential disaster when its brand name pain reliever Tylenol killed a consumer because a *saboteur* had laced the capsules with cyanide. Johnson & Johnson's swift reaction in recalling all outstanding supplies of Tylenol, in setting up hotlines, and in launching advertising campaigns announcing a reward for the capture of the person responsible, earned J & J a reputation for caring for its customers and for social responsiveness. And indeed, despite the scare, the company kept over 90 percent of its customers and market share because of its positive response (Fombrun 1996: 29).

Contrast the above example with the events following the grounding of the *Exxon Valdez* in Prince William Sound, Alaska, in March 1989. After the tanker ran

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aground and spilled eleven million gallons of crude oil, Exxon's slow reaction to the spill, its apparent lack of concern for the victims, its reluctance to admit full responsibility, and its poor communication with the media caused its stock to depreciate 10% ($6 *billion*) in two weeks (Fombrun 1996: 29-30). Exxon, needless to say, did not earn a positive reputation for corporate citizenship. This instance would be considered a debit on the reputational "balance sheet." One may question how corporate leaders would allow this situation to unfold as it did. The point is that they did let it happen, and in turn their reputation plummeted.

In the world of high tech communications on the internet, one provider, America On Line, has a reputation for providing the most information at the disposal of customers "surfing the internet." However, its smaller competitor CompuServe has the reputation of providing much better customer service and assistance.[2]

Nation-states can also have several reputations. France is known for its gastronomy and viniculture. French wines are renowned. The Second Empire era (Napoleon III) laws regulating the *appellation des vins* have guaranteed customers a high level of quality. Thus, France has a reputation for making excellent wines, as well as for having an excellent national cuisine. On the other hand, French people have a reputation for rudeness.[3]

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[2] I would like to thank my wife Sophie, who provided me with this example after diligently researching this issue in several computer magazines.

[3] Although experienced travelers have told me the French reputation for rudeness is solely a Parisian feature.

Other reputations countries may have include reputations as good vacation destinations. Think of some well-known vacation resorts known for tourism--the Dominican Republic or Costa Rica come to mind. These countries have earned these reputations because the sum of many thousands of tourists' impressions of these places is positive due to the combination of friendly people, good climate, favorable exchange rates, decent accommodations, and interesting sights to visit such as beaches, ruins, or tropical rain forests. Conversely, very few people vacation in Iraq or Sudan because of the lack of some or all of the above.

Other countries may have reputations as having good banking laws, excellent tax incentives to relocate factories, or great social welfare programs. Finally, countries may be well-known for their corruption or brutality. The point is that while there are different types of reputations, we can say that there are net "positive" and net "negative" reputations for each type; we are known for our good as well as bad deeds.

The Tangible Effects of Reputation

Although reputations are intangible, they can and do have tangible effects. They can become assets or liabilities for the beholder. For individuals, there are several ways in which one's "reputation" can have real-world effects. For example, as ordinary citizens, organizations can estimate our reputation through a credit check. Those with good credit reputations receive tangible benefits such as lower credit card interest rates and higher credit limits, easier access to home mortgages and car loans,

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and even to rental property. Those with "bad" credit reputations have a difficult time obtaining loans and are often rejected. Famous people can bank on their good reputation by endorsing products; the more well-regarded a star is by the public, the higher fee she can command for endorsing products. If a famous person has a bad reputation, he cannot count on his fame alone anymore as a source of revenue. For example, football legend O. J. Simpson had a substantial advertising career until his trial for murder, at which time companies dropped him and vowed not to associate their product with a criminal suspect. Despite his acquittal he still is "blacklisted" because of the perception by many consumers that he is guilty.

Students of business and public relations easily recognize the benefits that having a good reputation can earn. Companies spend immense sums of money to produce, market, and advertise brand name goods that symbolize their commitment to quality in the public mind. They hope thereby to ensure repeat patronage. Likewise, an entire public relations industry has flourished as various organizations learned the value of projecting a good image, and creating or maintaining their good reputation. The most successful corporations have long realized that "when a company serves its constituents well, its name becomes a valuable asset...A company with a [good reputation] actually gains a competitive advantage against rivals because its reputation enables it to charge premium prices for its product, to achieve lower marketing costs, and to benefit from greater freedom in decision making" (Fombrun 1996: 11).

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Firms can even measure their reputation by calculating their "reputational capital"; for example, calculating the excess value of a company's stocks in relation to its salvageable capital gives an idea of the value of one's reputation (Fombrun 1996: 92). Another way to calculate the monetary value of one's reputation is by looking at the royalties companies earn for licensing their brand names. For example, a well-regarded company such as Coca-Cola can earn a high royalty figure when its logo is affixed to items such as clothing. Less well-regarded companies simply cannot license their logo.

Professional offices such as law or CPA firms, which are search-goods as opposed to experience-goods like cars, are more aware of the importance of having a positive reputation because their business depends on repeat customers and word-of-mouth advertising. In other words, with experience-goods such as stereo equipment or clothing, the consumer can touch it, see it, test it before purchase. With search goods, the consumer takes a leap of faith; one cannot test drive legal advice before purchasing it. So, many of us, when purchasing education at a university or legal advice from a lawyer, rely on the reputation of the firm, effectively meaning word-of-mouth. We rarely pick a lawyer at random from the Yellow Pages; more than likely we ask friends for referrals.

Finally, for nation-states the tangible effects of reputations can easily be seen. Countries with reputations for having good banking laws attract more foreign clients. Countries with excellent reputations as tourist destinations attract more tourists, and

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hence, more hard currency. For example, it is very difficult to secure a reservation in Cancún during the Winter months without advance planning—especially during Spring Break when American college students descend in droves.

A Specific Type of Reputation: Security

I have argued that there are different types of reputations that individuals, firms, or countries can earn. However, some reputations are more worthwhile than others. It is nice to have a reputation as a good windsurfer, but having such a reputation generally is less useful than having a reputation as a good worker, unless one is a professional windsurfer. Some reputations matter more than others. For an individual, it is arguably more important to have a good reputation related to the work ethic than for having an equally good reputation in a peripheral endeavor. The former is more likely to bring tangible monetary rewards. In other words, some reputations are more important than others.

In this dissertation, I am concerned with a specific type of reputation, one related to security. Security can be defined as a feeling of well-being, of freedom from attack and from danger.[4] It is therefore related to life and death issues; since we can die as a result of attack, it follows that security—freedom from attack—is a life-or-death issue. Thus, it is often argued that our most basic interests can be defined in terms of security (Waltz 1979).

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[4] This view of security conforms with that of most philosophers and scholars, e.g. Hobbes and Rousseau, and more recently, Morgenthau (1978) and Waltz (1979). For a different definition of security, see Morrow (1987).

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At the individual level, a reputation as a defender of one's interests (defined in terms of security) can be earned that brings a tangible reward. Imagine a prison setting, and a new prisoner arrives. It is popular belief that shortly upon arrival some new prisoners pick a fight and try to beat up someone in the court yard in an effort to demonstrate that the new inmate is not to be bothered. The rewards for a successful display of force can range from freedom from harassment to freedom from rape. Whether these stereotypical events accurately describe prison life is not the point; the important aspect is that we can meaningfully think in terms of tangible benefits from security reputation in a wide variety of circumstances.

In the business world, companies also can develop reputations for aggressively defending their interests defined in terms of security. In June 1993, PepsiCo, the maker of Pepsi, was the victim of a nation-wide hoax. Customers around the country purportedly found dangerous objects inside cans of Pepsi Cola, such as syringes and crack vials. But the managers at PepsiCo went on the offensive to prove that this type of product tampering was impossible. PepsiCo enlisted the aid of federal law enforcement agencies and soon was proven right; twenty arrests were made on charges of fraud and attempted extortion (Fombrun 1996). In a sense, PepsiCo developed a reputation as an aggressive defender of its security interests.

Moving up a few levels of analysis to international politics, we discover that a security-related reputation is also an old and intuitive concept, the importance of which has been understood by statesmen for centuries. Thucydides chronicled how

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the Melians and Athenians worried about their reputation during the Peloponnesian Wars. Two thousand years later in 1783, Lord Hartley, the English plenipotentiary charged with negotiating peace with the United States after the Revolutionary War, wrote that "[Nations] are jealous in honor, seeking the bubble reputation even in the cannon's mouth. But...the reputation of nations is not merely a bubble. It forms their real security" (Bigelow n.d.: 123). More recently, US Presidents have justified several foreign military actions on the basis of maintaining America's reputation as a strong player in the international arena: Reagan in Central America; Bush in the Persian Gulf, and Clinton in Bosnia.

Indeed, American Presidents seem to agree that maintaining a strong reputation is a cause worth fighting for. President Truman "thought that failure to defeat the aggressors in Korea 'would be an open invitation to new acts of aggression elsewhere' " (Mercer 1996: 2). President Nixon opposed abandoning his South Vietnamese allies because "the cause of peace might not survive the damage that would be done to other nations' confidence in our reliability" (*ibid.*). President Reagan favored a strong stand against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador because by doing otherwise, "our credibility would collapse and our alliances would crumble" (*ibid.*). President Clinton used a similar argument in favor of a military strike against the Serbian Army in Bosnia. In sum, preserving the US' reputation seems to be a prominent concern of American Presidents. There is no *a priori* reason to suspect this is not so for leaders of other states.

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Among the various foreign and domestic policy pursuits of state leaders, security certainly figures as one of the most important of the "national interest", if not the most important. It follows that if a state's reputation is strongly linked with its security, as Lord Hartley proposed, then leaders have incentives to establish a diplomatic reputation as a formidable player on the international scene.[5] A state with a reputation as a strong player will be in an advantageous position to deter other states from attack or predation, or to force concessions at the bargaining table.

Thus *diplomatic reputations* arguably are the most important kinds of reputations for interactions with other states in the anarchical international system because they can form the basis of security.[6] Having a positive reputation as a tourist destination cannot provide as much security as having a strong *diplomatic* reputation. Diplomatic reputations are formed through international political activity aimed at preserving and promoting one's security in the international system. They can be formed by a country's history of behavior in past international conflicts.

In sum, the previous discussion focuses on the incentives state leaders have to invest in a reputation for being an aggressive defender of one's interests, which I call a

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[5] It is common for writers in international relations to anthropomorphize the state. This derives from a widely shared simplifying supposition known as the "unitary actor assumption." While it is obvious that states as political entities do not make decisions--leaders do--many scholars assume that the way in which a foreign policy decision is made is not as important as the decision itself and the related consequences of that decision. Therefore, in this study I use the word 'state' and 'state leaders' interchangeably; regrettable as far as the English language and semantics are concerned, but useful for the sake of parsimony. Therefore, in my theory it does not matter who the state leaders are and what type of political system exists. The main concern is the foreign policy *output.*

[6] I discuss the anarchical structure of the international system in the next chapter.

diplomatic reputation. The incentive derives from the interest in security and the resulting need to invest in a deterrent to potential threats. Strong reputations convey information to friends and foes alike. Reputations are a valuable commodity in business, an intangible good offering tangible rewards. In the international arena, reputations act as signals to other states; up to a certain point, a state's past history is embodied in its reputation, just as an individual's is. Thus, if a state has consistently demonstrated resolve in the international arena, its strong reputation might act as a general deterrent to other states which might otherwise demand changes in policy from it, or as a bargaining advantage in negotiations. Such can be thought of as the tangible rewards of investing in reputation. But as I have argued, reputations are a constant function of other people's net experiences with us. Thus, a reputation can change if behavior changes. A reputation can change over time.

Reputation Over Time

Reputations are not necessarily constant over time. Since reputations are perceptions that others have of us, changes in our behavior or perceived actions can modify our reputations. Earlier I used the example of O. J. Simpson; his overall reputation went from positive to negative because many thought he had committed a heinous crime. Firms' reputations can also change over time, such as IBM's. Just a few years ago, "Big Blue" was one of the most prestigious high-tech companies, especially after it developed some of the first home usage personal computers. But

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recently, its PCs have not fared well against other brands, and they are regarded as slower and obsolete despite their higher price. National reputations also change, in the same fashion as Great Powers and Empires wax and wane. Consider the example of the "Made in Japan" label on products; a little over twenty years ago it was synonymous with shoddy craftsmanship. Now, the label indicates excellence.

In the area of security and diplomatic reputations, Sweden and Switzerland stand out as examples of states that once instilled much respect and perhaps fear in their neighbors, yet no longer do. For centuries, these states were active, if not aggressive, members of the international scene. In the 14th and 15th Centuries, the Swiss successfully defended their Cantons from attacks by the expansionist Hapsburg rulers and the King of Burgundy (in that order), with the help of their new weapon, the pike. In the late 1400s, Swiss soldiers perfected this new weapon as well as infantry tactics to maximize its utility. In the following decades, with little land in the mountainous country to settle after the wars were over, they offered themselves for hire. The Swiss became "the most notorious and for a time the most sought after mercenaries in Europe" (Howard 1976: 27). For almost a century,

> [T]he Swiss were very much in a class by themselves. In the
> first place war was for them a nationalized industry. The
> negotiation of all contracts was in the hands of the Canton
> authorities, as was the selection of the troops, among whom
> there reigned, during the campaign, the kind of cantankerous

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democracy one finds in a successful trade union. Secondly the

Swiss were highly specialized. They produced their great pike

phalanxes, including men armed with swords and halberds for

close-quarter fighting, and that was all" (Howard 1976: 27).

This aggressive export of warrior talent lasted from the late 15th Century until the mid

16th Century, until the Germans and Spaniards developed better and more flexible

infantry tactics, and came to be in higher demand (Howard 1976). Although the Swiss

had a reputation as aggressive warriors, they chose not to use it to expand their

territory. Nevertheless, they once had a reputation for fighting which they do not have

today. Instead, Switzerland developed its famous neutrality and non-aggression

stance. Its reputation clearly has changed over the last four hundred years.

Sweden offers a similar case, but one even more supportive of the notion of

changing reputations over time, because in the past it was truly an expansionist

empire, contrary to its status today as a benign country. Beginning in the 16th

Century, the Vasa Dynasty instituted a military conscription in order to fight the Danes

and Poles (Howard 1976). Then, with the ascension of King Gustavus Adolphus in

1611, the Swedish Kingdom extended itself into the Baltics, and in 1631 defeated the

Hapsburg armies at the battle of Breitenfeld. Subsequently, the Swedes successfully

fought the Russians for control of present-day Finland, Estonia, and Lithuania

(eventually losing the last two territories in 1721).

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The Swedish Kings regularly engaged in combat with the much larger kingdom of Russia to maintain control over Finland, almost always successfully. Sweden had a professional army, and is credited with the development of mobile artillery and improved troop deployments on the battlefield (Howard 1976). During the Napoleonic Wars, the Swedes (under King Bernadotte) fought against France. Accordingly, Sweden was accorded secondary power status along with Spain and Portugal at the Congress of Vienna, thus being one of the eight original signatories of the new peace. And as a reward for having fought against Napoleon, Sweden was handed Norway in compensation for the loss of Finland to Russia (Albrecht-Carrié 1973). In sum, the Swedes developed a reputation as being aggressive and skilled warriors during the Thirty Years War, and later in the Great Northern Wars. Now, the Swedes simply do not engage in any aggressive activity; they even remained neutral during World War II.[7] They now are known mostly for their extensive and generous welfare system.

Consider, as a final example, the rise and decline of the diplomatic reputation of Japan. This nation was once imperialistic and militaristic. Starting in the late Nineteenth Century with the Meiji Restoration, Japan became a militaristic empire; by 1932 it controlled all of Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula, and was active in south China and in Southeast Asia. Now Japan has become a model of economic industriousness bereft of any colonial possessions, with a constitution that not only

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[7] Sweden's last foreign policy crisis was with the Soviet Union in 1952 after the Soviets shot down a Swedish aircraft in the Baltic Sea. See Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988 Vol. 1: 222.

prohibits military aggression and expansion, but also restricts how large the Japanese Defense Forces can be.

There are several reasons for these changes of diplomatic reputation over time. First, states' reputations change due to constantly changing power relationships among them. This provides a need to actively maintain one's reputation. Strong diplomatic reputations are not earned forever, and must be "managed" just as firms constantly manage their products and brand names, and even occasionally by developing new products and niches to remain competitive. The analogy is not that far fetched, since states "produce" foreign policy on behalf of their principals, the citizens. Similarly, the international system has been compared to a market (Waltz 1979).

Second, the diplomatic reputation of states change because of the constantly changing political leadership of countries. If leadership were constant, reputations might last longer, as the same leaders dealt with each other, remembering past actions and dealings over time. But changing leadership occurring periodically throughout the international system creates incentives for new leaders to assert themselves, and to (re) establish their state's position as strong defenders of their interests. Therefore, electoral, generational, and other types of leadership changes create additional incentives for diplomatic reputation-building behavior by the countries' leaders.

Thus, reputations do change over time because they are the net sum of others' experiences with us. They are a continuing function of time. A change in behavior or in actors can change the 'balance sheet' of other people's experiences with us. Thus the

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notion of reputation is distinguishable from stereotyping in that reputations are empirically based and are a continuing function of experiences over time, while stereotypes imply fixed impressions we have of others that *do not* change, until they are abandoned altogether.

Summary and Goals of this Dissertation

It is logical and intuitive to argue that reputations matter. As already mentioned, individuals and firms can see tangible rewards from having a good reputation, or can suffer consequences from having a bad one. In international relations, states interact with each other in a closed system. States that border each other or that are in the same geographic region interact a great deal more. Their reputations embody their history, and the history of their interaction with other states. These reputations are known and observable by the other states in the system; therefore, reputations are public and can convey information. They act to decrease uncertainty in an anarchical international system where states must fend for themselves (Waltz 1959; 1979).

Many have written about the importance of reputation (Schelling 1966; Mercer 1996), also called credibility (George and Smoke 1974), resolve (Snyder and Diesing 1977), and international prestige (Morgenthau 1978). However, there is as yet no explicit, operational definition for measuring this concept. Given the centrality of reputation in so many theories and models of international relations, it is important to

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identify, operationalize, and measure what a reputation is and how states acquire and maintain it. Toward that end, I measure diplomatic reputation by examining the international behavior of states over time. The result is a model capturing the reputational consequences of foreign policy behavior. I begin this investigation by developing the research question and presenting a theoretical model of diplomatic reputation-building behavior in Chapter Two. Chapter Three consists of a review of the extant literature pertaining to the ideas and hypotheses developed in the previous chapters. Next, in Chapter Four, I discuss the data and methods used to evaluate the model of state reputation-building behavior, and its consequences for the international system in terms of future interactions among states.

Chapter Five presents the actual empirical evaluation of the diplomatic reputation-building model using crisis data for the international system from 1918 to 1988. The hypotheses developed in Chapter Two are evaluated. Then, having examined the consequences of crisis activity in the international system, Chapter Six investigates some of the interesting "applications" of the Diplomatic Reputation model in three "puzzles" of international relations: the selection effect in international conflict studies; enduring rivalries; and belligerent states. Finally, I conclude in Chapter Seven with a discussion of the implications of this model for international relations, as well as with remarks and suggestions for further research.

The model presented here is intended to add significantly to our understanding of foreign policy behavior. It is my hope that one day the field of political science will

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advance enough that theories and models developed in academia actually will become

indispensable tools for our foreign policy makers.

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CHAPTER 2

DIPLOMATIC REPUTATION-BUILDING

Political Activity

I am interested in determining how the foreign policy behavior of state leaders, and, by extension, of their states, affects subsequent activity through the establishment of a diplomatic "reputation."

The academic discipline of international relations is concerned with the activities of actors, be they governments or non-states, in the international system. Politics is the study of how actors influence each other in the authoritative distribution of goods (Lasswell 1936), and international relations is the study of politics on the international scale. Much of the political activity among nation-states is similar to the activities of actors at the intra-state level of analysis. Actors negotiate, bargain, threaten, bribe, and seek to influence others towards their preferred positions. In democracies these activities may be conducted primarily among the major political parties and organized interest groups such as labor and big business. In autocratic

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states they may be conducted among the competing factions of the ruling class or different ethnic groups.

However, much of this intra-state political activity is mitigated and/or arbitrated by a set of rules and regulations devised by the government. In democracies, bargaining is conducted among elected agents within a defined parliamentary structure (for example), and set of rules. In authoritarian states such wrangling may be carried out among competing factions within the ruling elite, with the military watching over. In other words, when actors in the domestic political sphere engage in political activity, it is almost always within a defined structure and set of rules, with an ultimate arbiter acting as referee--the electoral public or the dictator, depending on the form of government. I am stating the obvious: in most cases, countries are ruled by someone or some institutions, who create sets of rules or governing set of principles commonly referred to as laws. Other times, the governing sets of principles may be ancient customs. The point is that domestic affairs occur within a structured framework of rules, regulations, institutions, and shared customs.

Therefore, within the domestic political context, reputations are formed within a structured environment, and can be earned, managed, or rehabilitated with the help of the law, an agent, or a patron. In the United States, if an individual's credit record is bad, there is recourse to help restore it. A politician may free-ride on the reputation of a family name (*e.g.* Kennedy, Rockefeller, and Taft), or on that of her political party (*e.g.* members of Congress getting elected on the "coat-tails" of a popular President).

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Finally, in the business world, a growing public relations industry has flourished by helping firms manage their corporate image and develop their reputations. So, domestically reputations are earned within a defined structure of laws and procedures, and thus can be managed somewhat more easily because of the existence of these laws and/or institutions.

The Anarchic International System

Reputation takes on added importance in international relations because of the anarchic structure of the international system (Waltz 1959; 1979). The international system does not have a set of laws and institutions to support the states; each state is sovereign within the system. In other words, states exist in the international system as independent members without anything like a government to rule over them. Indeed, the term anarchy simply means "absence of government" (*Webster's*: 21).[1]

In this anarchic structure, the parts of the international system--the states--exist *via* self-help.[2] Government leaders in each country, acting as the central agents of foreign policy-making on behalf of the entire nation, are responsible for their nation's security and for devising their own foreign policy.[3] Governments are thus their own

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[1] Some writers disagree with this 'conventional wisdom' of the structure of the international relations. See: Keohane and Nye (1977) and Keohane (1986) for the alternative viewpoint of "interdependence," among others.

[2] As structural realism is anticipated to be familiar to the reader, I shall not dwell at length on Waltz's argument. Suffice it to say that the structure of the international system is assumed to be anarchical, thus allowing further propositions to be deduced.

[3] The reader may recognize that I invoke the unitary actor assumption of international relations. This is to avoid the problem of Arrow's Paradox in decision-making by more than

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agents. International relations scholars and philosophers have likened the structure of the international system to the condition of mankind before governments were invented; each person was responsible for his own security, there was no police or courts to protect people, and life tended to be, as Hobbes imagined it, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. It is assumed that long ago men traded some of their sovereignty--their power to do as they please as their own autonomous entity in a world without laws or government--in exchange for basic security and protection.

The anarchic structure of the international system causes two major problems for states, just as it caused problems for people before they formed societies and governments: a *security dilemma*, and *uncertainty*.

First Problem: The Security Dilemma

The first problem caused by the anarchic structure of the international system is the security dilemma (Herz 1950; Jervis 1978). Put simply, because each state in the international system must provide for its own security, and since power is relative and unevenly distributed among states, any action which State A takes to increase its security necessarily reduces the security of State B. Thus, B might feel compelled to counter A's security increase, which in turn will decrease A's security, *ad infinitum*. We can imagine a situation where there are no police, and my neighbors (whom I don't know very well because they speak a foreign language) have bought a gun to defend

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one actor. See: Bueno de Mesquita (1981), and Waltz (1979), among others, for further elaboration.

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themselves. This may cause me to wonder what they will do with the gun. So, just to be on the safe side, since I am responsible for my own protection, I buy one too. The neighbors may become alarmed at my sudden arming proclivities, and so they purchase a rifle, just in case I decide to burglarize them. When do we stop feeling threatened? In the real world, there are laws about carrying weapons, there are police around to protect us, and there are zoning laws against sinking missile silos under our front yards. In the international system there are no police to call or zoning commissions to which one may report violations. Therefore, because of the security dilemma inherent in anarchic systems, there is a constant need to monitor security in relation to one's adversaries, but to also be aware that increasing one's security has externalities associated with it.

Second Problem: Uncertainty

The second problem caused by the anarchic structure of the international system is uncertainty. Uncertainty in interactions with others changes a lot of things. Consider the following example, borrowed from Schelling (1966: 100-103), involving the game of chess. In the normal game there are three possible outcomes: Win, lose, and draw. Let's imagine a fourth outcome, called "disaster," where both players are automatically fined ten thousand dollars when the White player's knight and the Black player's queen cross the center line into the opponent's territory, and *vice-versa*. Two things will occur with this new rule. First, the "disaster" situation will never happen;

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if the Black player crosses his knight into the other's side of the board, the White

player will be deterred from moving her queen across, knowing full well her doing so

will cost both players a lot of money. The second thing that occurs is that players will

use the rule to attempt to keep each other's queen on the safe side of the board. In this

example, both players will jockey to move a knight across the center line and the

disaster outcome will never happen because the penalty is *certain* and *automatic.*

By introducing uncertainty, the dynamics of the game change. Let's say that if

the players move the proscribed figures across the center line, each player in turn rolls

a die and the disaster occurs if a 1 comes up; otherwise, the play continues, but at each

turn that the opposing queen and knight are on the other's side of the board the die

must be cast anew.[4] Here, we see that the figures can be moved into the opponent's

territory; when one player moves her knight across, the other player can move his

queen and attempt to pressure her to move back. Now the game resembles a

bargaining game. Each player privately knows how long--or how many rolls of the

die--(s)he is willing to risk in order to pressure the other player to retreat. Both players

can create the pressure, and both share the risk of disaster.

Because each state in the international system is sovereign--they recognize no

legitimate power over themselves--and must therefore provide their own foreign

policy, states cannot rely on independent agents for information about the intentions of

their adversaries. The flow of information about the intentions of the actors is

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[4] Schelling correctly points out that the uncertainty and unpredictability of crises need
not--and probably do not-- arise from random mechanisms. "Dice are merely a convenient
way to introduce unpredictability into an artificial example" (Schelling 1966: 103fn).

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incomplete. Much of this is by design (such as classified information about military weapons or intelligence activity), and some is due to differences in culture, language, and misperception. Moreover, in many situations such as bargaining, it is presumed to be advantageous not to reveal one's preferences to gain greater advantage; in other words, misrepresenting your true preferences and the true value you attach to outcomes. This is the same principle we use when haggling over prices at a flea market: we as buyers are willing to pay two dollars but start the bidding at one dollar; the seller is willing to get seventy-five cents but starts the bidding at three dollars. Both actors keep their sale figure private in order to get an even better price than each hoped for. Conversely, each person does not know (but would like to know) what the other one would be willing to pay/accept. Similarly, in the chess example, each player had private information about how many turns--rolls of the die--they were willing to risk to force the other's queen back across the line; but each player was also ignorant of the other player's willingness to take the same risk. So international relations are conducted in a state of uncertainty and incomplete information.

The chess and flea market examples demonstrate how uncertainty can affect the dynamics of a simple game. They show two types of uncertainty actors on the international stage must cope with: (1) uncertainty due to incomplete information about the other actor's preferences and risk propensity--willingness to incur risks to achieve their goal; and (2) uncertainty resulting from the difficulty in communicating one's true intentions to the other side, due to the assumption that actors misrepresent

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their preferences during bargaining in order to "come out ahead."[5] I now explain each in turn.

Type 1 uncertainty: incomplete information about the opponent. A key piece of information that actors need to successfully bargain is the true value the other side attaches to its preferred outcome. Each actor has private information about, for example, the value he attaches to outcomes, and how hard he is willing to bargain to achieve them. In the flea market analogy, the buyer would love to know that the seller is willing to get as little as $0.75 for the item; she would offer exactly this amount, and come out ahead by $1.25 (recall that she is willing to pay $2.00). Ditto the seller; if he knew the buyer is willing to pay $2.00, he would be firm with this amount and earn an additional profit of $1.25 over what he would have made had he sold for his original price.

In the international arena, the same problems exist. How many missiles are the Russians really willing to dismantle? How many American automobiles are the Japanese really willing to import next year? How much land is Israel truly willing to trade for peace? What political rights and concessions would truly satisfy the Sinn Fein Irish Nationalists and the IRA? To remedy this state of uncertainty due to incomplete information, specifically about the other player's preferences and willingness to incur risks to achieve them, states engage in many activities to increase

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[5] Thanks are due Joe Eyerman, who points out a third possible type of uncertainty: situations when states misperceive their own type or capability. In order to be able to draw conclusions and empirical results though, I assume that leaders know their own type, and that they know what their capabilities are, *i.e.*, states have good private information about themselves.

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the flow of information and thus help to decrease uncertainty. Such activity includes, but is not limited to, espionage; the exchange of consular offices to increase communication between state leaders and appointed agents from foreign countries; monitoring foreign media broadcasts and subscribing to foreign news sources; and summit meetings between state leaders.

This Type 1 uncertainty is frustrating, but understandable. In simple game theoretic terms, each player holds private information about its type (resolute, irresolute; risk acceptant, risk averse, etc.), but does not know the other's type. Also, each player's payoffs are unknown to the other. The players attempt to gain information about the other's type, which is based on their true preferences. They attempt this during the bargaining process, by offering incentives to see what the other side accepts. If there is progress in the negotiation each side updates its beliefs about the other side's type. If the negotiation bogs down, neither side knows any more than it did at the beginning of the game. Both sides have incentives to bluff.

Type 2 uncertainty: communicating intentions. This type of uncertainty is related to, yet distinct from, the Type 1 uncertainty described above. In short, there are strategic incentives to withhold or misrepresent one's position in bargaining situations (Fearon 1995). Both sides know this, so both sides can assume that the other side is misrepresenting his position, or bluffing. Of course, states can misrepresent their position in several ways, such as exaggerating their willingness to fight, or by inflating how much they value a certain outcome in order to get the

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opponent to concede more. Both sides have incentives to do this. Since there is this presumption that each side is bluffing, the problem becomes one of communicating one's true intentions to the other side.

During a negotiation, one side may attempt to signal to the other side what its true preference is. But the other side may simply not believe it: maybe it is a bluff, or maybe it is "cheap talk." Signalers attempt to elicit positive responses from the opponent. For example, the shopper in the flea market may tell the seller that she only has one dollar in her pocket, as a way to begin the negotiations. The seller would be happy to accept this, for he *still* would come out ahead by a quarter. Thus the buyer is signaling that she will bid low; but the seller may think to himself "who on earth comes to a flea market with only one dollar?" and conclude that she is bluffing. Or, he may read this as a strong signal on the part of the buyer to "take it or leave it." At that point, it is the seller who first updates his belief about the buyer's type. Based on the seller's response (which could range from "okay," to "how about two dollars"), the buyer will also update her belief as to the seller's type.

States also engage in signaling behavior to increase information about their true preferences (Jervis 1970). Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992: 132-133) theorize that the development of standing armies and the institutionalization of the drill--war practice--in the 17th Century was an important signal that states were willing to fight and defend themselves against probes and attacks. These trained standing armies, replacing *ad hoc* hired mercenaries, decreased the uncertainty about

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what State A would do if attacked by State B. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992: 133-134) demonstrate graphically that the average number of great power wars decreased by half since the introduction of standing armies, evidence that the decrease in uncertainty helped to decrease the frequency of wars.[6] Nevertheless, information still remains incomplete.

Another example of a strong signal was the United States' decision to send a brigade of soldiers to West Berlin in the early stages of the Cold War; the message to the Soviet Union was not that these troops were expected to defend Berlin alone, but rather that the U.S. would automatically become involved in a European war if the Soviets overran West Berlin (Schelling 1966: 47).

For example, as I have alluded to above, since much of international relations concerns bargaining among states[7] (either for treaties, trade issues, or fishing rights), due to the dynamics of bargaining state leaders face incentives not to reveal their true preferences in order to gain some concessions. Similarly, they face incentives to misrepresent the true subjective value of their concessions in order to appear to be giving more ground than they really are. State leaders hold private information concerning their true preferences, and about how much they are willing to concede or how tough they will act to achieve these preferred outcomes. In game theoretic terms, they are playing a game with pooled equilibria, whereby all types are presumed to be

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[6] Unfortunately, while the frequency of Great Power wars has decreased, they have become more severe; see Levy 1983.

[7] Again, I invoke the unitary actor principle, so I use "states" and "state leaders" interchangeably.

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sending the same message; in other words, there is a possibility that one or all the players are bluffing and misrepresenting their true type (Morrow 1994: 225-226).

This may not cause major problems in low-cost issue areas. But what happens when two adversaries are bargaining over an issue that at least one of the actors deems of extreme importance? The problem that now arises is analogous to the 'Boy Who Cried Wolf'. There is such a presumption that keeping one's true preferences secret benefits negotiation, that in a bargaining area crucial to at least one actor the problem is to communicate that "This time, I am very serious." Why should the opposition believe this is true? This is the central problem in high cost bargaining: How to impress on the other side that one is willing to fight over this issue ("honestly, I swear we will fight!").

Finally, some types of states may have an even more difficult time in communicating intentions than others. It is easy to imagine that statements by democracies are hard for other states to understand. With the separation of powers typical of democracies between a Head of State and Head of Government; with frequent changes of government through elections; with opposition leaders openly criticizing policy; and with the media further criticizing and dissecting every government move, democracies might find it hard to communicate intentions due to all the static. For example, Saddam Hussein is reported to have disbelieved President Bush's resolve at the eve of the Gulf War because he was aware that many Americans were openly protesting US military involvement in the Gulf. Saddam believed the

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"Vietnam Syndrome" still permeated the United States. Thus, democracies might be even more susceptible to the Type 2 uncertainty problem, and may have to compensate for it more than autocratic states where the leadership is more constant and predictable.

Crisis and Uncertainty

In crisis bargaining, the costs are higher than for any other type of bargaining, because of the uncertainty and high probability of war.[8] Thomas Schelling writes that

> [C]rises...are inherently dangerous. [I]n a crisis, the danger of
>
> inadvertent war appears to go up. This is why they are called
>
> "crises". The "crisis" that is confidently believed to involve no
>
> danger of things getting out of hands is no crisis; no matter how
>
> energetic the activity, as long as things are believed safe there is
>
> no crisis...It is the essence of a crisis that the participants are not
>
> fully in control of events; they take steps and make decisions
>
> that raise or lower the danger, *but in a realm of risk and*
>
> *uncertainty* (emphasis added)" (Schelling 1966: 97).

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[8] A discussion of the definition, relevance, and importance of crisis and its role in reputation building is presented in Chapter 4: Operationalizations. For the time being I should note that a foreign policy crisis occurs when there is a change in the *status quo* where state leaders perceive the following three necessary conditions: (1) a threat to their political system; (2) a finite time to respond to the threat; and (3) a high probability of military activity.

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In a crisis, every element of international relations comes into focus: bargaining, negotiations, threats and/or uses of force, national interests, cultural values, the impact of systemic structure, the influence of great powers, alliances, etc. Indeed, Glenn H. Snyder (1972: 217) writes accurately that an international crisis is "international politics in microcosm." To resolve the crisis before a costly and unpredictable war ensues, the goal of the state leaders is to find out what the other side's true intentions are; what their true preferences are, and how far they are willing to go to achieve them.

In sum, during a crisis one or more of the actors may in fact be willing to go to war over an issue. The other side may be bluffing. How does a state convey to its adversary(ies) that it is willing to fight? The best signal possible may be a *diplomatic reputation* that identifies oneself as an active defender of one's national goals.

Reputation as Public Information

The previous chapter's discussion of the importance of reputation attempts to make clear that reputations exist at all levels of aggregation. A reputation embodies the net sum of other actors' experiences with the actor in question. Therefore, everyone and everything that has a history "has" a reputation. When two actors are engaged in a negotiation, they are aware of what the other side has done in the past. Even if the adversaries have never dealt directly with each other, there is one

definitional feature of reputation that is of use to the adversaries: *Reputations are, above all, public.*

If two states have clashed in the past, they may have learned something from the experience that may help them in the future.[9] They may store information about each other and retrieve it in the future. Allan (1983: 70) writes that "the balance of resolve is constructed as the history of the relationship between the two parties." This is only partially true; the *other* actors in the system also may learn from the actions of these adversaries, because their actions during the crisis were observable to all. Schelling (1966: 124) correctly observes that "[w]e lost thirty thousand dead in Korea to save face for the United States and the United Nations, not to save South Korea for the South Koreans, and it was undoubtedly worth it. Soviet expectations about the behavior of the United States are one of the most valuable assets we possess in world affairs." In other words, even if the Soviets were not directly involved in the war, the US fought to send them a message.

Troop movements, press reports, official *communiqués* and *démarches* to the United Nations, pleas to superpower patrons (or clients) and allies...all these actions during a crisis are observable by all the other states in the international system, as is going to war to resolve a dispute. Crisis participants' actions might give important

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[9] "Learning" among states in repeated interactions is also an interesting research agenda in international relations. See especially Leng 1983, 1993. Also, Axelrod's 1984 work with computer tournaments playing iterated games of Prisoner's Dilemma has raised interest in learning in repeated interactions because of its implications for social behavior. Axelrod shows that in dyadic situations of repeated interactions under certain conditions, a "nice" strategy of "9/10ths of a tit-for-tat" induces cooperation in a variety of social and biological systems.

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clues about their type, which could then be used later by other parties. Possession of more information about an opponent's type can change the equilibrium solution of a game. Recall that in a pooled equilibrium, the strategies of the players were the same regardless of type; no player could deduce any information about the opponent's preferences. However, with information about the other's type, "separating equilibria" can be achieved whereby the player can play different strategies because Player A can tell what type of sender Player B is after observing a move (Morrow 1994: 225). In other words, Player A observed a *prior move* by Player B which it then uses to update its belief about B's type, and adjust its strategy accordingly. Everyone sees the behavior of disputants in prior conflicts, and can bank that information for later use.

For example, State A's prior actions against State B have been observed by State C (and D, E, F, and G, for that matter), State A's new adversary. State C can use the information it had gained about State A's activities during the previous conflict. Likewise, State A may draw upon any information about C's prior public behavior. Armed with this information, each side can make judgments about the true type of the other. Thus, A can develop a reputation *via* past behavior which can affect its present crisis with C, and vice-versa.

In traditional theories of conflict behavior, it is assumed that players A and B update their prior beliefs about each other's type at each successive move or dispute. In reality, all the actors in a system can update their beliefs about *both* A and B which they can use later on. This occurs because a diplomatic reputation is an empirical

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observation over time by the members of the system. Diplomatic reputations form when players send costly signals in an attempt to reveal their true type, to decrease uncertainty in a dispute that may bring too high a cost for both parties.

The reason diplomatic reputations are formed during crises is because of the high cost crisis behavior entails. A crisis, with its high probability of war, signals a willingness to suffer high costs. Of all the types of international activity, crises arguably offer the best chance of signaling resolve because the leaders show a willingness to suffer the potential destruction of their country in a war over an issue. Crises put people, leaders, and countries at high risk. Moreover, in democracies, which have potentially a bigger problem in communicating intentions, and where leaders have higher audience costs, the signaling during a crisis takes on even greater significance because crisis participation can have domestic as well as international consequences (Fearon 1994a). Since crises are a signal of willingness to suffer high costs, states which routinely show their willingness to bear these costs can be expected to develop a strong diplomatic reputation as active, even belligerent, defenders of their interests.

Let us return to the chess example above. If player A crosses her knight to the other side of the board, player B may call her bluff and send his queen across the center line. At the next turn, the die is cast, and the "disaster" is averted because the number 4 shows up. The game continues, but player A moves deeper into B's side of the board, so much so that it would require two or three moves to return to her side.

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After casting the die several times (and luckily avoiding the disaster of the $10,000 fine each), and after watching player A risk so much by moving deeper into B's territory, the latter may conclude that A is so determined to be across the line that she is willing to incur the disaster. Player B may thus conclude that her willingness to suffer outweighs his, and would return his queen across to his own side, thus backing down. Player B has learned something about player A, namely, that she was willing to bear the risk. Conversely, A learned that B was unwilling to risk disaster. Both players have updated information about each other's type.

Now imagine that this chess game is televised, or attended by spectators. Player A probably will play chess again against another opponent. The other player--call him C--will recall that A was willing to risk disaster, that is, willing to roll the die several times without being intimidated by the probability of rolling a one when the proscribed pieces were moved across the center line. We may say that she developed a reputation for being risk acceptant. Therefore, player C has knowledge as to A's true type; he can adjust his strategy accordingly, perhaps by playing a more defensive game. A's prior actions are used by the other players in the chess community to update their beliefs about her true type, and not just by player B if he happens to play against her in the future. In other words, all the players in this system--the chess community--observe the game between A and B, and also update their beliefs about A and B's true type, which they each can use in the future when they play against A or B.

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Another feature of international politics that increases the need to build a reputation is that the major players change. Empires rise and decline; countries are formed through revolution and independence movements; leaders are elected and then sent home; dictators rise to power and then are overthrown; and, a common feature to all mankind, leaders die and are replaced. I have described in the previous chapter the reputational rise and decline of the previously aggressive countries of Switzerland, Sweden, and Japan. More generally, all types of leadership changes and shifts in relative power occur on the international scene.

Furthermore, states are run by human beings, with all their accompanying features, good or bad. Human beings learn by imitation and example, and are thus prone to occasionally repeat the mistakes of their parents.[10] Also, experience tells us, and laboratory experiments demonstrate, that memory decays over time. All these elements of temporal, generational, and situational change cause reputations to be temporary. In other words, like the great empires of Athens, Rome, Byzantine, and Britannia, reputations wax and wane.

Summary: Hypotheses of this Dissertation

Based on the discussion above, two working hypotheses guide this investigation. From them, several specific testable hypotheses are drawn. The first focuses on reputation-building behavior of leaders, and by extension, of states. The

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[10] The proverb *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose* brilliantly captures this notion.

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first working hypothesis, **H 1**, is that state leaders invest in the diplomatic reputation of their state by achieving a strong international presence. New leaders and leadership cohorts have an incentive to build a diplomatic reputation as strong defenders of their interests. By doing so they can achieve the tangible rewards reputations carry, such as advantages in negotiations. The other players will be more likely to concede, based on the fact that the previous high cost behavior on the part of A acted as a strong signal as to its true type, namely, a strong player. Thus new state leaders represent uncertainty in the international arena; the other players do not know what to expect, nor the type of the new actor. To decrease uncertainty, and to attempt to earn the tangible benefits of a strong diplomatic reputation, leaders become involved in, or escalate crises. Since crises are costly signals, participation in them leads to a reputation for willingness to actively defend one's interests.

After a time, a reputation is established. Crises are costly because they carry the risk of war, so there is a diminishing marginal utility in becoming involved in further crises; in other words, leaders face a constrained maximization problem where they become involved in some crises to build their reputation, but do not want too many crisis involvements because of the autonomous risk of war each crisis carries (similar to the 'disaster' roll in the chess game). The consequence of this constrained maximization problem is that the frequency of crisis participation of leaders eventually decreases, leading to the expectation of an inverted "U"-shaped function of crisis activity among states. This expectation is shown in **Figure 1**.

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
Figure 1. Working Hypothesis 1: Expected Inverted-U Shaped Function of

Diplomatic Reputation over time.

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In sum, I expect that states will be involved in more international activity in the form of crises,[11] and will tend to escalate crises in which they are involved to a higher level of severity, until a strong reputation is established. At that point the frequency of crisis activity should diminish as leaders no longer want to risk war, having earned a satisfactory diplomatic reputation. In Hans Morgenthau's words, "[a] policy of prestige attains its very triumph when it gives the nation pursuing it such a reputation for power as to enable it to forego the actual employment of the actual instrument of power" (Morgenthau 1978: 87).

The second working hypothesis, **H 2**, assumes that sending signals *via* crisis participation is a costly act because of domestic audiences (Fearon 1994a). Some states have more attentive domestic audiences, such as democracies (*ibid.;* Eyerman and Hart, forthcoming). Thus, I expect that, *ceteris paribus,* the inverted U-shaped pattern of crisis activity over time will vary according to how attentive domestic audiences are. Specifically, the inverted U should peak at lower frequencies of crisis involvement for democratic states than for non-democratic states, because of the higher costs that leaders of democratic states pay for foreign policy failures (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992). This expectation is consistent with recent empirical findings that (1) democracies, arguably because of their attentive domestic audiences, have fewer conflict phases per dispute than do non-democracies (Eyerman and Hart, forthcoming); (2) are more likely to win

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[11] Again, the reader is urged to be patient until I discuss the operationalization of the variables in Chapter Four.

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wars than are non-democracies (Lake 1992); and (3) the general observation that democratic leaders pay a disproportionate price for engaging in risky behavior (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). In other words, democracies are expected to reach their "peak" diplomatic reputation earlier--in fewer years or with fewer crises or a combination thereof--than non-democracies, as shown in **Figure 2**.

Thus, to recap, two general working hypotheses guide this dissertation. They are related to the effects of crisis activity on the international system. They are:

H 1: The crisis activity of states will increase as leaders invest in efforts to build a "strong" reputation; subsequently, crisis activity will decline in frequency after states develop a "strong" reputation.

I derive two specific testable propositions from this:

H 1a: As Diplomatic Reputation increases, and approaches a local maxima, the probability of future crisis activity decreases following a Bayesian update scenario; and more specifically, states with strong diplomatic reputations should *initiate* fewer crises because of the diminishing marginal utility of doing so.

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
Figure 2. Working Hypothesis 2: Diplomatic Reputation Comparison Between Democracies and Non-Democracies.

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H 1b: Conversely, as Diplomatic Reputation decreases and approaches a local minima, the probability of future crisis activity increases; they should *initiate* more future crises because of the incentive to build a strong reputation.

The second working hypothesis states that:

H 2: Democracies will, on average, achieve "peak" diplomatic reputations sooner than non-democracies, because of the greater difficulties they face in communicating intentions, and the higher price democratic leaders pay for engaging in risky behavior due to the more attentive and cautious domestic audiences they face.

There are also two additional testable propositions I derive from this working hypothesis:

H 2a: Democracies experience, on average, fewer crises than non-democracies;

H 2b: Democracies have, on average, higher diplomatic reputation scores than non-democracies.

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To recap, I expect that states will exhibit reputation-building behavior. Crisis activity will tend to run in cycles, due to the need for state leaders to "reinvest" in their reputations resulting from the various types of change in the international political system. When a state has acquired a strong reputation, it deters other states from engaging in crisis activity. And since each crisis carries risk, crisis initiation will diminish for states with a strong reputation. Eventually, the other actors in the system will "forget," reputations will wane, new leadership cohorts will come to power, and the diplomatic reputation-building cycle will begin anew for those states who choose to remain active players on the international scene. Within this general pattern of diplomatic reputation-building behavior, I expect to find differences between democracies and non-democracies in their respective crisis behavior as expressed in the second hypothesis. The next chapter examines the literature pertaining to the above discussion.

CHAPTER 3

BACKGROUND

Literature Review

This dissertation explores the nexus of three distinct strands of ideas, represented by three different strands of literature. The concept of a state's reputation and its role in deterrence and signaling is the first strand I explore; the concept of a leadership cycle in politics that engenders a cyclical function to states' reputation is the second; and the third relates to the hypothesis that I expect a difference in the crisis behavior of democracies compared to other types of regimes; loosely this is the concept of domestic politics affecting foreign policy behavior. These strands are discussed in turn and connected below.

I have argued in the previous chapters that reputations exist and can earn tangible benefits. Charles J. Fombrun states "[r]eputation is of growing interest in the study of organizations."[1] His pioneering study (Fombrun 1996) of the effects of reputation in the business world argues and empirically demonstrates that a good

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[1] Personal e-mail communication on 4/23/96.

reputation is an intangible good which yields real benefits. In the economics and industrial organization literature, where the study of firms' reputation is now an important research enterprise, the study of corporate strategy is increasingly interested in how reputations garner competitive advantages.[2] A good reputation in the business world acts as a barrier to entry, earns companies more royalties and stock dividends, and increases their portfolio of brand names, among other benefits. And, as I have pointed out, for individuals a good reputation also brings tangible rewards such as when someone has an excellent credit rating. In sum, reputations matter because they can earn the holder some type of reward.

Reputation in Deterrence Theory

In international politics, scholars and statesmen realize the importance attached to having a reputation for being a strong defender of one's interests. The value of having such a reputation is especially evident in situations where the actors' interests are at odds, in other words, when there is conflict. Diplomatic reputations are important in bargaining and crisis diplomacy when the aggressive defense of one's interests becomes more important, indeed, becomes a life or death issue.

In traditional scholarly works, reputation is strongly associated with credibility (Schelling 1960), resolve-reputation (Snyder and Diesing 1977) and prestige (Morgenthau 1978). During the past thirty years, a rich literature pertaining to

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[2] For example, Professor Fombrun is launching a new journal entitled *Corporate Reputation Review*, whose role is to "facilitate dialogue between academics and practitioners about reputational matters" (personal communication on 4/23/96).

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credibility and resolve in connection with cold war politics, nuclear deterrence, and diplomacy has developed.

Deterrence is a psychological relationship between actors. An actor faced with a potential threat to itself (or one of its allies) must successfully communicate to the threatener that it will retaliate if the threatening deed is carried out. Deterrence sometimes is viewed as a passive type of aggression because so often the threat is issued by A when it learns that B is *about* to behave contrary to A's interests. The threat becomes something like "don't do this or else I will punish you." Deterrence is getting the other to *not* do something. Thus, the successful act of deterrence is one where A told B to not do something, and B complied.[3] When B crosses A, and A sets out to *undo* what B did, then we enter the realm of compellence, which is a more active form of aggression with brute force playing a more important role (Schelling 1966).

The successful deterrent is one in which there is a perception on the part of the threatened actor that the one issuing the warning has both the capability and the credibility to carry it through. In Kissinger's (1957: 12) words, "deterrence requires a combination of power, [and] the will to use it...[m]oreover, deterrence is a product of those factors and not a sum. If any one of them is zero, deterrence fails." This is the essence of deterrence; a multiplicative relationship where a combination of power and the *will* to use it has the potential for success. In this relationship, if the will is absent,

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[3] One objection to this is that in reality, successful deterrence involves a *nonevent;* B was so deterred by A that it never occurred to B to cross A in the first place. However, such non-events are difficult to evaluate empirically, since they never happened.

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or if the actor lacks power, a huge amount of the other attribute will not make a threat successful. But, more importantly having the will to use force, B has to *believe* A also has the will. Hence the psychological relationship.

Thus deterrence is the interactive relationship between capability (power) and credibility (the known will to use power). This view is shared by all the major scholars who have written on the subject (Kissinger 1957; Brodie 1959; Schelling 1960; Snyder 1961; Knorr 1966; George and Smoke 1974; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Huth and Russett 1984, 1993; Huth 1988, among others).[4] Conceptually, reputation, resolve, credibility, and will are all the same thing; one actor's threat or demand will be believed by the other state only if the former has credibility; a reputation for carrying out what they promise.

Perhaps the foremost proponent of the need for a reputation for resolve is Thomas C. Schelling. In his influential book, *Arms and Influence*, Schelling (1966) argues that it is imperative for US leaders to be willing to expend resources to maintain US credibility, both for the sake of its allies and enemies. He correctly points out that "deterrence is about...*influencing* enemy intentions (emphasis in the original)," and that the "hardest part is communicating our own intentions" (*ibid.*: 35), as I have discussed in Chapter Two. He also correctly identifies the crux of the deterrence problem: "It [deterrence] requires projecting intentions. It requires *having*

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[4] There is a distinction between the nuclear strategists such as Kissinger and Brodie, and scholars such as Huth and Russett who focus on conventional deterrence. However, the point here is that the deterrence literature begins with the premise that pure or immediate deterrence will succeed when the two conditions--capability and credibility--are present.

those intentions, even deliberately acquiring them, and communicating them persuasively...(emphasis in the original)" (*ibid.:* 36). Schelling is also one of the few writers who explicitly recognizes the fact that reputations are public, and that when one state undertakes a certain foreign policy with another state, the "message" the policy conveys may be deliberately intended for other parties. For example, he highlights the Formosa Resolution of 1955 between the Unites States and Formosa (Taiwan), in which the US promised to defend the Nationalist Chinese government, arguing it "was chiefly important as a move to impress a third party," namely, the United States' Chinese communist and Soviet adversaries.

Schelling's conclusion about deterrence is that one of the most important ways to project our intentions is to acquire what I have termed a strong diplomatic reputation: "[I]f the question is raised whether [a country's reputation for action] is worth fighting over, the answer is that this...is *one of the few things worth fighting over* (emphasis mine)" (*ibid.:* 124). The United States should therefore make strong commitments to its allies and not hesitate to aggressively defend them.[5]

Payne (1970) is equally vocal in his support of the need for states to always carry out their promises or commitments. He also recognizes explicitly that reputations are, above all, public, and believes that reputation for action and security are strongly interrelated. Writing about American involvement in Vietnam, Payne warns US leaders to adhere steadfastly to their alliance commitments, lest their

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[5] As with many works of the 1950s and 1960s on these topics (*e.g.* Kissinger 1957; Brodie 1959), the main focus tended to be prescriptive theories for US foreign policy, especially towards the USSR.

reputation for opposing communist expansion suffer. Thus, the traditional realist view, prominently manifested in the cold war deterrence literature, emphasized a hard line approach in dealing with the Soviets: never back down or they will push harder the next time. Consistent with this, Payne explicitly recognizes that past actions reflect on the present.

In sum, Kissinger (1957), Schelling (1966), and Payne (1970), among many others, implicitly recognize the concept of diplomatic reputation, and what it means in terms of security *via* a state's credibility in disputes. However, these studies contain no explicit operational definition of diplomatic reputation, no solid empirical evidence on its uses in conflict, and no measurement of the concept. They only say what is intuitive: demonstrating resolve is good, so others will believe what you say.

The first significant quantitative study of deterrence was undertaken by Russett (1963). He was mainly concerned with a specific type of deterrence: extended immediate deterrence. In extended immediate deterrence situations, a major power's client state is being threatened by another state. The major power must credibly commit itself to its client in order to deter the threatening state. Here, Russett also begins with the premise that the most important factor in determining the success or failure of a deterrent threat is the "credibility" of the actor issuing the threat (the "defender") on behalf of the defended (the "pawn"), against the aggressor. Russett examines nine possible variables which theoretically are related to the idea of "commitment," such as "the presence or absence of a formal agreement," and the level

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of political and of economic interdependence between the defender and its client. The major finding based on his sample of 17 cases is that the potential attackers were more likely to be deterred when there was higher political and economic interdependence and military cooperation between the defender and the pawn.

Therefore, in Russett's study credibility is viewed as the level of integration or interdependence among the allies. This makes sense; it is indeed a strong signal when states purposefully integrate their economies and policies; it signals that "if you attack my client, you are attacking me too, so I will be forced to punish you." These findings were robust in the sense that Huth and Russett (1984) find the same results in an extension of the earlier study.[6] However, one weakness of these studies is that they only focus on extended immediate deterrence in a static examination of a specific set of crises.

In sum, while there is agreement on the conceptualization of reputation, the way in which it is described and/or measured varies among scholars. Some writers focus on a subjective assessment of the overall tactical situation; credibility is enhanced when the object of the threat is militarily defensible by the deterer (Craig and George 1990). Russett (1963) and George and Smoke (1974) examine the commitments states make in terms of their alliances; it is thought that the presence of a military alliance signifies a commitment strong enough to signal credibility. (Russett [1963] and Huth [1988, 1993] find no support for this argument.) Other factors such

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[6] The Huth and Russett (1984) study is an almost exact replication of the Russett (1963) article, with 37 additional cases and a more sophisticated probit analysis.

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as economic and political ties are also thought to be sufficient to demonstrate resolve (Russett 1963; Huth and Russett 1984).

Huth (1988) and Huth and Russett (1993) come closer to actually measuring the effect of past actions on the present in their later extended deterrence model, by using variables pertaining to the "past behavior" of actors. In this particular case, this means whether the "defender" has fought on behalf of the "protégé" in the past. They find that the defender's past behavior with the potential attacker does have an effect on deterrence outcome. However, like other works on crisis learning (*e.g.* Allan 1983; Leng 1993), this measure only captures the effect of past actions on a repeated interaction among a dyad—a pair of actors—over time. Most interaction and learning among states is assumed to occur dyadically—bilaterally—with leaders formulating policy towards another state within a framework of expectations based on previous interaction (Allan 1983; Leng 1993). For example, Hitler learned in 1936 during his "bold gamble" to reoccupy the Rhineland that Britain and France did not possess the intestinal fortitude to counter him (Kissinger 1994); as a result, his later moves leading to crises over Austria, Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, and Memelland (Lithuania) were based on the expectation that Britain would continue her policy of appeasement (Albrecht-Carrié 1973). Twenty-three years after Munich, as a result of unimpressive US performance during the Bay of Pigs crisis and the morose 1961 Vienna summit with Kennedy, it was an emboldened Khrushchev who took advantage of a reputedly "weak" President Kennedy and sent missiles to Cuba.

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In contrast, I argue that reputations also may affect the way other states in the system view diplomatically weak and strong states, because as Payne (1970: 106) puts it, "reputations are, first of all, public." Thus, I contend that a reputation may be earned for the purpose of deterring a rival, or any other potential adversary in the system. For example, Britain's performance in the Falklands/Malvinas War probably influenced how Spain and China approached the issue of negotiations with Britain regarding their respective claims on the futures of Gibraltar and Hong Kong. Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 showed that dissension would not be tolerated within the East Bloc, and may have deterred reform movements in Poland and other Soviet client states for many years. So, once a reputation is earned, the value of this good is known and observable by the other actors in the system. Therefore, my study differs from existing studies in that it examines systemic aspects of reputation, as opposed to strictly bilateral or dyadic notions of crisis learning (e.g. Allan 1983; Leng 1993).

It therefore appears throughout the Cold War deterrence literature that there is widespread acceptance of the formula for successful deterrence: credibility (reputation) * capability (reputation *times* capability). Widely accepted data to measure the capability, or power, of states now exist: GNP, GDP, Correlates of War Composite Capabilities Index, etc. But as of yet, no satisfactory empirical measure of the reputation of states has been offered.

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Reputation and signaling. While scholars in the field of international relations assume that diplomatic reputations exist, the general concept of reputation has been formalized and modeled mainly in the economics literature. The classic work on reputation in the rational choice school is Selten's (1978) "Chain Store Paradox," which takes the form of a game-theoretic exposition on reputation-building. Selten imagines a situation where a monopolist in a number of markets is facing the prospect of a new entrant in one or more local markets. The monopolist (the "chain store") faces a choice: fight or acquiesce. Fighting the entrant(s) entails immediate costs, while acquiescing results in overall lower profits. While Selten proposes that the chain store should fight using predatory price reduction tactics, and should incur immediate losses to deter future entrants, his Nash solution concept of subgame perfection predicts that the chain store will acquiesce. Unquestionably, situations such as this do occur in the real world; predatory practices are common in the business world, therefore, the game became known as the chain store *paradox*: while the formal game theoretic solution calls for the chain store to acquiesce, the chain store faces a strong incentive to fight, in order to deter potential future entrants in the market.

It turns out that the key variable in determining the choice of the players in this situation is the level of information available to them. Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) independently discover that Selten's paradox is true only when both sides have complete information. When they introduce information

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asymmetry about each player's payoff structure and the concept of uncertainty about the future, they find their new sequential equilibrium solution predicts that the monopolist will utilize predatory tactics in order to gain a reputation as a predator and deter future entrants. Milgrom and Roberts (1982: 304) state "in *any situation* where individuals are *unsure about one another's options or motivations* and where *they deal with each other repeatedly* in related circumstances (or where past dealings with other people are observable), we would expect to see reputations develop" (emphasis added). In other words, in situations of imperfect information and repeated interaction, reputations should develop; furthermore, and more importantly for my purpose, Milgrom and Roberts state these two conditions are necessary (and maybe even sufficient) for reputation building.

In the setting of international relations, these two conditions are met: The interactions among and between the actors (states) are indeed repeated, and information is imperfect among them. These points need no further elaboration, as the problem of imperfect information and uncertainty is discussed at length in Chapter Two. Additionally, a foreign policy crisis represents a change in the status quo (Brecher and James 1986; Brecher and Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988), which is analogous to the situation of a chain store realizing that it faces the immediate threat of competition. It seems entirely plausible that since the conditions specified by Milgrom and Roberts are present in international politics, then the reputation-building dynamics should be applicable to the study of international relations.

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Indeed, the chainstore game and its implications for reputation-building have been used successfully in studies of international relations (Alt, Calvert, and Humes 1988) and comparative politics (James 1993), mostly as a heuristic device to derive equilibria--predict the outcome given the available alternatives and the preferences of the actors. Therefore, the attempt I undertake to formulate an explicit, dynamic model of diplomatic reputation-building as a function of crisis activity represents a step beyond the existing literature.

Reputations are important in other ways as well. As mentioned in Chapter Two, reputations are useful because of the information they convey; they are a signaling device by which actors can infer their opponents' preference structures. In other words, reputations decrease uncertainty in the bargaining process. Decreasing uncertainty is an important step toward decreasing the threat of war.

Robert Jervis (1970) is acutely aware of the dangers uncertainty and incomplete information pose to peace, and of the importance of an "actor's signaling reputation" (*ibid.*: 80). Jervis is interested in finding out "how, in short, can an actor influence beliefs about himself and lead others to make predictions about his behavior that will contribute to his reaching his goals...in other words, how actors can project images 'on the cheap'?" (*ibid.*: 3-4). Jervis is talking here about the importance of signals in conflict bargaining, which he defines as "statements of actions the meaning of which are established by tacit or explicit understandings among actors" (*ibid.*: 18). Clearly, as argued in previous chapters, by making an initial investment in a strong

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diplomatic reputation, later conflicts of interest will more likely be resolved "on the cheap" because a strong diplomatic reputation is a strong signal of an actor's seriousness of purpose. Indeed, Schelling (1966: 150) states that "words are cheap...action is more impersonal, cannot be 'rejected' the way a verbal message can...Actions also prove something; significant actions usually incur some cost of risk, and carry some evidence of their own credibility." But Jervis (1970: 19) argues instead that while some words are cheap, "actions are not automatically less ambiguous than words...words also can be costly."

Jervis's view on signaling is that sometimes, "being known to issue misleading signals can help an actor deter adversaries and restrain allies" (*ibid.*: 85). He cites as an example strong American military involvement in Korea after the declaration of Korea as outside the United States' vital areas. The Russians may have interpreted the Korean War as a trap to lure the Soviets into a war. "Thus, ironically, America might deter Russia from attacking a country by claiming to be uninterested in it" (*ibid.*). This type of behavior over time would earn one a reputation for schizophrenia if nothing else, and would randomize future interactions since no behavior or preferences could be estimated, let alone predicted. Uncertainty would be pervasive in such a world. Nevertheless, Jervis is not the first person to recognize the importance of appearing to be irrational; Schelling (1960: 181) showed how an irrational response to a small threat could "purchase" future deterrence with low "maintenance costs." Powell (1987) shows that in a game theoretic crisis bargaining scenario, a state that

bluffs can "win," and that "uncertainty and incomplete information may significantly enhance deterrence" (Powell 1989: 503). So while Schelling (1960; 1966), Jervis (1970), and Powell (1987, 1989) discuss the advantages of lying and signaling wrong intentions, I believe this type of behavior, in the long run, is riskier than building a diplomatic reputation, because the risks of conflicts getting out of hand are higher due to the increased uncertainty these mixed signals create.

Ironically, in later works Jervis (1976, 1978) seems to emphasize to a greater extent the role of uncertainty in international conflict, and the negative effects of cognitive processes, stereotypes, and prejudice on rational decision-making. Jervis (1976) is more emphatic about the dangers of "misperception," which seems to contradict some of his earlier writings, e.g. Jervis (1970).

In sum, as argued in Chapter Two, the best signal possible to demonstrate seriousness of purpose and resolve is to establish a diplomatic reputation as a strong defender of one's interests through action, and once established, the other members of the international system have this information available to them because of the public nature of signals. Thus, this dissertation goes one step beyond what others have studied by considering general international consequences of reputations based on past acts.

Cycles of Leadership and Political Change

The second major strand of literature I examine pertains to the cyclical nature of reputations. I posit that once a state has secured a reputation (as either strong or weak), this is not earned forever; generational and other types of leadership changes among the various members of the international system create a situation where leaders have an incentive to alter their state's status and reputation.

Like the previous concept of reputation, the idea that events occur in cycles is not new. Cycles figure prominently in a variety of recent literatures in international politics: Long Cycle Theory (Modelski and Thompson 1989); Cycle of Relative Power (Doran and Parsons 1980); and various theories of economic cycles (Wallerstein 1984; Goldstein 1985, 1988), imperial overstretch (Kennedy 1987), or of the growth of rent-seeking domestic organizations (Olson 1982). But these theories postulate cycles that reoccur after long time periods, typically one century (Gilpin 1981; Modelski and Thompson 1989). Furthermore, most cycle theories describe some form of global cycle that determines the initiation of world or global wars (Modelski and Thompson 1989; Goldstein 1985, 1988; Wallerstein, 1984).

By contrast, Toynbee (1954) proposes the idea of an internal generational cycle of reoccurring events (as opposed to a long systemic cycle) in explaining the apparent regularity of war being waged every other generation, and Doran and Parsons' (1980) theory of the Cycle of Relative Power is idiosyncratic to each state; in other words, each state runs through its cycle in its own time. Doran and Parsons postulate that

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what is important about one's position on a relative power cycle curve is how the leaders and elites of the country perceive and deal with the changing situation; not necessarily one's exact position on the curve in relation to other states *per se.*

This is related to my idea that different political leaders will behave differently when faced with similar situations, despite the "lessons" of the past. Allan (1983) advances the concept of "diplomatic climate," which affects the perceptions actors have of a situation, given the influence of past events on the current situation. Thus, current events and perceptions are based on past events, with a gradual dissipating effect, such that more distant events weigh less heavily than more current events (indeed, Wickelgren [1967] shows that memory decays exponentially in experimental subjects; see also Goertz and Diehl 1992: Ch. 5, on this point). Jervis (1976) also stresses the importance of history and learning on leaders. Therefore, the idea of time affecting international relations, in the form of global cycles, internal cycles, and memory decay, has been explored by various scholars as an explanatory variable of international phenomena.

More specifically, however, the field of American politics offers more relevant and theoretically important insights as to how generations are shaped and why they behave differently. Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (1986) offer some plausible explanations of how political generations are created within a country: the conventional wisdom and empirical evidence suggest that it is a combination of conversion and mobilization; a young generation is deeply affected by an event and

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mobilized to throw the responsible incumbents out of office, and subsequently many are converted to the party that has seemingly best resolved the situation. In sum, there is strong evidence of generational processes at work that affect people's political choices.

This idea of generational shift is also investigated in other political settings, such as Butler and Stokes' (1974) investigation of British political shifts, and Inglehart's (1971) study of changing generational values in Western Industrialized states. As developing nations and formerly Communist states begin to open up, and data from these countries can be reliably obtained, there is no *a priori* reason why similar generational shifts do no occur there as well. While my purpose in this dissertation is not to explain why these shifts occur, the implications of these shifts are clear for my theory: leaders change, states' relative power and position in the international system change, public expectations change, and therefore policies, including foreign policies, change.

Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy

Linkage politics. Finally, the third strand of literature relevant to this dissertation concerns "linkage politics"; the nexus between domestic and international politics (Rosenau 1969). Traditional literature linking domestic and international politics tends to focus on the "scapegoat" or "diversionary" hypothesis, which posits that in periods of internal political or economic strife, the ruling elite redirects public

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concern towards a real or imagined external threat; the people then are expected to rally together to protect their nation. The diversionary hypothesis (and its corollary byproduct, the "rally around the flag" effect) is an extremely appealing explanation for why states, nations, or societies fight, despite the less than unconditional empirical support this theory has found in practice (Levy 1989). Nevertheless, many studies investigating this linkage as a possible cause of conflict and/or war have been undertaken (Rummel 1963; Wilkenfeld 1968, 1973; Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992; James and Hristoulas 1994). Simply, I am interested in the impact of state structure on crisis involvement; in other words, how does the domestic political structure affect conflict proneness.

Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller (1992) and Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995) find strong empirical evidence that the outcome of conflict affects the survivability of regimes. In particular, defeated initiators and democratic regimes are much more likely to be removed from power after a war than are authoritarian regimes and/or victorious targets. Thus, since the risk of being removed from office increases for being involved in a crisis, a leader can be said to be sending a costly signal when she gets the nation involved in a crisis.

In sum, there is logical and empirical evidence that neither the structure nor the process of domestic politics is independent of what occurs outside the state, and vice-versa; what occurs outside the state impacts on the structure and process of the domestic polity.

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Democracies and foreign policy. Indeed, one of the most prolific debates in the past decade deals with the renewed interest in how the domestic structure of states affects their foreign policy. Long before Rosenau's (1961) "Pre Theory" of how the domestic characteristics of states can affect foreign policy (a 3*2*2 table organizing the different types of states as Large, Medium, or Small; as politically Open or Closed; and as economically Developed or Underdeveloped), Immanuel Kant argued that liberal or democratic states would have more peaceful foreign policies among themselves than would non-democratic states, based on a "harmony of interests" that democratic societies would enjoy with one another.[7] Kant also argued that this effect would occur because of the higher costs democratic leaders would face in terms of domestic political costs (see Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992: 45 for this interpretation).

There are strong theoretical reasons democracies should be more peaceful than other kinds of states. Some arguments focus on the norms that democracies foster, namely peaceful competition, compromise in resolving disputes, and the legitimacy of the leaders (Doyle 1986; Russett 1993). Thus, these democratic norms are projected onto a democratic state's foreign policy, especially when dealing with other democracies since the norms are shared. A democratic state is expected to use force to

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[7] Writers use the terms "republican," "liberal," "libertarian," or "democratic" to denote states that generally conform to what we view as democratic: open elections, free market, and individual rights and freedoms, or a combination of these. I use the term 'democracy' to avoid a semantic discussion. I operationalize 'democracy' in Chapter Four.

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defend itself, but in bargaining situations the norms of compromise and peaceful resolution of disputes should guide negotiations.

Another set of arguments focuses on the institutions which characterize democracies. The argument here, which is equally plausible, is that conflict and war are decided by leaders operating within a set of domestic political institutions, which can constrain and/or guide the leaders' decision. Some of these constraints may include parliaments that must declare war; opposition political parties; systems of checks and balances; an electoral system, etc. (Morgan and Campbell 1991; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). In sum, all these factors are thought to constrain democracies from being too aggressive and hasty in engaging in conflict.

The empirical evidence on these propositions is surprisingly uniform, and three findings appear to be as conclusive as any other findings we have in the field of international relations. First, the democratic peace proposition is a dyadic phenomenon; democracies do engage in conflict--perhaps as much as any other type of state (Singer and Small 1976; Chan 1984), but democracies have rarely, if ever, fought against each other (Levy 1988; Ray 1993). This finding, if it holds up to continued scrutiny, is referred to as the "joint democratic peace proposition" (Ray 1995).

The second general empirical finding is that we cannot easily separate a democracy-and-peace argument into the norms and institutions variants of the democratic peace theory; they both appear to work interdependently to mitigate conflict (Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993). There is something at work in

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democracies that is interactive; not surprisingly, since it is the democratic norms that create institutions such as opposition parties and elections, which then serve to reinforce pre-existing democratic norms. Therefore, democracies are different in their domestic structure and norms from non-democracies, and this results in a joint democratic peace.

The third empirical finding is that the *process* of conflict differs between democracies and non-democracies as well. Lake (1992) shows that democracies tend to win the wars in which they become involved because they are able to marshall resources more efficiently. Eyerman and Hart (forthcoming) find that when engaged in conflict, democracies experience fewer conflict phases than do non-democracies. They hypothesize, as do I in the previous chapter, that this is because democratic leaders face domestic audience costs. This idea is introduced by Fearon (1994a), who demonstrates those states which can generate the highest audience costs (democracies?), are more able to signal to their opponent their willingness to engage in violence to defend their interests. Think of an audience cost as a punishment imposed on an agent by his principals for failing to represent them responsibly. A classic example of an audience cost in a democracy is removal of the leader in an election; other audience costs could be increased parliamentary opposition leading to a loss of effectiveness for the ruling party, or criticism of the leader in editorial pages. Democratic leaders likely face higher audience costs for bluffing, so when democratic states escalate a dispute, it becomes a *de facto* signal of resolve.

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Therefore, the existing literature on the relationship between domestic structure and foreign policy is consistent with my second hypothesis that the foreign policy activity of democratic states in terms of diplomatic reputation-building behavior should differ from the foreign policy behavior of non-democratic states. While there still is a debate going on about whether the democratic peace phenomenon actually exists (*e.g.* Layne 1994; James and Mitchell 1995; James, Solberg, and Wolfson), so far the preponderance of the evidence points to a difference between democracies and non-democracies in international conflict.

Summary: Diplomatic Reputation as a Dynamic Process

The model presented in this work describes a dynamic process where the intangible earned good--the reputation--has to be reacquired periodically, because a reputation is not permanent. For example, in the 18th and 19th Centuries, Sweden was a redoubtable state in Europe. It made important military contributions to the Holy Alliance against Napoleon, and maintained an empire of its own in Scandinavia. But in the present time, Sweden does not posses a reputation as a strong state (recall that Sweden's last crisis was the 1952 "Catalina Affair", in which the extent of the Swedish response to the Soviet downing of its airplane was to send angry diplomatic notes to Moscow; the whole matter was dropped a month later. See Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988, Vol. 1: 222). Thus, in a crisis, it is plausible to suggest that any ultimata or threats issued by Sweden would fall on deaf ears; how could its adversary judge the

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credibility of the threat without an empirical record for reference? That reputations are temporary and must be reacquired periodically was an obvious point to past leaders. For example, Frederick the Great wrote in the 18th Century that "A monarch ought to make himself, and particularly, his nation, respected...At the commencement of a reign, it [is] better to give marks of determination than of mildness" (Payne 1970: 13). Since "commencement of reigns" recur periodically, reputations must be rebuilt periodically as well.

In this chapter, I have demonstrated that scholars have given much thought to the importance of reputation in the deterrence literature. In a recent work, Jonathan Mercer (1996) writes that deterrence scholars have accepted too readily the assumption that reputations exist, as I have pointed out above. Mercer argues that not enough emphasis has been placed on examining how reputations actually form, and whether they matter at all. Drawing from recent advances in the field of social psychology, especially attribution theory, he argues that reputations can only form when two conditions exist: first, "an observer uses what are called dispositional or character-based attributions to explain another's behavior;" and second, when actors "use past behavior to predict future behavior...when people perceive commitments as interdependent or coupled" (Mercer 1996: 6). Furthermore, he states that social psychological theory holds actors tend to perceive desirable behavior as situational, while undesirable behavior is perceived as dispositional or character based.

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Based on these explanations of attribution of behavior, Mercer develops a theory of reputation-building based on "desire." His "desire hypothesis" states that leaders will perceive undesirable behavior of adversaries as character-based, while the opponent's desirable behavior will be explained in situational terms. The same is true for allies: desirable behavior is perceived as situational, while undesirable behavior is perceived as character-based. (Note that by undesirable and desirable, he simply means whether the behavior of the other actor correlates with one's policy preference.)

Mercer's four hypotheses, for which he finds some support in his empirical examination, can be restated as follows: adversaries can develop reputations for resolve, but rarely for irresolution; and allies can develop a reputation for irresolution, but rarely for resolve (*ibid.: 67*).

Mercer's conclusion for policy-makers is that they should not be concerned with expending lives and resources to fight for one's reputation. "We should not view our putative reputations as interests in themselves...fighting to create a reputation for resolve with adversaries is unnecessary [because adversaries can get reputations for being resolute but rarely for being irresolute], and fighting to create a reputation for resolve with allies is unnecessary [because allies can get reputations for lacking resolve but rarely for having resolve]" (*ibid.: 227-228*).

While Mercer's argument appears to be strong, it is incomplete. First, I agree that scholars have not explained how reputations form in the first place. However, while he accomplishes this task, readers are left wanting for a practical application.

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Reputation is almost certainly more than a dichotomous variable: reputation for resolve or not. Reputations are very likely relative and constantly changing, but Mercer never allows for this.

Second, he limits his investigation to disputants in three crises. He purposefully selects the First Moroccan Crisis (1906), the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis (1909), and the second Moroccan Crisis (Agadir; 1911) because these crises "involved the same states and many of the same policy-makers, often fighting over the same issue" (*ibid.*: 11).[8] As argued in the previous sections, reputations are, first and foremost, public. Reputations can be perceived by all members of the international system. In this vein, Mercer's study examines crises among the same actors over time without examining the effects of crisis involvement--and of resulting reputations--on the international system. In short, his spatial-temporal domain does not allow the general conclusions we need.

In summary, much has been written about the importance of diplomatic reputation in international politics. However, many simply assume it exists and then proceed to a discussion of how to build more of it, without defining or measuring it. Others, such as Huth and Russett (1988, 1993) come close to identifying the problem but only manage half of it; "past behavior" is measured but only in terms of the immediate past behavior within a dyad. Mercer (1996) manages the other half, but does not complete the puzzle; he discusses how a reputation is formed, but never

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[8] These actors are: England, France, Russia, Germany, and Austria, and the time frame of Mercer's study is 1905-1911.

measures it. In this dissertation, I attempt to complete the puzzle by operationalizing

reputation, describing how it is formed, measuring it, and evaluating its effect. I now

proceed to the discussion of the empirical aspects of the model.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN

Modeling Diplomatic Reputation

In this chapter, I present the data and methods used to test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter Two. First, I discuss the importance of crisis as foreign policy activity, and how it relates to the reputation-building behavior of state leaders. Then I discuss the sources of the data, define and operationalize the variables, and present the reputation-building model. Empirical evaluations are presented in Chapter Five.

To recap, the major thesis of this dissertation is that state leaders have incentives to build a reputation for their state as a strong defender of national interests (defined in terms of security) in order to decrease uncertainty in foreign policy activity. Furthermore, I argue that the notion of reputation can be measured and used as an independent variable to examine the foreign policy behavior of states in the international system. This follows from the argument that reputations are public (they convey information very broadly), and foreign policy activity impacts on all states in the international system, rather than solely on the immediate disputants. The type of

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foreign policy that is most likely to decrease uncertainty in the long term is crisis activity, because crises bring into sharp focus the differences among states. Crises convey information about preferences of states, and produce information other states can use to update their beliefs about current crisis actors. This is because almost every move in a crisis is made in public; although the tactical decisions are made in private, the results of the decision-making process is public. As previously mentioned, official *communiqués, démarches* to the United Nations, troop movements, and attacks are public events. Therefore, examining the crisis activity of states over time will help determine whether state leaders actually do behave as if they were building a reputation for their state as strong international actors, presumably in order to decrease uncertainty.

Crisis as Foreign Policy Activity

I argue that the principal way in which a state develops a reputation as either a strong or weak actor in the international system is by its foreign policy activity over time. As stated above, I operationalize foreign policy activity in this dissertation in terms of a state's performance in international crises. The leader's (and by extension the state's) performance in a crisis unfolds as choices between alternative courses of action are faced. One choice is to make concessions, hoping the other state will reciprocate. A second possibility is to escalate in order to force the other state to back down and make concessions itself. A third choice is to attack immediately. Each of

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these choices carries a range of potential consequences. Leaders may decide to escalate the crisis in order to show resolve, with the hope of "winning" and thereby improving their political standing. At the same time they hope to earn a reputation as a "strong" player to be reckoned with, in the hope of deterring future similar crises. Some crises may thus serve as preventive medicine against future crises.

Definition of crisis. The first issue to address is the specific meaning of crisis. There is a remarkable consistency in the literature on what constitutes a crisis (Lebow 1981; 7-8). Scholars operationalize crisis as a situation in which the normal flow of international interactions is interrupted, where state leaders perceive some sort of threat to their sovereignty, political system, or position (McClelland 1968; Young 1968; Azar 1972). Also, most scholars include a heightened probability of military hostilities in their operationalizations, indicating crisis leaders are often willing to fight to defend their interests (Brecher 1977; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Lebow 1981; Leng 1993). Finally, most researchers mention the common characteristic of a time factor, arguing that the perception of a finite time to react to a threat adds to the stress and uncertainty we intuitively associate with crises (Hermann 1972; Brecher 1977; however, not all writers assume time is an important component of crisis is time, *e.g.* Leng 1993).[1]

In this dissertation, the definition of a crisis is drawn from the International Crisis Behavior Project (hereafter ICB), directed by Michael Brecher and Jonathan

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[1] Leng (1993: 26) argues that defining what constitutes a sense of time pressure is difficult. He argues that "a reciprocated threat, display, or use of military force [is] a sufficient threshold indicator of the presence of a MIC [Militarized Interstate Crisis]."

Wilkenfeld. This project, underway since 1975, represents the most comprehensive effort to create a crisis database within the field of international relations. The Project specifies two levels of analysis within a crisis: the event, or macro-level of analysis, and the participants, or micro-level of analysis. At one level, crisis is an event that can cause change in the international system. The ICB definition states that:

> An *international crisis* is a situational change characterized by two necessary and sufficient conditions: (1) distortion in the type and an increase in the intensity of *disruptive interactions* between two or more adversaries, with an accompanying high probability of *military hostilities*, or, during a war, an *adverse change* in the *military balance;* and (2) a *challenge* to the existing *structure* of an international system--global, dominant, or subsystem--posed by the higher-than-normal conflictual interactions (Brecher, Wilkenfeld and Moser 1988 Vol. 1: 3, emphasis in the original).

This definition describes the actual event. But a crisis involves perception as well, since the actors must actually *perceive* these disruptions in the international system and the challenge to the *status quo* before they can be seen as crisis participants. Therefore, at a second level, crisis involves the perception of the actors. The ICB Project defines a crisis for a state in these terms:

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A *foreign policy crisis,* that is, a crisis viewed from the

perspective of an individual state, is a situation with three

necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change in a

state's external or internal environment. All three are

perceptions held by the highest level decision-makers of the

actor concerned: a *threat to basic values,* along with the

awareness of *finite time for response* to the external value

threat, and a *high probability of involvement in military*

hostilities (Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988 Vol. 1: 3;

emphasis in the original).

The ICB Project's two-part definition of crisis offers a dual advantage. First, it has

become a somewhat "standardized" definition of crisis, since it is based on elements or

components that other scholars have long associated with crises. The ICB Project's

definition is widely accepted and used because it focuses on the elements scholars

have traditionally identified as being components of crises. It is important to

standardize concepts in international relations so studies can be replicated. When

there is no standardization, scientific progress is slowed. That is, there may be

difficulties in cumulation across studies focusing on diplomatic activity short of war

that the author(s) term a 'crisis,' but which identify crisis by widely varying criteria.

For example, Brace and Hinkley (1993) examine "uses of force" as defined by the

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Congressional Reference Service, while Lian and Oneal (1993) look at whether an international event is covered in the first five pages of the New York Times. Unless there is a high correlation between these two measures, these studies may not be, strictly speaking, comparable. The ICB Project's definition of crisis, in contrast, offers the advantage of a standardized dataset incorporating events which have many of the attributes and characteristics commonly associated with crisis through thirty years of empirical investigations.

The second advantage is that the ICB Project's definition is comprehensive. In all, the current ICB data set contains over 390 international and 825 foreign policy crises from 1918-1988. The scope of this data set provides the opportunity for testing many hypotheses about crisis behavior. In addition, the ICB Project offers a summary of each foreign policy crisis in the included data set, including its background, the involved actors, the issues under dispute, and a short bibliography used to compile each case. Therefore, there exists the opportunity to create new variables germane to different hypotheses that may not have been included in the original data set. David Carment (1993), for example, uses the case summaries provided by the ICB Project's data set to create a new set of variables pertaining to ethnic conflicts within crises. Since Carment builds from the ICB list, his findings are immediately replicable and comparable to a range of other crisis studies that employ the ICB data set, even though they do not consider ethnic issues.

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The ICB crisis data set identifies two different types of crisis participants. These are (1) crisis actors, and (2) triggering entities. I explain each in turn.

Crisis actor. Simply put, a crisis actor is a state whose leaders perceive the three elements of a foreign policy crisis: a threat to their political system, a finite time to respond to the threat, and a high probability of engaging in military hostilities. Crisis actors can be the initial protagonists, or they can be "dragged" into an ongoing crisis by their clients, allies, or values. Either way, a state is coded as an ICB crisis actor as soon as its leaders perceive a threat, an increased probability of military hostilities, and a finite time to respond to the threat.

Triggering entity. The triggering entity initiates a crisis for another actor. For example, for the United States the Cuban Missile Crisis was triggered on 16 October 1962 by the discovery of the Soviet Union's deployment of missiles in Cuba. In the ICB data set, the USSR is coded as the triggering entity because its actions caused another state to perceive a crisis. The USSR's actions precipitated the chain of events. The Soviet Union and Cuba became crisis actors six days later on October 22, 1962, when the United States announced a blockade of Cuba, in turn triggering a crisis for the USSR and Cuba (Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988: 260). In this Cuban Missiles example, there are three crisis actors, that is, states whose leaders perceive the three elements of a crisis (threat, time constraint, and likelihood of military hostilities), and the original crisis trigger is traced to the USSR.

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It is worth noting that the triggering state may or may not become a crisis actor at any point during a crisis. This is because the triggering entity, by being the instigator, may not necessarily perceive itself to be facing a threat to its political system. For example, on June 8, 1981, Israel launched a successful air attack destroying an Iraqi nuclear reactor. The Israeli air raid triggered a crisis for Iraq because it perceived a threat, finite time to respond, and a heightened probability of military hostilities; thus Iraq became a crisis actor as soon as it was hit with the air raid. However, Israel was not a crisis actor (ICB case number 296, Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1989: 231). Although its actions triggered a crisis for Iraq, Israeli leaders did not perceive the three necessary conditions that comprise a foreign policy crisis; Israel was in control of the situation and did not perceive itself to be in danger. But, for example, if Iraq had reacted by massing troops on the Jordanian border and calling up reserves four days after the air raid, then these actions could have triggered a crisis for Israel, who would then be coded as a crisis actor four days after the raid. Israel still would have retained the designation "triggering entity" for this June 1981 crisis.[2]

In this dissertation, I treat triggering entities as if they are crisis actors. A triggering act that starts a crisis for another state is a predatory action that signals a state's intention to vigorously defend its interests. In the Iraqi nuclear power plant raid

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[2] In a personal conversation, Michael Brecher told me that this particular example will be recoded in the revised data set due out in mid-1997, whereby Israel actually becomes a crisis actor due to a perceived threat to its survival by Iraq. I also will recode this example in subsequent drafts of this project as the new data become available.

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example above, even though Israel never becomes a crisis actor, Israel initiated the raid as a pre-emptive act of self-defense.

Another example to reinforce this point is the Belize Crisis in 1975 (Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988, Vol. 1: 310). Ever since Britain announced in the 1960s that British Honduras (Belize) would eventually become independent, Guatemala revived its old claims to that territory. In 1975, Guatemala triggered a crisis for Britain by threatening to invade Belize and by issuing a declaration announcing its intention to annex it. Britain reacted by sending troops to reinforce its garrison there. The United Nations urged the two countries to negotiate the issue peacefully; eventually, Guatemala and Britain did hold talks concerning the future of the colony, and the crisis ended a few months later.[3] Guatemala never became a crisis actor, but did trigger a crisis for Britain. Guatemala engaged in risky behavior by starting a crisis, signaling to Britain (as well as everyone else paying attention) its designs over Belize. Thus, because this type of crisis activity also acts as a strong signal, there is no *a priori* reason to differentiate between states that are crisis actors and those that become involved as triggering entities; theoretically, both types of crisis activity is risky and is a strong signal.

Importance of crisis. Having defined what constitutes a crisis and the two types of crisis participants, the next step is to reiterate why crisis activity is important to my theory. Crisis is an international phenomenon of great importance because of

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[3] However, a second crisis over Belize erupted in 1977. Incidentally, Belize became independent in September 1981, and relations with Guatemala have improved.

the changes it engenders: changes in the international *status quo,* causing changes in the states' activities; changes in the behavior of leaders; and changes in the international system after the crisis is over. In sum, crisis "is a much broader phenomenon than war. In fact, war is a subset of crisis, not the reverse; that is, all wars result from crises, but not all crises lead to war" (Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988, Vol. 1: 2).

I have argued that reputations are built through a state's performance during crises over time. This is because a crisis represents a sudden change in the international *status quo.* A crisis alters the *status quo* by elevating disputes, and bringing them into sharper focus and increased attention. Within the *status quo* of routine foreign policy activity,[4] no immediate threats are posed to the members of the international system,[5] so it is irrelevant to speak of challenges to a state's security and reputation. In a crisis, though, a direct challenge to a state's security and interests is posed. There may be a high probability of war. The *status quo* may be seriously threatened. By contrast, in the routine foreign policy exchanges among states no such threats are present.

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[4] The *status quo* here means the routine foreign policy activity of states, and not the structure of the international system at a given time. Therefore, while some states may be dissatisfied with the structure of the international system, they still engage in foreign policy activity that is not always crisis or conflict based.

[5] Immediate or tactical threats can be distinguished from general or strategic threats for our purposes. For example, while the State of Israel may base much of its foreign policy activity on a real or perceived general strategic threat coming from its neighbors, it is not the case that Israel is always facing an immediate threat of invasion. Thus, the vast majority of the time, we can safely say states conduct their routine foreign policy activity in a state of peace (or at least not in a state of war).

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Crises also are important because they serve as costly signals but have lower expected costs than fighting wars; securing a strong reputation through performance in a crisis yields tangible rewards at lower costs, so long as the crisis does not escalate to war. In other words, seeking to establish a strong reputation through winning a war amounts to naught if, at the conclusion of the successful war, one's military forces and economic infrastructure are damaged or ruined because of the war.[6] At the crisis level, the military and economic base of the participants are not threatened in the same way, although some crises do of course result in war.

If reputations can be built based on crisis performance, strong reputations result from successful crisis participation. By definition, reputations are public; reputation-building activity is observable to all the members of an audience, in this case, the other members of the international system. Members of the system can identify which states perform well in crises. Therefore, reputations are not necessarily built only to impress one particular actor, but to impress an audience. For example, as previously mentioned, Britain's strong stance and successful war in the Falklands/Malvinas could be observed by other states in the system besides Argentina. Most notably, Spain and China each had a special reason to observe Britain's reaction

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[6] While it is true that the empirical record shows that in the medium term, states recover from the destruction of war (Organski and Kugler 1980), the economic, social, and political upheavals that can follow a war are strong immediate, short-to-medium term costs. The leader(s) who start a war are likely to be removed from office (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992), and the generation that fights is likely to suffer immediate costs even if the country recovers from the ravages of war in the long run.

to Argentina's threat to a British possession, in light of their respective claims to Gibraltar and Hong Kong.

To recap, crisis is emphasized as a source of reputation because of the lower costs involved in managing crises than in fighting wars. During a crisis, leaders have the opportunity to send costly signals to other states in order to build their reputation as strong players, or as aggressive defenders of their interests. So as argued throughout this dissertation, a crisis is nearly the "perfect" costly signal: leaders show they are willing to risk war, but they are often means to get one's way without going to war and suffering potentially disastrous costs.

Spatial and Temporal Domain of the Data

Having defined the unit of investigation, I now turn to the data and operationalization of variables. The domain of the data is the entire population of states in the international system from 1918 to 1988 (inclusive) which have at any point in this time period had a population of 1 million or more. For example, Nicaragua reached a population of 1 million by 1948, so it is included for all years. The data thus consists of 6317 cases out of a possible 7000.[7] For these states, the data I use to gauge the dependent variable include all crises in the international system as defined by the ICB data set for the years 1918 through 1988 inclusively. In all, there

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[7] The Correlates of War project lists 7000 state-years from 1918-1988. I excluded states which never reached a population of 1 million at any point to be unencumbered by small island states such as Vanuatu and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. In total, less than 10% of all possible cases are excluded. The list of excluded states is found in APPENDIX A.

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are 377 international crises during these 71 years, and 926 crisis actors whose behavior I examine.

Data for empirical testing. For the first part of the empirical evaluation in Chapter Five, I examine the crisis activity of all the included states during 1918-1988 to evaluate **H 1**. The sample thus consists of 6317 cases for this portion of the study. In the second part of this chapter I evaluate **H 2**, which involves the differences between democracies and other states, so the crisis activity of democracies is compared to other types of states. There are 1642 observations of democratic state/years, and 4675 observations of non-democratic state/years. I operationalize 'democracy' later in the chapter.

Data for case studies. For Chapter Six, which deals with some of the interesting applications of the Diplomatic Reputation variable to the study of international conflict, a variety of states are selected to illustrate how the Diplomatic Reputation variable can be used.[8] Each country selected is part of my data set. In the section on Rivalries, the rival states were selected randomly from a sample population of rival dyads (see Chapter Six); otherwise, the selected states were chosen on the basis of their extra-ordinary characteristics, which warranted their further study. In sum, the selection criteria are explained when necessary in Chapter Six, but each is part of the data set.

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[8] I examine more closely the following states: Egypt, Israel, Greece, Turkey, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Africa, and Iraq.

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The Dependent Variable: Crisis Involvement

The phenomenon examined in this dissertation is how crisis activity manifests itself over time. I seek to explain this as a function of a state's diplomatic reputation; initially the leaders have incentives to increase crisis activity. Eventually these incentives decrease once they have earned a strong reputation. Crisis involvement for a state is operationalized in this dissertation as occurring when a state becomes a "crisis actor," or a "triggering entity."

Generally, this is not a problem. The majority of triggering entities become crisis actors at or near the onset of the crisis. However, as I have pointed out, some states that trigger crises for other states do not become crisis actors *per se*. Initially, I have no *a priori* theoretical reason to distinguish between states that initiate a crisis for another state and crisis actors, if the triggering entity does not become a crisis actor. This is because state leaders, in their effort to build a reputation, do not have to initiate a crisis. An evolving dispute may present the necessary opportunity for a state to join in with the intention of building its reputation; likewise, if a state is the target of a threatening action, it may decide to escalate the dispute into a full-fledged crisis with the same intention. In other words, since one can never be in control of every situation, one can use opportunities that avail themselves without necessarily being the instigator of the event. But a triggering entity that becomes a crisis actor is coded as 1 crisis participation.

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Explanatory Variable: Diplomatic Reputation

The principal independent variable in this study is diplomatic reputation. As previously mentioned, one of the major contributions of this dissertation to the field of international relations is that a measure of reputation is developed and evaluated as an explanatory variable for foreign policy activity. Reputations are important because of the information they convey.

The study of reputation is of growing importance in the economics literature, where the study of corporate strategy increasingly focuses on how reputations can help to build a competitive advantage. Insights from this field can help us operationalize and measure the reputation of states. Economists and specialists in business organizations have two major methods to measure the dollar value of the intangible good "reputation." One way is accomplished by calculating the excess market value of its securities, in other words, by calculating the difference between the liquidation value of a firm's total assets, and the total dollar value of the company's stocks (Fombrun 1996: 90-92). A firm having a good reputation will have a high stock price, and the value of all its stock will exceed its total assets.

A second way of calculating the monetary value of a firm's reputation is by assessing the value of its brand equity through the value of its royalty sales. In other words, for companies that manufacture a brand name product (*e.g.* Coke, Nike, Titleist), it is possible to ask how much a third party would have to pay to obtain the rights to use the name (Fombrun 1996: 90). Marketing consulting firms such as

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Interbrand perform this type of estimation, and the publication *Financial World* provides a yearly estimate of the brand equity of several well-known firms (*ibid.*: 91).

For individuals, there are also several ways in which one's "reputation" is measured. For most citizens, firms can estimate reputation through a credit check. The various credit bureaus are engaged in this type of exercise; namely, of quantifying reputation. For more well-known individuals such as athletes and movie stars, their "reputation" can be estimated from the value of the endorsements they are offered by product companies.

Clearly, reputation can be measured for firms and their brand name products, and for individuals. The major task here is to develop a measure of the reputation of nation-states that represents the net value of their past actions, good or bad. I have suggested that reputation is a function of foreign policy activity—more specifically, of crisis activity, due to the need for states to convey information to potential adversaries. Furthermore, reputation is a good that must be reacquired periodically. Thus, in addition to examining crisis behavior, there is a time frame to consider in any attempt to measure the reputation of states. As previously mentioned, leaders change, memory decays, and the relative capability of states changes. So what is the period in which reputations are expected to fluctuate?

As a starting point, Jervis (1976: 239) writes that leaders learn more from, and are influenced the most by, events which they experience firsthand. This brings up the idea of "generational cohorts" discussed in Chapter Three. A generational cohort may

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represent a time frame of approximately twenty to twenty-five years. Allan (1983) finds deductive-logical and empirical evidence to consider a twenty-year time frame as representing a leadership cycle.[9] Also, twenty years corresponds to empirical patterns of international processes uncovered by scholars such as Toynbee (1954)[10] and Singer (1972).

Also, based on the logic of the chain store game, it follows that a state's reputation is based on past performance as a "predator"; in this case, the measurable activity is the state's prior performance as a crisis actor. The more frequently a state is involved in crises, and the more crises that the state wins, the "stronger" the state's reputation. A "weak" state might be one seldom involved in crises, or a state that often loses international disputes. Finally, another component to take into account is whether a state's crisis involvements were severe, in the sense that something important was at stake, or at least whether the stakes were relatively high. A state that wins a few very severe crises might have a stronger reputation than a state which wins more disputes if they are essentially petty squabbles. For example, winning a crisis against a superpower should boost one's reputation more than winning a crisis against a small power. Therefore, a meaningful crisis-based measure of reputation might ideally include all these components: crisis involvement, outcomes, severity, and time decay.

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[9] At the upper extreme, Goertz and Diehl (1992a: 109) use a thirty-year time period to represent a "generation of leadership."

[10] Toynbee finds a 100 year cycle of global war, which has 5 phases, thus making 20 year "sub-cycles."

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The Measurement of Diplomatic Reputation

Based on the previous discussion, it is time to put the pieces of the model together. I propose a measure of diplomatic reputation that takes the following form:

$$\sum_{j,i=1}^{n_{ji}} (-1)^{V_{ji}}(.3338*\ln t_j)(S_j) \qquad [1]$$

Where:

n_{ji} = The number of crises j experienced by state i over the last 20 years, consistent with Jervis's (1976) argument that leaders learn most from events they experience firsthand, and empirical findings by Toynbee (1954), Singer (1972), and Allan (1983) that events tend to reoccur in twenty year cycles;

V_{ji} = Outcome of each crisis j for state i, where V= 1 if loss, 2 if victory.[11] This is an exponent, therefore countries that experience mostly victories will have a positive number when summed over all cases because of the (-1) constant, while frequent capitulators will have a negative value when summed over all cases;

t_j = Time of the crisis j where 20 years is the present, and 1 is 20 years ago; this is the discount parameter for a state's reputation over time, bounded to 20 years to correspond with the approximate length of a generation of citizens in major leadership

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[11] The variable Outcome for the ICB data set is recoded such that "victory" and "compromise" are coded 2, and "stalemate" and "loss" are coded as 1, to dichotomize the variable into "good" performance versus "bad" in crises. See the discussion on the importance of outcome further below.

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roles. The constant (.3338) makes the discount parameter ln t_j reach zero (0) at the

twenty year mark (see **Figure 3**, which depicts the functional form of the time decay);

$S_j =$ Severity of crisis j on a ten-point interval scale with 10 being the most severe;[12]

Thus, there are four components to the measure of diplomatic reputation: (1)

crisis frequency; (2) time; (3) the outcome of the crisis, that is, whether one side won

or lost; and (4) the severity of the crisis. I have already discussed the crisis frequency

and temporal component of the model, I now explain these last two components in

further detail.

The importance of outcome. The component "outcome" measures the effect

of winning *versus* losing a crisis. In the ICB data set, there are four possible outcomes

of crises: Victory, Compromise, Stalemate, and Defeat. Obviously, states that win

crises should be regarded differently from those that lose. Known winners probably

can deter other states from escalating. Since crisis is a strong signal that conveys

information, part of the information being conveyed embodies past *performance*

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[12] "Severity" represents a weighted linear combination of six indicators: Number of actors involved, level of superpower involvement, geographic location of the crisis, heterogeneity of the actors, issues at stake, and level of violence (Brecher and James 1986; Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988 Vol. 1). I discuss the importance of severity more comprehensively below.

TIME: Hypothetical Crisis Occuring in 1950

Figure 3. The Functional Form of the 20-Year Time Discount Parameter.

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in crises. Winners and losers are known as such to the others in the audience.[13] Their reputation should reflect their performance.

Is winning everything, though? Challengers could hypothetically build themselves reputations for pugnacity. Imagine a situation where a smaller but dissatisfied state takes on the regional or systemic *status quo* power.[14] The leader may engage in a crisis, lose, yet not be deterred from quarreling again. A recent example might be Iraq challenging the American-enforced *status quo* in the Gulf War of 1991, and afterwards. Apparently, Iraq was not afraid of challenging the United States on the issue of the Kurdish refugees, and violated the "no-fly zone" established over the 36th parallel. In sum, there are imaginable (and real-world) scenarios in which pugnacious reputations *could* develop without a state actually winning any crises. But to create an exceptional class of security-related reputation called "Quarrelsome States That Lose But Keep On Challenging" is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead,

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[13] Fearon (1994b: 264) argues that the exact outcome should not matter as much in building a reputation as the fact that a state involved itself in a crisis (with all the associated risks of war) in the first place, since "the fact that a state was willing to try resistance, even if it ultimately made concessions, reveals a higher willingness to use force on the issue than if the state had not resisted at all (and no crisis had occurred). In other words, regardless of the outcome, the fact that a past crisis occurred suggests that there is at least one issue on which both states have higher than normal values for conflict."

[14] For a discussion of dissatisfaction with the status quo, see Lemke (1993, 1995). Simply put, Lemke argues that a 'parvenu' state that grows in power eventually may reach parity with the dominant state (in a region, sub-region, or globally). This new power did not participated in the creation of the *status quo*, and may be dissatisfied with it if the *status quo* does not reflect the interests of the parvenu. The dissatisfied state, upon reaching power parity with the dominant state, is then in a position to challenge the *status quo*. An example is Germany reaching approximate parity with Britain in the late 19th/early 20th Century, and staking its claims as a new Great Power against a *status quo* developed by Britain and France. Eventually, Germany challenged the *status quo* powers in the two World Wars.

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I "split the difference." I maintain my contention that winning is better than losing. However, I recognize that escalating a dispute all the way to a crisis is an explicit costly signal. So I give "credit" to states that at least end the crisis in some type of compromise. Therefore, I dichotomize the "outcome" variable in the ICB dataset and recode it 2 for a "win", that is if the crisis ended in victory or compromise for state A, and 1 if the crisis ended in a "loss" or a "stalemate" for state A. Additionally, this coding is useful at this stage as I attempt to keep the model parsimonious.

The importance of severity. I have argued that crises are strong signals because they convey a willingness to bear costs. The riskier the behavior, the stronger the potential cost, the stronger the signal. Therefore, the more severe a crisis a state engages in, the costlier the signal. Crisis severity is a measure of the intensity of the disruptions caused by a crisis, originally developed by Brecher and James (1986). One crisis may have certain attributes or causes that make it more dangerous than others. Some of these crisis attributes include (1) the number of actors and whether any great powers were involved; (2) the level of involvement of the actors; (3) the geostrategic location of the crisis; (4) the probability of misperception due to the cultural differences between the actors; (5) the number and type of issues under dispute; and (6) the level of violence of the crisis.[15]

Brecher and James (1986) argue these six crisis attributes are related to the potential disruptions in the international system a crisis can bring. For example, they

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[15] For a full treatment and operationalization of these attributes, see Brecher and James 1986 and Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988, Vol. 1.

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argue that a crisis involving the two superpowers, which become actively involved, located in an important geostrategic location such as Europe or the Middle East, and in which several issues are under dispute has the potential for greater disruptions of the systemic *status quo* than a crisis involving two small South American states over one issue. Severity is measured as a weighted summation of these indicators, and then converted to a ten-point scale for ease of interpretation. I explain more fully the measurement of Severity in APPENDIX B, and I urge the readers to refer themselves to the appendix. In sum, severity represents a measure that approximates the autonomous risk of war inherent in each crisis; the higher the severity of a crisis (due to the actors, location, etc.), the higher the expected risk of war. Consequently, the greater the reputational effect.

Finally, I should note that Severity is not a ratio-scale variable. It takes on values from 1 to 10, with the higher number indicating a more disruptive crisis; but a crisis measuring 8 on this scale cannot be said to be twice as disruptive as a crisis measuring 4. However, this should not pose a measurement problem. Meteorologists and oceanographers can calculate the effects of an increase in one degree of temperature in their models, even though temperature expressed in degrees Fahrenheit or Celsius is not a ratio-scale measure; 80 F is not twice as warm as 40 F.

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Other Variables

Besides examining the reputation-building behavior of states and its effect on crisis involvement, I argue that the attributes of a state may also influence its reputation-building behavior. Specifically, democracies may build reputations in ways different from other types of states. Other attributes of states may also influence crisis activity and reputation. Theoretically relevant state attributes that may have effects on crisis activity include (1) regime type; (2) size in terms of power; and (3) regime age.

Regime type. I have postulated that democracies might exhibit a difference in their crisis activity. This is based on mounting evidence that there is something about democracies that causes them to act differently in the international arena. To begin with, democracies do not fight each other. As previously mentioned, there is very strong empirical evidence pointing to a "separate peace" among democracies. It is by now a *cliché*, but Levy (1988) writes that the nearest thing we have to a law of international politics is that democracies do not fight each other. So, although democracies do fight wars, they do not fight each other.

Second, there is also something about democracies that affects their chance of winning a conflict. Lake (1992) finds that democracies win wars they fight against autocracies much more often than the reverse, partly because they can marshall resources more efficiently. He argues this is because democracies have more legitimacy. Autocracies are more inefficient because they exhibit more rent seeking by the rulers. Finally, democratic attributes can even affect the escalatory process of

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conflict.   Eyerman and Hart (forthcoming) show that, presumably because democracies face higher audience costs, democratic states exhibit fewer escalatory phases in conflict.   Therefore, I expect that democracies also behave differently in their diplomatic reputation-building behavior.

The measure of democracy I use is known as the Ray Thresholds of Democracy (RTOD), developed by James Lee Ray (1993, 1995; see also Eyerman and Hart forthcoming).   RTOD is dichotomous, only considering a state to be democratic if

> the identities of the leaders of its executive branch and the
>
> membership in the national legislature are determined in
>
> competitive, fair elections...electoral systems are competitive
>
> and fair as long as they involve at least two formally
>
> independent political parties, confer suffrage on at least half the
>
> adult population, and produce at least one peaceful,
>
> constitutional transfer of power between opposing political
>
> parties, groups, factions, or coalitions (Ray 1995: 102).

Thus, the major components of RTOD are (1) competitive and fair elections, and (2) a record of peaceful transitions of power.

I use this definition because it is parsimonious, intuitive, and sufficiently inclusive that it identifies enough democracies that we can derive meaningful

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generalizations, yet restrictive enough that states which people do not normally think of as being democratic are not included. Most previous measures of democracy (such as Raymond Gastil's 1990 Freedom House measure; Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore's 1989 Polity II) are either "far too complex" or "so vague" (Ray 1995: 93-95) that they do not appear valid, and generally are difficult to work with, since they often are composite measures on a scale, and researchers arbitrarily assign a number on the scale to define which states are democratic. RTOD, by contrast, is easily understood and is intuitive; the components are the things we generally think of as making a state democratic. Thus, the measure of democracy used in this dissertation is not encumbered by complex components that other measures have, such as levels of executive constraints (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1989; Maoz and Russett 1993) or the number of political liberties and rights available to citizens (Gastil 1990). Finally, in addition to having strong face validity, RTOD also correlates highly with the more complicated measures of democracy. Eyerman and Hart (forthcoming) report that RTOD correlates with the Polity 3 (Jaggers and Gurr 1995) score of "8" (out of a possible 10) at the 0.74 level, and 0.82 with Freedom House's score of "5," two of the most widely used measures of democracy. In sum, RTOD possesses face validity because it is parsimonious and intuitive, and content validity because it correlates highly with other "established" measures.[16]

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[16] RTOD data were made available to me by Jim Ray and Joe Eyerman, for which I am grateful.

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Size and Power. The previous section explains that democracies are different in their conflict behavior; they engage in conflict, but they do so differently. Democracies do not fight each other, they win more often, and they exhibit fewer conflict phases of escalation. Is this an artifact of the fact that democracies are, for the most part, older, rich, European nations? Many non-democracies are smaller, poorer, and younger, having become independent only since WWII. Thus, a control for power and wealth is needed to insure that the expected difference in crisis behavior of democracies is not a statistical artifact of these nation's power.

It also is important to control for the size and power of states simply because as countries grow they impact on their neighbors. I do not necessarily mean that growth equals conflict; simply, that growth in size and power can introduce the opportunity for friction due to the aforementioned security dilemma caused by the anarchic structure of the international system. Since most of the international system's conflict behavior can be accounted for by a few states (Gochman and Maoz 1984), which happen to be powerful states, I expect powerful nations to be involved in most international crises. Either way, power is expected to affect crisis behavior, and therefore should be included as a control variable.

I control for power by introducing two variables. The first control is a "power" variable from the Correlates of War (COW) Project's "Composite Capabilities Index," which measures national power based on a combination of six measures that yields a country's share of the world power. These are: total population, urban population, size

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of the military, military expenditures, iron/steel production, and fuel consumption.[17] In sum, a country's world share of these six factors is averaged to come up with a country's share of world power. This measure is widely used as a measure of national power.[18]

The second control for size and power is for the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is a measure that indicates the value of the goods produced in a country—in other words, the country's wealth. Organski and Kugler (1980), Kugler and Arbetman (1989), and Lemke (1993) demonstrate that GNP[19] is an effective and efficient proxy that yields similar results to those obtained with other power measures (such as the COW measure discussed above).[20]

Therefore it can be argued that GDP is a superior measure because it is more parsimonious yet as effective as other measures. Unfortunately, GDP data are notoriously difficult to obtain for all but a few states, and for all but a few decades. In this dissertation, my domain is very large and extends backward to 1918. Gathering

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[17] See Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972). For a good discussion of measuring the national capabilities using the COW index and how power is related to conflict proneness, see Bremer (1980).

[18] See, for example, Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972); Bremer (1980); Bueno de Mesquita (1981); Kennedy (1987); Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992); Maoz and Russett (1993); and Hensel (1995), among others.

[19] Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Product (GNP) are closely related and correlate highly. The difference between the two measures is that GDP subtracts the net factor payments from abroad from the GNP. GDP is used in most studies because "of its greater availability" (Grennes 1984: 4).

[20] Using GDP data as a proxy for national power requires the assumption that power is fungible; in other words, that resources can be shifted from one use to another (for example, shifted from the production of consumer goods to the production of military weapons).

GDP data for the entire domain is well beyond the scope of this project. There is an available dataset that contains GDP data for most countries in the world as far back as 1950 called the Penn World Tables (PWT), by Robert Summers and Alan Heston (1991, updated 1995), with Daniel Nuxoll and Bettina Aten. This is the most useful data on GDP available because it expresses GDP in terms of purchasing power parity and all states' values are converted to U.S. dollars for ease of interpretation. In other words, GDP is not inflated by weak currencies because it is expressed in dollar amounts of what the currency can actually buy. Since I cannot control for GDP for the entire time period under study because data are not available, I use the COW power measure throughout the dissertation, and the PWT GDP data as a validity check after 1960 (when GDP for almost all the countries is available).

Regime Age. Here I introduce two variables in order to uncover potentially interesting crisis processes. The first is a measure of the age of the regime; the data span the years 1918-1988, yet over half the countries in existence today did not exist in 1918. I "trichotomize" the age of the states in the international system into "older" states in existence before World War One; "adolescent" states which were founded between 1918 and 1957; and "young states" that came into existence in the post-colonial era beginning in 1957.[21] Since I have discussed the importance of time

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[21] There are two reasons for my selection of these dates. First, it correlates with related regime age variables found in the ICB and COW data sets. Second, in historical terms, they make sense. The states in existence before WWI are older and established. These include most of Europe and the Americas. Their historical development and institutions are older and more established. The adolescent states were spun off from the two World Wars, and include many states in East and Southeast Asia, such as India, Pakistan, and the Koreas. They were the first to be de-colonized and have fairly established institutions. Finally, after Ghana

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in international relations, I expect a different pattern of crisis activity between older and newer states. For example, most large powers such as the United States, Britain, and France have existed the longest as independent states in the international system. I expect them to exhibit the most crisis activity, *ceteris paribus*. Also, younger states are expected to invest in their reputation in order to establish themselves as aggressive defenders of their interests. Therefore, I expect the following pattern: the inverted-U shaped pattern of crisis activity posited in **H-1** will apply to older states, since they have been in the system long enough to have had several "generations" of leaders with the incentive to engage in reputation-building behavior. By contrast, younger states in existence since the 1960s have not had time to have several generations of leaders in power since independence.

For example, Algeria won its independence in 1962 after a long (eight-year) war of independence against France. The various Algerian factions fighting for independence united under an umbrella group called the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) in 1956. After independence, the FLN became the single political party of Algeria. From 1962 to 1992 every Algerian president was a veteran of the War of Independence and an original member of the FLN. Therefore, in Algeria's crisis activity, there would be little manifestation of the domestic leaders' incentive to

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became independent in 1957, a decolonization wave began in Africa, with most African states winning independence in the following decade. These are very new states with less-established institutions. The age of a regime should affect the reputation-building behavior of states.

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build a reputation after the 1960s, since they all came from the same generation. I would not expect to see a clear cycle of crisis activity in such an instance.

Methodology

The exact procedures for the empirical tests are explained in further detail in the next chapter. But here I lay out the basic series of empirical tests for the major hypotheses.

The first step is to evaluate the general validity of the diplomatic reputation-building model. I mainly use descriptive statistics to this effect, such as figures of crisis activity over time. Similarly, in order to evaluate **H-1**, I examine frequency graphs of crisis activity over time to uncover the predicted "inverted-U" pattern of crisis activity. I present figures showing how crisis activity is distributed among the actors in the international system, and across time. Thus, the first part deals mostly with visual evidence and descriptive statistics.

Afterwards, I proceed with more complex analyses. I employ logistic regression to evaluate the probability that states with a high and/or low diplomatic reputations will become involved in future crises. I use logistic regression because my dependent variable--crisis--has a skewed distribution. In other words, most of the cases are clustered on the left hand side of a frequency histogram. Logistic regression is an appropriate statistical tool for this situation.

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Then, the second step is to evaluate **H-2**, which predicts a difference in the crisis activity of democracies compared to non-democracies. A similar set of tests are performed, but this time the effect of democracy is explicitly the focus of the new series. Additionally, I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to evaluate the impact of regime type on the formation of diplomatic reputation.

In sum, I use a variety of simpler descriptive statistics to evaluate the validity of the general model, and then more sophisticated regression techniques to evaluate the hypotheses.

Summary

In this chapter I discus the theoretical importance and the expected empirical role of crisis for diplomatic reputation-building. Then, I describe the spatial and temporal domain of the data. I then present the model, explain each of its components, and the variables and controls used to evaluated it.

Finally, I describe briefly the methods I use to evaluate the model. I now proceed with the examination of the data and the evaluation of the model.

CHAPTER 5

INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRISIS ACTIVITY

Crisis Activity in the Twentieth Century

Thus far, I have defined and discussed the concept of diplomatic reputation, and how I expect states to form reputations over time. In this chapter, I examine the crisis behavior of states in the international system for the period 1918-1988 using data from the International Crisis Behavior project. I show the patterns of crisis activity among states and apply the reputation-building model to actually measure the diplomatic reputations of states relative to each other.

States form reputations through their behavior during international crisis, because this type of public behavior is observable by the other states in the system, and because crises entail less potential costs in terms of casualties and resources than do wars. In other words, the cost-to-benefit ratio may be regarded as being higher from winning a crisis that stops short of war, since fewer resources are expended, while a diplomatic victory is achieved and observed by the other states in the system. Thus, to recap the discussion in Chapter Four, a state's diplomatic reputation is the

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sum of the number of crises won minus the number of crises lost, controlled for the level of severity of each crisis, over a period of one political generation, discounted for the elapsed time since each crisis.

To represent this notion in visual terms, I begin by discussing the patterns of crisis activity exhibited by individual states, and then by the international system, this century. Of course, it would be too time consuming to represent each state's crisis activity individually. In FIGURE 4, I graph the United States' crisis activity as a point of departure. Note that while the temporal domain of this study covers the years 1918 to 1988, the first crisis for the United States occurs only in 1929--a crisis with Haiti about US influence over that Caribbean nation (see Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988, Vol. 1: 145). The bar graph shows the US has been involved in 57 crises either as a crisis actor or triggering entity during the time period under consideration. There is only one clear pattern that emerges in this graph: most crises occur between 1944 and 1972. The two peak years of crisis activity occur in 1944 (when the US triggered four crises for Japan in the Pacific Theater of WWII) and 1961 (when President Kennedy also involved the US in four crises), seventeen years apart. Aside from these observations, in this case, there is no obvious inverted-U shaped function of crisis activity as expected in the discussion in Chapter Two.

Perhaps this is due to the particular situation of the United States, an artifact of its role as superpower and global hegemon in the Post-WWII era. To examine the

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
Figure 4. U.S. Crisis Activity, 1918-1988

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behavior of another state, I turn to France. FIGURE 5 shows a bar graph of crisis activity for France during 1918-1988, and here we clearly can see a reoccurring generational (operationalized as twenty years) pattern of crisis activity. There are obvious clusters of crisis activity occurring around the years 1920, 1938, 1958, and 1978, almost exactly twenty-year intervals. These clusters can be explained historically. The crises occurring around 1920 dealt with France's involvement in two Hungarian crises that resulted from the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and two crises with Germany over the Ruhr region;[1] eighteen years later, a series of crises occurred related to WWII. Then, twenty years after that, in the late 1950s and early 60s, France was mired in disputes in Southeast Asia (Laos and Vietnam) and North Africa (Tunisia and Egypt). Finally, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, France is involved in a series of crises with Libya over Chad. Nevertheless, these clusters of crises occur in twenty year cycles, consistent with the notion that leaders must reinvest in their nation's reputation every generation.

A similar pattern occurs for Turkey, a medium-sized state, as shown in FIGURE 6. While the cyclical pattern is not quite as obvious as it was for France, we nevertheless can see a cluster of crisis activity occurring around 1920, when

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[1] I will not present a detailed history of each crisis mentioned in this dissertation, as there are over 370 of these. For case studies for crises between 1929 and 1979, see Brecher, Wilkenfeld and Moser 1988 Vol. 1. Brecher and Wilkenfeld (forthcoming) are about to publish a comprehensive update of their 2-Volume set originally published in 1988. This new volume will cover the years 1918-1994, and will feature more crises and updated case studies and sources.

Figure 5. France's Crisis Activity, 1918-1988

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
Figure 6. Turkey's Crisis Activity, 1918-1988

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post-Ottoman Turkey is engaged in a struggle with Greece over Eastern Thrace; then another loose cluster centering around 1940 and World War II, and then another cluster around 1963 when troubles with Greece over the Cypriot question flared up. After that, four more crises occurred at seemingly random intervals in the 1970s and 80s—again with Greece. However, what I see is additional, albeit weaker, support for the idea of a cyclical function to crisis activity which is related to a generational time frame of twenty years.

Finally, in a fourth exhibit, I show that the pattern of crisis activity is similar for a small state, namely Thailand, in FIGURE 7. Small states generally have not been independent very long, and as a whole are less likely to be involved in international crises. But Thailand is independent for the entire period under study, and has been involved in seven crises. Even here we can see that Thailand's crisis activity tends to occur in twenty-year cycles, in 1940; around 1960; and then loosely around 1984. In summary, in a stratified non-random sample of four states, there is visual evidence that crisis activity occurs in cycles, at regular intervals of about twenty years, and thus lending face validity to a time factor to consider in modeling crisis behavior.

Diplomatic Reputation

Recall that reputation is a composite measure of three aspects of crisis activity: 1) performance; 2) severity; and 3) time. To recap, the reputation-building model is:

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
Figure 7: Thailand's Crisis Activity, 1918-1988

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$$\sum_{j,i=1}^{n_{ji}} (-1)^{V_{ji}}(.3338 * \ln t_j)(S_j) \tag{1}$$

Where:

n_{ji} = The number of crises j experienced by state i over the last 20 years,

V_{ji} = Outcome of each crisis j for state i, where V= 1 if loss, 2 if victory;

t_j = Time of the crisis j where 20 years is the present, and 1 is 20 years ago. The constant (.3338) makes the discount parameter $\ln t_j$ reach zero (0) at the twenty year mark;

S_j = Severity of crisis j on a ten-point interval scale with 10 being the most severe;

An example of this calculation is presented in APPENDIX C. Diplomatic Reputation is a measure of a state's resolve, credibility, and of commitment to its "national interests." In past actions, a state became involved in crises, and other states observed its behavior and the outcome of these crises. States that performed "well," that is, won the crises they were involved in, built a reputation as strong defenders of their interests. They sent strong and costly signals to others. Conversely, states that lost crises sent a different signal. Moreover, these signals are relative to the signals sent by other states in the system, so each state's diplomatic reputation is transformed to reflect this, using the standard Z-score transformation. Thus, a state's relative diplomatic reputation standing can easily be observed.

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So what does a diplomatic reputation look like? Traditionally, reputation was a word like "pornography;" hard to define in practice, but most knew it when they saw one. Powerful states, such as the UK or the former Soviet Union, were presumed to "have" a strong reputation. I have argued throughout this dissertation that reputations can be measured and compared, and used as predictors in crisis behavior models. FIGURES 8 through 12 show the diplomatic reputation scores for the four states whose crisis activity were graphed earlier, plus the USSR.

Figure 8 shows the United States' diplomatic reputation scores from 1918 to 1988. We see that the US reached its maximum diplomatic reputation in 1962. This coincides with a decline in overall crisis activity on the part of the US (see FIGURE 4), thus lending support to H 1; crisis activity increased until the US earned a strong diplomatic reputation, then decreased. Figures 9, 10, and 11 show the diplomatic reputations scores for France, Turkey, and Thailand for comparison. Note the true superpower status of the United States on the left-hand scale; the US scores up to 8 on a standardized scale, truly an outlyer. It is interesting to see what a security-based operationalization of a diplomatic reputation looks like on a graph.

For comparison, Figure 12 shows the diplomatic reputation graphs of the United States and the Soviet Union. The diplomatic reputation model appears to have face validity upon examination of these graphs.

Figure 8:   Diplomatic Reputation of the United States, 1918-1988

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
Figure 9: Diplomatic Reputation of France, 1918-1988

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
Figure 10. Diplomatic Reputation of Turkey, 1918-1988

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
Figure 11. Diplomatic Reputation of Thailand, 1918-1988

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
Figure 12. Diplomatic Reputation of the US and USSR, 1918-1988

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For example, we can see in Figure 12 that the United States generally had a weaker diplomatic reputation than the Soviet Union until WW II; after that, US prestige grew dramatically throughout the Cold War, as did the Soviet Union's, but to an even larger extent. Both superpowers then suffered a decline in the 1960s and 70s. Eventually in the late 70s, Soviet prestige grew while the United States' kept declining. The patterns on the graph are not surprising, considering that in the 1930s the US was in an isolationist period, while the Soviet Union under Stalin was quite active in expanding Soviet influence outside the Russian heartland. It is not surprising, therefore, that the USSR has a higher diplomatic reputation than the US. However, in the 1940s, the US became the most powerful country on earth as a result of World War II. This is reflected in the growth of US diplomatic reputation. The Soviet Union also was a victor in WWII, and its diplomatic reputation also grew.

Finally, we can observe from the graph that US prestige declined starting in the 1970s, presumably due to Vietnam and a series of Soviet bloc victories in Angola and Afghanistan; these losses for the US are gains for the Soviet Union. Additionally, the US became involved in various imbroglia in Central America. By 1988, Soviet and American diplomatic prestige seemed about equal, which is not surprising considering the *rapprochement* that occurred between the two superpowers after the rise of Michael Gorbachev in 1985 and the three summits between him and President Reagan.

A second feature of FIGURE 12 that strengthens the model's face validity is the normalized diplomatic reputation score of the two superpowers during the time

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period under study. As discussed above, the raw diplomatic reputation scores of all states in the system are normalized every year. Notice that the normalized diplomatic reputation scores for the superpowers are very high--attaining outlying Z-scores of 8 for the US and 4 for the USSR in the 1960s--thus reflecting their *super*power status relative to the other states in the system.

In summary, I am confident the following analyses of crisis activity using the reputation-building model are valid based on the graphic evidence discussed so far; diplomatic reputation contains face validity, and I now proceed to more detailed examinations of crisis behavior.

Diplomatic Reputation of More Countries

To show graphs of the diplomatic reputation of all states in the international system would be uninteresting; many states have few or no crises, and many have existed only for short periods of time. In this section, I concentrate on a few key states that are of interest if only because they, along with the superpowers, are involved in the majority of the system's crises, and because they are, or have been, international Great Powers. Therefore, I selected Great Britain, Germany, China, and Japan to look at their diplomatic reputation over time, and contrast them with the very different graphs of Brazil and Canada.[2]

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[2] Other states of interest are examined in the following Chapter: Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Africa, and Iraq.

Britain and Germany. This pair of states is of natural interest in light of the rivalry that existed until World War II. Twice this century, Germany challenged the largely British-imposed international *status quo* by starting global wars. We know that after German Unification in 1871, Germany's power grew until it rivaled that of Britain as early as 1905, then surpassed it.[3] Germany nearly succeeded in both its World War objectives, stopped only by overwhelming coalitions eventually formed against it. So how did these two European rivals compare in terms of Diplomatic Reputation? FIGURE 13 shows British-German diplomatic reputation scores.

The first general observation is that, as expected, in the 1920s, Britain built a stronger reputation than Germany, unsurprisingly since the latter recently had lost World War I and was then embroiled in serious domestic problems, and was consequently hardly concerned with foreign adventures. After 1933, however, we see that Hitlerian Germany built a stronger diplomatic reputation, especially after 1938, reflecting Germany's diplomatic victories in the Munich and Anschluss crises, and the pre-WWII Danzig and Memelland crises. These diplomatic victories were gained at Britain's expense, and we see the latter's reputation falling relative to Germany's.

The graph thus clearly shows Germany's reputational rise from 1936 to 1942, which corresponds to the historical record. Then, beginning with Hitler's losing

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[3] According to the COW Composite Capabilities Index, Germany and Britain were equal in power in 1905, and by 1910 Germany was substantially more powerful; also, Organski and Kugler (1980) report that by 1914 the ratio of German-to-British GNP was 1.10. Thus, by WWI, Germany had surpassed Britain in both measures of power.

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4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

-4

Diplomatic Reputation score

KEY

Ger.

W.Ger.

UK

1918   1928   1938   1948   1958   1968   1978   1988
    1923   1933   1943   1953   1963   1973   1983

Year

NOTES: (1) Germany 'drops out' of the international system from 1946-54

(2) West Germany is considered Germany's 'successor state' after WWII.

Figure 13:   Britain's and Germany's Diplomatic Reputation, 1918-1988.

gamble to invade the Soviet Union (Barbarossa), Germany's decline is shown. Conversely, Britain's rise occurred beginning with its diplomatic victory in the Battle of Britain. By 1945, Britain was 2 standard deviations above Germany in diplomatic reputation.

After World War II, Britain's prestige declined proportionately with the United States' rise. As a matter of fact, 1947 traditionally marks the 'official' passing of the torch from British to American world hegemony, when Britain washed its hands of any involvement during the Greek Civil War. And we see that is somewhat precisely in FIGURE 13, as British prestige declines, reaching a low point in 1967, then rising as a result of strong stances against Iceland, Guatemala, and Argentina in the 1970s and 80s.

During this post-World War Two period, Germany was not very involved in international affairs, so its diplomatic reputation is fairly low, hovering at about -0.5. Its only crises after WWII were in 1958 and 1961, over the division of Berlin. In summary, a quick examination of British and German diplomatic reputation shows that the model does have face validity, as the graphs correlate nicely with the historical record. To show additional evidence of the model's validity, I examine a second pair of important states, China and Japan.

China and Japan. FIGURE 14 shows these two Asian powers' diplomatic reputations. The results also look encouraging and offer further support for the model's validity.

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Figure 14: China's and Japan's Diplomatic Reputation, 1918-1988

NOTE: Japan 'drops out' of the international system from 1946-52 during
U.S. occupation.

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Both countries had the same diplomatic reputation for the first ten years of the period under study. However, in 1932, after Japan assumed control of Manchuria followed by growing Japanese control of China, Japan's reputation grew at the expense of China's. We see that Japan remained very strong diplomatically—about 2.0 to 3.0—until it began losing the Pacific War to the United States beginning in 1943. After World War II, Japan had no international crises. Its very low reputation in the 1950s (at -1.5) reflects the lingering effects of its loss of WWII and subsequent occupation by the US. Then, by 1963 the effect of time attenuates this, and Japan's reputation remains steady, and relatively weak.

China, on the other hand, increased its reputation after WWII, and climbed steadily until about 1968; after that China lost a crisis against the USSR in 1969 (Ussuri River), and had a mixed record against Vietnam in two Sino-Vietnam crises (1978 and 1984), to lose another crisis in 1988 over the Spratly Islands.

Again, the point here was not to offer a detailed case study of every country's crises. My intention was to demonstrate what a diplomatic reputation 'looks like,' in order to convince the reader that the model has face validity. Not only is the measure logical, but it also captures the 'real world.' In sum, I showed what diplomatic reputations looked like for the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, Germany, China, and Japan. These states have had many crises each, and they were (and still are) powerful and important actors in the international system. Some may object and ask

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what a diplomatic reputation looks like for small and/or weak states that have fought few or no crises.

Brazil and Canada. As a final set of examples, I offer in FIGURE 15 the diplomatic reputation scores of Canada and Brazil. The former was involved only in two WWII-related crises, and the latter has no ICB crises on record. Both were independent sovereign states for the entire time period under study.

The graph shows that Canada earned a strong reputation as a result of its participation on the winning side of WWII. The ICB data set codes, objectionably perhaps, the Allies as the victors in the Entry into WWII crisis, so Canada benefited from its strong support of Britain and its active participation in WWII. The effect of this earned reputation diminished with time, until by 1963 its security-related diplomatic reputation was the same as Brazil, at about -0.2. The solid line oscillates, since diplomatic reputation is recalculated for every year; in some years the systemic crisis activity differs, such as between 1920 and 1935 (where there were few international crises) and 1938 to 1945 (when there were many). This is why my model really captures systemic crisis activity and its effect on states' diplomatic reputations.

Having thus explored the actual diplomatic reputations of selected states, I now turn to explicitly evaluating the hypotheses set forth in Chapter Two.

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
NOTE: except for the 'hump' for Canada, Canada and Brazil have the same diplomatic reputation scores throughout the series.

Figure 15:   Brazil's and Canada's Diplomatic Reputation, 1918-1988

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H-1: Diplomatic Reputation as a Predictor of Future Crisis Activity

Crisis participation. H-1 predicts that states with higher diplomatic reputations should experience less crisis activity in the future, and specifically, should initiate fewer crises because of the decreasing incentive for them to do so. I begin the empirical evaluation of these expectations in order.

Here, I examine the effect of diplomatic reputation on future crisis activity *in general*. It seemed logical, and consistent with the Chain Store Paradox analogy alluded to in Chapter Three, that states' diplomatic reputation would manifest itself mainly by the frequency of crisis initiation--predatory behavior. However, I explained that while states cannot control who initiates a dispute with them, they can control their responses to provocation. If leaders feel the need to establish their reputation for resolve, they can take advantage of the *opportunity* of a crisis to escalate and take a tough stance. This is why I chose not to confine my analysis to crisis initiations only. Therefore, in this section, I am interested in repeating the analysis performed above, but now examining the effect of a state's diplomatic reputation on becoming involved in a future crisis *in general*.

Logistic regression is used in these series of models since the dependent variable is whether a state is involved in a crisis in a given year. Thus, I can measure the marginal impact of my independent variables on the probability that a state will become involved in a future crisis, so my primary independent variable--diplomatic reputation--is lagged. The results of four models are presented in TABLE 1.

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Model 1 measures the probability of crisis participation. Here, because of the greater number of data points, all the variables are significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. It is also important to keep in mind the "baseline" probabilities for the models; they generally hover around .10. There are three important results. First, it seems that the higher the diplomatic reputation, the higher the probability of becoming involved in a crisis; the coefficient is positive. This is contrary to expectations, even if the independent marginal impact is weak. Second, democracies are much less likely to become involved in a crisis; 30% less likely (from 10% to 7%), the coefficient being in the anticipated negative direction. Finally, old states and young states are less likely to become involved in a crisis than the excluded category of medium states.

Model 2 is the same model, but substitutes GDP per capita as a measure for wealth or power. The coefficient for GDP is *negative*, suggesting that the higher the GDP, the less likely the country will become involved in a crisis. But the coefficient is not statistically significant ($p < 0.56$). All the other coefficients are highly significant, and all in the same direction as in Model 1: lagged diplomatic reputation is positive, and democracy, old states, and young states' coefficients are negative and the marginal impacts are all very significant, decreasing the probability of crisis involvement by 4%, 7%, and 6%, respectively. Therefore, while these results seem robust because they checked out against another measure of power (GDP), the measure for power itself did not check out. In the future, I will do the analyses using

the COW CCI only.[4] But the results are even more robust considering that GDP is available since 1950 for advanced industrialized states, and 1960 for most others; therefore, Model 2 was in reality a post-1950 model. Since all the coefficients held their significance and direction, I am confident in the internal validity of the model, and can proceed with greater confidence.

Model 3 is an attempt to isolate the USA and some of the other internationally active democratic states such as Britain and France. Here, to the "full" model is added an interactive term, "Old*Democracy." The results are very interesting indeed. Once again, the effect of lagged diplomatic reputation on the probability of crisis involvement is positive, contrary to expectations. And again, the marginal effect for young states is negative, and about the same magnitude as in the other models. However, we see that the new interactive term greatly affects the effects of Democracy and Old. The added effects of the coefficients for democracy, old, and old*democracy are negative overall. The marginal independent impact of being democratic on crisis activity now becomes -6%; that's an effect in the order of -63% on the baseline probability.

However, this important independent effect is washed out if one is an Old-Democracy, such as the USA, France, and Britain, since the marginal effect of being Old is -10%, and the combined effect of being an Old Democracy now is +16%. Thus, the cumulative effect washes out for old democracies such as Britain.

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[4] I ran successive models using GDP, and none were significant. Also, since GDP only is available for most countries since 1960, many data points were lost.

It is important to consider that I am comparing these categories of states to the *excluded* categories. So, for example, Britain's chances of being involved in a crisis in a given year is about 12% (adding up the independent effects of the coefficients which apply to Britain), while a generic, young, non-democracy with an average diplomatic reputation of 0 would have a diplomatic reputation of about 5.5%. For a young democracy with an average diplomatic reputation score, the chances tend to 0%. In sum, in adding the independent marginal effects of the coefficients, keep in mind the excluded categories.

The implications are that democracies appear to have something different in their crisis behavior, unless they are among the older, established democracies. Furthermore, these results hold very well for **Model 4**, which is the same model as Model 3, but with the USSR and USA excluded. As we can see, the coefficients and their marginal impacts remain virtually the same, and all are significant at $p<0.05$ or better. The only important change is for the Power coefficient; when the USA and USSR are excluded from the analysis, it appears that one's Power greatly affects the probability of crisis involvement, since the marginal impact is 4% (out of a baseline probability of 8.8%).

In summary, the most important finding here is that the effect of a lagged diplomatic reputation is contrary to the original expectation. I hypothesized that states with higher diplomatic reputations would be *less* likely to become involved in a crisis; here, I find that a high diplomatic reputation *increases* the likelihood of crisis

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TABLE 1

RESULTS OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR CRISIS PARTICIPATION

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4 (US+USSR excl)
Constant	-1.70***	-1.48***	-1.60***	-1.64***
Lagged Dip. Rep.	0.11*** (0.01)	0.32*** (0.034)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.09** (0.006)
Power	12.55*** (.002)		12.42*** (.002)	20.50*** (0.04)
GDP per capita		-0.000012 (-0.004)		
Democracy (RTOD)	-0.45*** (-0.03)	-0.51*** (-0.04)	-1.24*** (-0.06)	-1.28*** (-0.06)
Old	-0.61*** (-0.07)	-0.61*** (-0.07)	-0.78*** (-0.10)	-0.89*** (-0.10)
Old*Democracy			1.03*** (0.16)	1.20*** (0.16)
Young	-0.67*** (-0.05)	-0.83*** (-0.06)	-0.75*** (-0.04)	-0.71*** (-0.04)
N	6196	3597	6196	6056
Model X^2	271.66***	94.49***	288.03***	210.68***
d.f.	5	5	6	6
baseline probability	.10	.106	.095	.088

*** = p<.01; **=p<.05

NOTE: Values in parentheses represent the change in the probability of the dependent variable taking on a value of 1 given a one-unit change in the independent variable, holding the others constant at their means (or modes).

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participation. Perhaps there is some sort of "momentum" effect, or the lag was not long enough. Further investigations should examine these possibilities.

I did, however, find that the effect of being democratic does lower the overall likelihood of becoming involved in a crisis. This relationship will be explored later, but now I evaluate another prediction within H-1, that states with high diplomatic reputations should initiate fewer crises.

Crisis initiation. In this evaluation, logistic regression is used to evaluate the probability that a state will initiate a crisis in a given year. I use two models in this first regression, a "naive" model, where only two covariates are used, and a full model, where the controls discussed in Chapter Four are included. The "naive" model builds on the previous section. I use only the lagged diplomatic reputation score, and the COW power indicator as a control.

TABLE 2 shows the results of the logistic regressions for crisis initiation. As previously mentioned, logistic regression is the appropriate technique in this case since the dependent variable is dichotomous, and we can look at the marginal impact of our covariates on the probability that the dependent variable will take a value of one--that is, crisis initiation in a given year. It is important to note that the "baseline" probability that *any* state will initiate a crisis in a given year is about 4.5% for the data set as a whole (284 crises for 6317 observations), and about 3.7% for the logistic regression models, the difference being attributable to the fact that the logistic model has control variables. It is important to keep this in mind since the marginal impact of

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the covariates may seem small, but, for example, a marginal impact of -.01 in our case would represent a large negative change in the probability of crisis initiation, in the order of about a 27 percent *decrease* in the probability that a state would initiate a crisis, from the logit baseline probability (from 3.7% to 2.7%= -27%).

With that caveat in mind, we can see in Model 1, TABLE 2, that the coefficient for Lagged Diplomatic Reputation is negative, the anticipated direction, but not significant at the conventional standard of $p<.05$. The marginal impact for a one standard deviation change in diplomatic reputation on crisis initiation is -.003, not very large. Diplomatic Reputation does seem to affect, very slightly, the probability that a state will initiate a crisis, but not very significantly ($p<.15$). In other words, there seems to be no support for H-1a and H-1b given the evidence so far.

The Full Model shows a similar story. The marginal effect of lagged diplomatic reputation is very strong, decreasing the probability of initiating a crisis by 55%, from 3.6% to 1.6%; but it is not statistically significant ($p<.38$).

The control variables for democracy, power, and regime age are included, and all are significant at the $p<.01$ level. The variable for democracy is in an anticipated direction, negative, but the marginal effect is not very strong (-.002). The effect of regime age is interesting. It seems that older states are less likely to initiate a crisis, but not very much less (-.002), and the younger states (those independent after 1957) are *much less likely* to initiate a crisis (-.025, and sig. $p<.01$) than the baseline. A word on this: the excluded regime age is the medium states, so the other states compare

TABLE 2

RESULTS OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR CRISIS INITIATION

Variable	Model 1	Full Model
Constant	-3.38***	-2.61***
Lagged Dip. Rep.	-0.08*	-0.05
	(-0.003)	(-0.02)
Power	11.37***	13.36***
	(0.01)	(0.016)
Democracy (RTOD)		-0.8***
		(-0.002)
Old		-0.82***
		(-0.002)
Young		-1.19***
		(-0.025)
N	6196	6196
Model X^2	81.57***	143.02***
d.f.	2	5
Baseline Probability	0.037	0.036

*** = $p<0.01$; *=$p<.15$

NOTE: Values in parentheses are first differences, representing the change in the probability of the dependent variable taking on a value of 1 given a one-unit change in the independent variable, holding the others constant at their means (or modes).

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themselves to this category. Thus, medium-aged states (gained independence between 1918-1956) seem the most likely to initiate a crisis.

To see why there was a weak but statistically not significant result for crisis initiation, I finally create a simple table, TABLE 3, showing international crisis initiation by diplomatic reputation score. Of the 270 international crises initiated by a state, only 51% were initiated by a state with a weak diplomatic reputation score (below zero). Thus, there is a difference, but it is very marginal and not statistically significant.

In sum, in this section, I found no support for H-1. It appears that states with a negative diplomatic reputation are only slightly less likely to initiate crises than states with a positive diplomatic reputation. At the crisis involvement level, it appears that a higher diplomatic reputation is positively associated with the probability of crisis involvement, contrary to expectations. However, there was a consistent finding that relates to the second general hypothesis: I consistently found that the crisis behavior of democracies was different. What is this difference, and how is it observable in different respects is the topic of the next section.

H-2: Diplomatic Reputation and Regime Type

One enduring proposition of international relations concerns the "Second Image" hypothesis (Waltz 1959): the internal structure of a state is said to affect its

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TABLE 3

DIPLOMATIC REPUTATION (LAGGED) BY CRISIS INITIATION

Triggering Entity's Diplomatic Reputation	Total
Trigent's Dip. Rep. > 0 (positive dip. rep.)	132 (.49)
Trigent's Dip. Rep. < 0 (negative dip. rep.)	138 (.51)
TOTAL	270

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foreign policy proclivities. For example, democratic states accord suffrage to their citizens and protect their civil rights, and have developed domestic institutions to resolve political conflict peacefully. Therefore, it may be argued, democratic norms and structures, working interdependently, may "cause" democratic states to be more "peaceful" and consensual in their foreign relations policy than autocratic states, which are not beholden to electors, and thus face lower domestic audience costs. This argument is as old as Aristotle, who was perhaps the first to propose the idea that the domestic structure of a state affects its domestic and foreign policy.[5] This argument was made twenty centuries later by Kant, and by scores of intellectuals since, including James Rosenau (1961) in his famous "Pre-Theory" of foreign policy behavior.[6]

Thus, because democracies may face greater domestic audience costs (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992; Fearon 1994; Eyerman and Hart *forthcoming*), democracies encounter a constrained maximization problem whereby they have the same incentives to establish reputations, but risk more each time a crisis is entered into. Furthermore, I proposed that since we know that democracies tend to win the wars in which they are involved (Lake 1992), combined with the constrained

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[5] Recall that Aristotle, perhaps the first empirical political scientist, proposed a 3x2 table of "Who rules" (One, Few, Many), and in "Whose Interest" (in the interest of the Few, of the Many). Aristotle proposed that the "best" forms of government, based on his study of over 100 Greek city-states' constitutions, were *aristocracies* (few elites ruling in the general interest) and *polities* (many rulers ruling in the general interest).

[6] Recall (Chapter Three) that Rosenau (1961) argues that three of the most important determinants of foreign policy behavior are (1) the size of the state; (2) its level of economic development or wealth; and (3) its domestic political system--whether it is "open" or "closed."

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maximization problem, I expect that democracies will reach higher diplomatic reputation in fewer crises, and/or in fewer years, than their non-democratic counterparts (see FIGURE 2, Chapter 2). This forms the basis of the second general hypothesis.

To test **H-2**, I proceed from two directions. First, I use simple descriptive statistics to compare the reputation-building behavior of democracies and non-democracies. Then I use OLS regression to assess any impact the variable Democracy has on the dependent variable Diplomatic Reputation, controlling for a state's size and power.

Descriptive statistics. In this section, I break down the 6317 observations in my data set into democracies and non-democracies, according to Ray's Threshold of Democracy (RTOD; Ray 1995—see Chapter Four). In TABLE 4, I report the statisticson the differences in crisis behavior between these two groups. As we can see, **H-2** is partially supported by the data: on average, democracies do have higher Diplomatic Reputation scores than non-democracies. I show both the raw measure and the standardized Z-score measure of Diplomatic Reputation for comparison. Democracies score 1.98 (raw) and 0.27 (Z) higher than non-democracies, with a pooled standard deviation of 7.74 and 0.98, respectively. The difference in means is significant at the $p<0.1$ level. In other words, if we assume *a priori* that there is no

TABLE 4

COMPARISON OF CRISIS ACTIVITY BETWEEN DEMOCRACIES

AND NON-DEMOCRACIES

	Mean Raw Diplomatic Reputation (s.d.)	Mean Diplomatic Reputation (Z) (s.d.)	Mean Number of Crises (s.d.)	Total number of Foreign Policy Crises
Democracies n=1662	**2.59** (10.77)	**0.2** (1.35)	**0.14** (.49)	**232** **(238 exp)**
Non-democracies n=4655	**0.61** (6.32)	**-0.07** (0.82)	**0.15** (.45)	**684** **(678 exp)**
Total **Difference** (pooled s.d.) Student's t-score signif. (1 d.f.)	**1.98** (7.74) 4.48 p<0.1	**0.27** (0.98) 5.05 p<0.1	**0.01** (0.45) 0.39 (not significant)	**916** **6** $(X^2_{1 d.f.} = 0.2)$ (not significant)

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difference between the two, than the chances that these two scores come from a representative sampling population is less than 10 percent. Or put the other way, I am 90 percent sure that these means are different.

TABLE 4 does not strongly support the second part of H-2, which states that democracies will also have fewer crisis involvements due to their higher domestic audience costs. On average, democracies do become involved in fewer crises--6 less than would be expected given their proportion of the population of events--but the difference is not significant, with a chi-square of only 0.2 for 1 degree of freedom.

Further testing. While the descriptive statistics show some support for **H-2**, a more powerful test is required to ascertain the true effect of democracy on foreign policy behavior--in this case, on foreign policy activity operationalized as Diplomatic Reputation. In this section, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to measure democracy's impact on Diplomatic Reputation, controlling for other features of states that might account for some of the variation in crisis activity, such as size and power (see Chapter Four). The model I evaluate takes the following form:

$$\text{Diplomatic Reputation}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Democracy}_i + \beta_2 \text{ Power}_i + \beta_3 \text{ Age}_i + e_i \qquad [2]$$

Where:

Democracy$_i$ = A dichotomous variable scored 1 if a state i reaches Ray's

Thresholds of Democracy (RTOD);

Power$_i$ = State i's Composite Capabilities Index from the Correlates of War

 (COW) project (Singer, Bremer, Stuckey 1969);

Age$_i$ = Age of State i (see Chapter Four);

e_i = Stochastic error term.

I can confidently use OLS regression, since there is no *a priori* reason to believe that the model violates any of the Gauss-Markov assumptions; indeed, standard diagnostic tests show no obvious problems of correlation among the independent variables; furthermore, the dependent variable, diplomatic reputation, has a good variance and is not serially correlated with any of the variables.

I show the results of the OLS regression in TABLE 5. We see in **Model 1** that the coefficients for the variables Democracy and Power are in the anticipated direction and are both highly significant. It appears that democracies--states coded 1 for this dummy variable--have a Diplomatic Reputation score of 0.18 (Z) higher than non-democracies, all else held constant; a result similar to the 0.27 difference reported in Table 5 Also, and logically, it appears that for every percent increase in the COW Composite Capabilities Index, a state increases its Diplomatic Reputation by 0.1252 (Z). This is not immediately apparent upon examination of the coefficient for the variable Power, but this is because the COW power index is based on a percent share of 1, the unit being the total world power; therefore we have to divide by 100 to get a percent increase.

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TABLE 5

OLS REGRESSION: EFFECT OF DEMOCRACY ON

DIPLOMATIC REPUTATION

Variables	Model 1 Coefficient (t-ratio)	Model 2 (US+USSR excl) Coefficient (t-ratio)
Democracy	**0.18** **(6.72)**[***]	**0.14** **(5.92)**[***]
Power	**12.52** **(36.07)**[***]	**6.71** **(11.49)**[***]
Age	**-0.11** **(-7.19)**[***]	**-0.09** **(-6.58)**[***]
Constant	**0.06**[***]	**0.07**[***]
N	6219	6171
F	472.01[***]	62.19[***]
Adj.R^2	0.183	0.17
[***] = $p<0.01$		

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The coefficient for Age is interesting; it would appear that older countries have a lower diplomatic reputation score. This is counterintuitive, since eight out of the ten states with the highest Diplomatic Reputation scores are "old" states, coded 3 (the "higher" value). Thus, perhaps these is a non-linear effect at play, *i.e.*, a curvilinear effect, especially considering the findings in the logistic regressions earlier, where I "trichotomize" age into three different dummy variables. In sum, this first OLS result shows that democracies have higher diplomatic reputation scores than non-democracies. Once again, to check whether the superpowers might be affecting the results, I re-ran the model excluding the superpowers in **Model 2**. All the coefficients retain a high level of significance ($p<0.01$), the model remains highly significant ($F=62.19$; $p<0.001$), and all the coefficients are in the same direction as in Model 1. I am confident that democracies do have a higher diplomatic reputation than their non-democratic counterparts.

As previously mentioned, I found that the Age coefficient was probably misspecified, given the way I modeled this in the logistic regressions earlier. Thus, I re-ran the model, including an Old*Democratic interactive term, and the age term as a series of dichotomous variables as in the logistic regressions.

We see here that something interesting happens to Democracies and Old states: again, the coefficient for Democracy is positive and significant at the $p<0.05$ level. However, the coefficient for Old states is negative (and significant at the $p<0.01$ level), while the coefficient for Old*Democracy is positive and significant (at the

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p<0.1 level). Therefore, it appears that older states have lower diplomatic reputations scores (not surprising, considering they are less likely to become involved in a crisis in a given year), but older democracies have significantly lower average diplomatic reputation scores. Once again, no matter how it is modeled, democracies have higher diplomatic reputation scores until an age control variable is introduced.

But how are democracies in general gaining a higher diplomatic reputation with less crisis involvements? If this is the case, it follows that--*ipso facto*--democracies tend to win the crises in which they become involved, and escalate them to a higher severity. The logic is that Diplomatic Reputation is a function of crisis activity, *outcome, and severity.* Thus, upon closer examination, we should see democracies escalating crises to higher levels of severity, and winning more crises than non-democracies. In other words, if the frequency of crisis activity is that same, then democracies are winning more severe crises in order to have the higher average Diplomatic Reputation score.

Indeed, TABLE 7 is a cross-tabulation of Democracy and Crisis Outcome, using the crisis-level data set of 270 initiators of international crises. We can see that Democracies not only *initiate* far fewer crises than would be expected given their proportion in the population of events, but they are also much more likely to *win* the crises they initiate. Indeed, 52 crises (19%) of the crises were initiated by democracies, while we would expect 70 (26%). This difference is significant at the

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TABLE 6

OLS REGRESSION WITH OLD*DEMOCRACY INTERACTION

Variables	Coefficient (t-ratio)	Significance
Democracy	0.10 (1.96)	p<0.05
Power	12.50 (35.97)	p<0.01
Young	0.63 (1.68)	p<0.10
Old	-1.61 (-4.99)	p<0.01
Old*Democracy	0.10 (1.68)	p<0.10
Constant (Medium)	-0.10	p<0.01
N	6219	
F	284.02	
(Sig.)	(p<0.001)	
Adj.R²	0.184	

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p<0.05 level (X^2=6.25, 1 d.f.).[7] But democracies win an overwhelming 71% of the crises they do initiate. The odds ratio that a state will win a crisis that it triggers, given it is democratic, is 2.61. These are robust findings.

In TABLE 8, I show the mean severity scores of crises between democracies and non-democracies. We see that democracies score almost one full mean level of severity higher than non-democracies (5.16 *versus* 4.20), and this difference is statistically significant at the p<0.05 level.

Thus, so far, we have seen that first, democracies generally have a statistically significantly higher diplomatic reputation than non-democracies (at the 90% confidence level). Second, while democracies participate in crises at about the same rate as non-democracies, they are far less likely to initiate a crisis; and if they do, they are more than twice as likely to win these crises--2.61 times more likely to win.

Summary of the Empirical Findings

The findings reported in this chapter mixed, yet encouraging. I can say that H-1 received no support, while H-2 received some strong support. Here is a summary of the hypotheses presented in Chapter Two, and the empirical results I found that supports them:

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[7] The Chi-square statistic calculated here is based on a naive model that the events are distributed equally according to their proportion of the observations. It is a simple test of independence, but it is robust.

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TABLE 7

CROSSTAB OF DEMOCRACIES AND CRISIS INITIATION

Regime type	Initiator Loses	Initiator Wins	Row Totals
Democracy	**15** (35 exp.)	**37** (35 exp.)	**52** **(70 exp)**
Non-Democracy	**112** (100 exp.)	**106** (100 exp.)	**218** **(200 exp)**
TOTALS	127 (135 exp.)	143 (135 exp.)	270 $X^2_{1\,df}= 6.25$ **(sig. p<0.05)**

Note: The expected cell frequencies were calculated based on the proportion of the observations in the data set, and on the naive expectation than victories (wins) and defeats (losses) are distributed evenly, 50-50.

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TABLE 8

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND CRISIS SEVERITY

Regime Type	Mean Severity of Crises (stand. dev.)
Democracy n = 225	**5.16** (2.07)
Non-democracy n = 601	**4.20** (1.77)
difference pooled s.d. Student's T-score significance	**0.96** 1.86 6.61 p<0.05

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1. Hypothesis H-1 As stated in Chapter Two: The crisis activity of states will increase as leaders invest in efforts to build a "strong" reputation; subsequently, crisis activity will decline in frequency after states develop a "strong" reputation. I expect an "inverted U" shaped function to crisis activity.

A. Testable hypothesis H-1a: As Diplomatic Reputation increases, and approaches a local maxima, the probability of future crisis activity decreases following a Bayesian update scenario; and more specifically, states with strong diplomatic reputations should *initiate* fewer crises because of the diminishing marginal utility of doing so.

B. Testable hypothesis H-1b: Conversely, as Diplomatic Reputation decreases and approaches a local minima, the probability of future crisis activity increases; they should *initiate* more future crises because of the incentive to build a strong reputation.

Here, the results do not support half the predictions. I find the "inverted-U" shape of crisis activity in the graphs earlier on. Some support for H-1 was found when lagged diplomatic reputation was used to predict the probability of a state initiating a crisis in a given year using logistic regression; the coefficient was indeed negative as predicted, for both a naive and a full model (Table 2). However, the coefficient did not attain conventional levels of significance ($p < 0.15$ and $p < 0.38$, respectively).

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The portion of H-1 predicting that states with higher diplomatic reputation scores should be involved in fewer crisis activity in general, did not find any support. Logistic regression results in Table 1 show that the marginal effect of lagged diplomatic reputation *increases* the probability of future crisis involvement by an average of 0.5%, an order of magnitude of 6 percent increase over the baseline. All other control variables were significant, and had a logical impact. I did find, interestingly, that regime age mattered: young states, as well as old states, were *less* likely to become involved in crisis.

While H-1 found no support for part of the predictions, the most important results of these series related to the second general hypothesis, concerning the expected behavior of democracies. The most encouraging results dealt with H-2.

2. Hypothesis H-2: As stated in Chapter Two: democracies will, on average, achieve "peak" diplomatic reputations sooner than non-democracies, because of the greater difficulties they face in communicating intentions, and the higher price democratic leaders pay for engaging in risky behavior due to the more attentive and cautious domestic audiences they face.

A. Testable hypothesis H-2a: Democracies experience, on average, fewer crises than non-democracies;

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<u>B: Testable hypothesis H-2b:</u> Democracies have, on average, higher

diplomatic reputation scores than non-democracies.

I can say that I find strong support for the predictions in H-2. I show through

descriptive statistics in Table 4 democracies do have higher diplomatic reputation

scores than non-democracies. This finding is confirmed in two different regression

models presented in Tables 5 and 6. There is no doubt that democracies have a higher

diplomatic reputation score than non-democracies, but the relationship washes out

when an old*democracy interactive term is introduced.

As a sideline analysis, I also demonstrate that democracies trigger many fewer

crises than would be expected, in Table 7. Also, democracies tend to win a large

majority of the crises they initiate, and also escalate crises in general to higher levels

of severity, both activities associated with higher diplomatic reputation scores. The

odds of a triggering entity winning a crisis given it is democratic is about 2.6 to 1. So

while democracies do not start as many crises as would be expected, they tend to win

the ones they do.

In sum, I have found support for half the predictions. There are many

interesting things that were uncovered during this analytical chapter, such as the high

likelihood that democracies win the crisis that they trigger, and the comparative

diplomatic reputation graphs among rival states. Since no one has modeled reputation

before in this way, there are some applications of the diplomatic reputation model I

would like to examine in the next Chapter, before I synthesize the meaning of these results.

I do not wish to attribute the shortcomings of the predictions to my theory; rather, in future research I should perhaps respecify some of the components of the model such as the time discount factor. More on this later.

CHAPTER 6

INTERESTING APPLICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Three Puzzles of International Conflict

In this exploratory chapter, I discuss some implications of Diplomatic Reputation for three additional areas, or "puzzles" (Zinnes 1980), of international relations: (1) the selection effect problem in conflict studies; (2) enduring rivalries; and (3) belligerent states.

The findings in Chapter Five support the notion that states build reputations; even though one of the major hypotheses was not supported, I did find support for the "inverted-U" shape expectation on the cycle of crisis activity, and I did find some (albeit weak-to-moderate) support for the prediction that states with higher diplomatic reputation scores would *initiate* fewer crises because of the decreasing marginal utility of doing so; and vice-versa, weaker states initiate more crises because of the need to establish a reputation. However, I found strong support for all the predictions regarding democratic regimes. How might these findings be applied to other research problems in international relations? For example, how does Diplomatic Reputation

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help solve the problem of selection bias in empirical studies of international relations? What do diplomatic reputations look and how do they form among rival dyads? Finally, is there a class of belligerent states that keeps challenging, keep losing, yet continue challenging? If so, how can we classify such states? These are some of the points I examine in this chapter, which is intended as an exploratory essay leading to suggestions for further research in crisis behavior, and also, to help synthesize the findings in Chapter Five.

First Puzzle: Crisis Activity and the Selection Effect Problem

In the past few years, there has been an increasing awareness of the special problems inherent in the empirical and statistical analysis of conflict in international relations. One of these problems is generically referred to as the "selection effect" (Siverson 1995). In sum, researchers engaging in the empirical analysis of conflict often build statistical models that analyze conflicts as if these were independent observations of events. However, diplomatic historians have long known that conflict often is a very deliberate and non-random act. For example, we all know Von Clausewitz's famous words to the effect that 'war is simply a continuation of politics by other means,' and another saying that the principal task of diplomats in the age of the absolute monarchs was to "ensure that a war was started at the most propitious moment [for one's country]" (Morgenthau 1978). Since war--and conflict in general--is the result of policy-making by state leaders, it is in this respect a deliberate

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act resulting from conscious or rational decision-making processes. Siverson (1995: 2, 4) puts it this way:

> One of the axioms of political analysis is that office-holders desire to continue to hold office and behave accordingly. This simple assumption has furnished the theoretical underpinnings for a considerable amount of political analysis, but its impact on the study of international politics has been decidedly less than elsewhere...if the policies chosen by leaders are selected because leaders believe they will enhance their position, then the conflicts we see in history do not represent a random sample of all possible conflicts, but rather are a biased sample of wars that were selected by the leader of the initiator because he or she had the expectation of a favorable outcome that would enhance their position.

In other words, leaders, in their quest for "power" and in order to remain in office, choose conflicts which they think they can win. Indeed, in Chapter Two of this dissertation I argue that leaders have an incentive to build a strong reputation for their state in order to secure both the state's position in the world, as well as the leader's domestic political standing. Diplomatic Reputation is built by leaders with the intent

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of increasing it by wining crises. Thus, leaders may select to become involved in a dispute specifically because they think they can win.

This is precisely at the core of the selection effect: conflicts are outcomes of decisions made by leaders, and not independent and random events. Non-events are not observed, even if the same forces are exerted upon them. All analyses are biased in that they observe events that are non-random. The recent works by Bueno de Mesquita (1981), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), and Siverson (1995), among many others, argue that war is an outcome of an expected utility calculation by initiators who think they can win. In summary, when faced with a decision on whether or not to engage an opponent, leaders act *as if* they calculated the benefits and risks of doing so, and opt for the alternative yielding the highest 'utility.' In performing these calculations, leaders estimate their countries' relative power, differences in world-view, support from third parties, and the political costs of beginning a conflict. When the benefits outweigh the costs, leaders attack. When the costs outweigh the benefits, we have a nonevent. Thus the selection effect problem. Incidentally, expected utility models perform quite well in post-predicting conflict initiation, with a major finding being that initiators of (dyadic) wars are more likely be the victors (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). In sum, wars are fought when they are because the initiator "calculated" that it could win.

The implication of the selection effect problem on crisis research is that in future empirical analyses of crisis activity, different models might be considered. For

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example, more attention should be paid to the effect of past crisis activity of the belligerents of a current crisis. In deciding to escalate a dispute to the level of a crisis, the initiator might select an opponent based on its diplomatic reputation; in other words, the initiator has a higher expectation of achieving victory if the opponent has a weak diplomatic reputation. This has policy implications as well; conflict management organizations should be aware of the link between past crisis activity and current dispute escalation to crisis level.

For example, initiators of disputes engage in conflict with the *expectation* of winning. If evidence can be found to link diplomatic reputations and expectations of winning, then Diplomatic Reputation might be a more efficient and parsimonious measure of predicted outcome of crisis than traditional expected utility measures. As a starting point, and in suggesting further study on this point, I present in TABLE 9 a breakdown of outcomes by who initiated a crisis. I focus only on whether the triggering entity won the crisis it triggered. The number of crises here is 301, and we can see that triggering entities tend to win the crises that they trigger, 53.5% to 46.5%, although the difference is not statistically significant.

What I have here is somewhat of a quandary: despite mountains of theoretical evidence, crisis triggering entities do not behave like the expected utility maximizers that they should be. They should win more than just 53% of the crises they trigger. But the solution is to include a control variable that will sharpen the distinction between triggering entities that win and lose: the effect of democracy.

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TABLE 9

FREQUENCY TABLE OF CRISIS OUTCOMES FOR INITIATORS

Initiator Wins	Initiator Loses	Total
161 (53.5%)	140 (46.5%)	301 $X^2_{1 d.f.} = 1.46$ $p<0.2$

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Below I present TABLE 10. This table shows that democracies win more crises than they should, based on naive frequencies. Here, we have some significant statistics. While democratic triggering entities do not win much more than they should, they do in fact *lose a lot less than they should,* if winning and losing are equally probable. The expected frequency for democratic losses is 35, and the observed frequency is just 15 (that difference is significant at the p<0.005 level, 1 d.f.). Overall for the Table, the chi-square statistic is 11.92, and significant at the p<0.01 level for 3 d.f. And to recap, the odds ratio of the initiator winning a crisis given it is democratic is 2.61:1, a substantial difference.

In sum, what I have learned is that democratic states have higher diplomatic reputation scores, and that they may be more selective in their choices of conflictual behavior. Perhaps because of the audience costs that democracies face, they are more careful of the disputes they are involved in. Presidents and Prime Ministers depend on public opinion for their jobs; a high-profile loss in an international crisis can be bad for them (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). Thus, they do not *lose* as often as they should statistically. These are interesting addenda to the selection effect problem.

Second Puzzle: Reputations and Rivals

In previous chapters I argue about the importance of past crisis activity on current crisis activity. I stress the importance of a diachronic--across time--view of

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TABLE 10

CROSSTAB: DEMOCRACIES AND CRISIS INITIATION

Regime Type	Initiator Loses	Initiator Wins	Row Totals
Democracy	**15** (35 exp)	**37** (35 exp)	**52** **(70 exp)**
Non-Democracy	**112** (100 exp)	**106** (100 exp)	**218** **(200 exp)**
TOTALS	127 (135 exp)	143 (135 exp)	270 table $X^2_{3d.f.} = 11.92$ **(sig. p<0.01)**

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crisis activity; past events influencing present events. Recently in the field of international relations, there is increasing awareness of the importance of history as a context of international interactions (Huth and Russett 1984, 1993; Leng 1993; Goertz 1994). I also argue that reputations are public: since crisis escalation is a signal viewed by all members of the international system, all observers can update their beliefs about the types of actors the belligerents are.

In international relations many interactions are dyadic. In other words, states tend to interact with each other in pairs. Global actors such as the US (and the USSR until recently) were exceptions, since they could and did pursue global grand strategies and regional alliances. Other exceptions are when regions establish customs unions or trading blocks, such as Europe '92 and NAFTA. But for the most part, states conduct relations bilaterally. This is all the more so in international conflict: studies have shown that most wars involve only two actors (Richardson 1960; Small and Singer 1982), as well as most crises (Leng 1993).

Recent work on enduring rivalries reinforces this point. Gochman and Maoz (1984); Diehl (1985) and Goertz and Diehl (1992; 1993) show that certain pairs of states engage in multiple conflicts over time. These "rival dyads" are formed as states engage in repeated conflict. Goertz and Diehl (1992: 151) find that "rival dyads account for a majority of international conflict and war." This is an important empirical finding in and of itself, since it forces conflict researchers to look at conflict as a diachronic phenomenon, a point argued throughout this dissertation.

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Goertz (1994: 204) defines an enduring rival dyad as two states with recurring

militarized interstate disputes (MIDs)--at least six in a twenty-year period to be

classified as enduring rivals; other features of enduring rivals include competition over

regional influence and space/territory. A rival ends if there were no disputes within

any 15 year period. Goertz identifies 45 pairs of enduring rivals in his 1994 study.[1] In

sum, enduring rivals are important because a majority of international conflict occurs

between them. Rivals are also important because they introduce an element of

historical context to the study of international conflict. The probability that two states

will escalate a dispute to a war is a direct function of the number of past disputes they

have fought against each other. This empirical relationship is very impressive. For

example, Goertz (1994: 210-211) reports that the cumulative probability of a dyad

fighting a war increases from about 10% after 1 dispute, to about 50% if they have had

5 disputes. Thus, the importance of historical conflict patterns or enduring rivalries is

largely based on these empirical observations about their war proneness.

In this section I am interested in examining the crisis activity of rival dyads

over time using the ICB-based crisis data set I constructed for this dissertation. Is

there a strong correlation between the rivalries uncovered by Goertz and Diehl using

the COW-based Militarized Interstate Dispute data set (MID) and what the ICB data

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[1] Gochman and Maoz (1984), Diehl (1985), and Wayman (1990) offer different operational definitions for enduring rivalries; see Goertz 1994: 201, Table 10.1, for a comparison of definitions. Also, some of the dyads in Goertz's list are "censored" because it cannot be determined if a rivalry still existed due to the temporal limitations of the data. In other words, if the data end in 1996, and 2 states were rivals in 1985 and had 12 years without a dispute, do you code them as rivals, since you cannot know if they will fight or not in the next 3 years?

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contains? How does diplomatic reputation form among rivals? To examine these questions, I randomly selected three rival dyads from the Goertz population of rivals (1994: 221-222). My selections meet two criteria: first, the period of the rivalry must be within the temporal domain of the ICB data, *i.e.*, 1918-1988; and second, these rivals must have participated in at least three ICB crises with each other so that Diplomatic Reputation could be meaningfully measured and compared. This whittled the 45 dyads down to 15 pairs of rivals, of which I randomly selected three. The three dyads I selected are (1) Egypt and Israel; (2) Greece-Turkey; and (3) Ethiopia-Somalia. I want to see how these states compared with each other in terms of their diplomatic reputation and overall crisis activity.

I want to stress that this section is not intended as a replication of earlier studies of enduring rivalries, nor as detailed case studies; rather, I am interested in what the diplomatic reputation scores of rivals look like.

Egypt and Israel. The Egypt-Israel rivalry has its roots in the dispute over the establishment of the Jewish Homeland in Israel/Palestine. In my data set, Egypt is considered independent in 1937 and Israel in 1948. Goertz lists them as rivals from 1948 to 1973. These states fight in 7 MIDs during this time; in my data set they are opponents in crisis 10 times.

The first of a series of crises between Israel and its Arab neighbors begins with the Israeli War of independence in 1948.[2] Then, Israel and Egypt experience at least

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[2] The Partition of Palestine in 1947 creates a crisis for the Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon), but not for Israel since it was not yet independent.

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ten crises with each other between 1948 and 1973.[3] In FIGURE 16 I plot these

countries' Diplomatic Reputation scores from 1937 to 1988. The graph clearly shows

that Israel earns a very high diplomatic reputation, at the expense of Egypt. Since

Outcome is one of the components, we see that Israel wins most of its crises with

Egypt. Only *after* 1973 and the Egypt-Israel *rapprochement* leading up to the Camp

David accords in 1979 do the diplomatic reputation scores converge. Indeed, these

two states did not engage in a crisis with each other since 1973. However, Egypt built

up its diplomatic reputation in the 1980s in a series of four "successful" crises with

Libya. In sum, the Israeli advantage in the rivalry between 1948 and 1973 was built at

the expense of Egypt, which yields the "mirror-image" diplomatic reputation graph in

FIGURE 16. Incidentally, Israel, with the higher diplomatic reputation throughout the

period, triggers *6 of the 10* dyadic crises and "wins" 9 of them, thus supporting the

selection effect puzzle discussed above, and counter to the results I uncovered in

Chapter 5.

While each of these crises is different, they all are related to the overall

Arab-Israeli protracted conflict. Egypt and Israel, as rivals, fought 10 crises that led to

two major wars. Israel was always the strongest diplomatically, and won 9 of the 10

crises. Thus, we have seen the "shape" of the rivalry in these two countries' respective

Diplomatic reputation graphs. I next look at the graph for some other rivals.

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[3] See Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988, and Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1989; these are: (1) Israeli Independence (1948); (2) Sinai Incursion (1948); (3) Gaza Raid (1955); (4) Suez-Sinai Campaign (1956); (5) Rottem (1960); (6) Six Day War (1967); (7) War of Attrition I (1969); (8) War of Attrition II (1970); (9) Israeli Mobilization (1973); and (10) Yom Kippur War (1973).

Figure 16: Egypt and Israel Rivalry, 1937-1988

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Greece and Turkey. Goertz (1994: 221) lists Greece and Turkey/Ottoman Empire as enduring rivals from 1829-1919, and from 1958-1976. Turkey and Greece experience 6 MIDs and 1 war according to Goertz, and at least 13 ICB crises with each other.[4] The outcomes are mixed, with Turkey winning more often than Greece. The Greek and Turkish rivalry graph also is very interesting. The graph in FIGURE 17 shows that this rivalry also has the "mirror image" shape to it. We see that Turkey emerges as a very "weak" state in terms of its diplomatic reputation after WW I--presumably due to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire--to then build a strong reputation at the expense of Greece, among others.[5] However, as both states first clashed over the status of Cyprus in 1963-64, the result was a stalemate, so we see both diplomatic reputation scores fall at the same time in this period. (It is interesting to note that prior to the Cyprus crises beginning in 1964, both states had not clashed directly since the end of the Greece-Turkey War of 1920-22, thus their rivalry could be said to have been terminated.) Turkey won the next two crises over Cyprus in 1967 and 1974, so it built a diplomatic reputation at Greece's expense. Then, a decade later, Greece won one of the Aegean Sea crises and the diplomatic reputation gap closed.

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[4] These are: (1) Greece-Turkey War I (1920); (2)-(5) Greece-Turkey War II * 4 clusters (1921); (6) Greece-Turkey War III (1923); (7) Cyprus I-a (1963); (8) Cyprus I-b (1964); (9) Cyprus II (1967); (10) Cyprus III (1974); (11) Aegean Sea I (1976); (12) Aegean Naval Crisis (1984); and (13) Aegean Sea II (1987).

[5] Turkey also experiences successful crises against Bulgaria, France, and Russia in the 1920s and 1930s, thus building its reputation even further. These crises are not completely isolated from the Turkish-Greek crises of the 1920s.

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Figure 17: Greece and Turkey Rivalry, 1918-1988

NOTE: Greece 'drops out' of the international
system from 1942-1944.

YEAR

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Interestingly, when Greece had the higher diplomatic reputation before 1923, it triggered *5 of the 6* crises between 1920-1922; then, after 1923, when Turkey had the higher diplomatic reputation, it initiated *two of the three* Aegean Sea crises. Thus, in 7 of 9 cases the state with the higher diplomatic reputation triggers the new crisis, further supporting the selection effect puzzle and contrary to my expectations.[6]

The Greece-Turkey diplomatic reputation graphs have the basic mirror-image component seen in the previous Egypt-Israel graph. It seems that we can begin to identify rivals because they can build their reputation as the expense of the other state. Now, to a third example.

Ethiopia and Somalia. The third rivalry to examine is the Ethiopia-Somalia rivalry. Here, the temporal domain is restricted to the post-1960 period, the year in which Somalia wins its independence from Britain.

In FIGURE 18, we again see the "mirror image" effect. These two states experienced at least 5 crises with each other in the 1960-1988 period.[7] The record is mixed, with a slight edge in favor of Ethiopia in terms of victories. In this time period, Ethiopia only experienced one crisis with an actor other than Somalia (with Sudan in 1983), and Somalia has only two (Somalia and Kenya crisis in 1963, and East Africa Confrontation in 1980), so these two states are true rivals in the Horn of Africa subsystem.

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[6] The four crises over Cyprus were triggered by non-state actors within Cyprus, namely, by the Cypriot Greek and Turk groups.

[7] These are: (1) Ethiopia-Somalia crisis (1960); (2) Ogaden I (1964); (3) Ogaden II (1977); (4) Ogaden III (1982); and (5) Somalia-Ethiopia Border crisis (1987).

Figure 18: Ethiopia and Somalia Rivalry, 1960-1988

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We see that throughout the time period, Ethiopia is the more powerful of the two rivals. However, Somalia triggers 3 of the 5 crises among the rivals, which is not what we would expect considering the previous examples, but consistent with my expectations that states with lower diplomatic reputations were more likely to initiate crises.

In summing up the findings so far, there are two interesting points. First, for all three of the randomly selected rival dyads, we clearly see a "mirror image" pattern in the diplomatic reputation scores.[8] They show us graphically which of the two states has the diplomatic advantage at a given time. Secondly, we found dyadic-level evidence to counter the systemic-level findings in the previous section: in 15 of the 24 crises (63%)[9] triggered by one of the rivals against the other, it was the state with the *higher* diplomatic reputation score that triggered a new crisis. Recall in Chapter 5, Tables 1 and 2, I was unsuccessful in finding support for H-1a.

Recall that one of the most important reasons to study enduring rivals is their conflict-proneness. Another examination that I would like to perform is to see if the randomly selected rival dyads discussed above exhibit more dangerous conflictual

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[8] For my own viewing pleasure I graphed four other pairs of rivals (India-China; India-Pakistan; Japan-USA; and Italy-Yugoslavia), and the "mirror image" pattern held in every case. The only exception I could find was the USA-USSR rivalry shown in FIGURE 12, Chapter 5. Here, we see both superpowers exhibiting a similar pattern, as opposed to a mirror-image pattern. The only explanation I would venture is that in the USA-USSR case there are few direct crises, and many more proxy crises. The direct crises would include Berlin 1961 and Cuban Missiles 1962, but there are far more crises with other states than there are with each other.

[9] Recall that four Cyprus-related crises between Greece and Turkey were triggered by a third entity, so I did not count these. The total number of crises experienced by the three rival dyads is 28.

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tendencies with each other. One way to do this is to compare the average severity of

these states' crises with each other to the mean level of severity for crises in the

international system as a whole.

To do this, I totaled the severity scores for each of the 24 crises and divided by

24. Then, I calculated the mean severity for all the crises in the dataset. The result is

reported in TABLE 11. The difference in mean severity between the rival dyads and

the general population is not statistically significant. For good measure, I also

compare the average number of crisis involvement per year; here the results is

significant at the $p<0.1$ level. Enduring rivals, *ipso facto*, have a higher frequency of

crisis involvement than the general population of states.

How much is the diplomatic reputation of one member of a rival dyad

explained by crisis involvement with the other member, compared to its reputation

earned from "outside" the rival dyad? To partially evaluate this rival effect, I present

in TABLES 12 to 14 severity scores of crises within the rival dyad and outside it. It

shows each dyad examined above (Egypt-Israel; Greece-Turkey; Ethiopia-Somalia),

and compares the severity of the crises they had among *themselves*, compared to the

crises they had with other states. We see that the results are mixed.

As expected, the Egypt-Israel rival dyad experienced more severe crises with

each other than with other states. About half of Egypt's crises involve Israel, and for

Israel, the proportion of its crises involving Egypt is about one third. The mean

severity of the crises within the rival dyad is 5.20 (out of a possible 10). For Egypt,

TABLE 11

COMPARISON OF CRISIS SEVERITY BETWEEN RIVALS

AND THE POPULATION

	Mean Severity of Crises	Mean Number of Crisis/yr Involvement
Rival Dyads	3.98	0.34
General Population (entire data set)	3.64	0.15
Difference:	+0.34	+0.19

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TABLE 12

COMPARISON OF CRISIS SEVERITY AMONG RIVALS, COMPARED TO

OUTSIDE THE RIVALRY: EGYPT AND ISRAEL

State	Mean Severity of Crises Within the Rival Dyad	Mean Severity of Crises Outside the Dyad	Difference
Egypt	5.20 n=10²	3.32 n=12¹	+1.88
Israel	5.20 n=10²	4.06 n=19³	+1.14

¹ These are: (1) Suez Canal; (2) Baghdad Pact; (3) Sudan-Egypt; (4) Breakup of UAR; (5) Yemen War I; (6) Jordan Internal Challenge; (7) Yemen 2; (8) Libya-Egypt; (9) Libya Threat to Sadat; (10) Libya Threat; (11) Omduran Bombing; and (12) Egypt-Libya.

² See page 164, fn.

³ These are: (1) Tel Mutillah; (2) Quibya; (3) Qualquila; (4) Jordan Internal Challenge; (5) Jordan Waters; (6) El Samu; (7) Six-Day War; (8) Karameh; (9) Beirut Airport; (10) Black September; (11) Libya Plane; (12) Yom Kippur; (13) Entebbe Raid; (14) Syria Mobilization; (15) Litani Operation; (16) Al-Biqua; (17) Iraq Reactor; (18) Lebanon War; and (19) Al-Biqua 2.

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TABLE 13

COMPARISON OF CRISIS SEVERITY AMONG RIVALS, COMPARED TO

OUTSIDE THE RIVALRY: GREECE AND TURKEY

State	Mean Severity of Crises Within the Rival Dyad	Mean Severity of Crises Outside the Dyad	Difference
Greece	2.82 n=13[1]	4.81 n=8[2]	-1.99
Turkey	2.82 n=13[1]	4.41 n=10[3]	-1.59

[1] See page 166, fn.

[2] These are: (1) Smyrna; (2) Corfu Incident; (3) Greece-Bulgaria; (4) Albania; (5) Balkan Invasion; (6) Balkan Invasion; (7) Greece Civil War 2; and (8) Truman Doctrine.

[3] These are: (1) Transcaucasia; (2) Mosul Land Dispute; (3) Bulgaria-Turkey I; (4) Alexandretta; (5) Bulgaria-Turkey II; (6) Balkan Invasions; (7) Kars Ardahan; (8) Turkish Straights; (9) Truman Doctrine; and (10) Syria-Turkey Border.

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TABLE 14

COMPARISON OF CRISIS SEVERITY AMONG RIVALS, COMPARED TO

OUTSIDE THE RIVALRY: ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA (post-1960)

State	Mean Severity of Crises Within the Rival Dyad	Mean Severity of Crises Outside the Dyad	Difference
Ethiopia	2.96 n=5[1]	3.02 n=1[2]	-0.06
Somalia	2.96 n=5[1]	2.10 n=2[3]	+0.86

[1] See page 168, fn.

[2] This is the Ethiopia-Sudan crisis in 1983.

[3] These are: (1) the Somalia-Kenya crisis in 1963, and (2) the East Africa Confrontation in 1980.

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the mean severity of the crises it experienced with *other* sates is 3.32, for a difference

of +1.88 (in favor of the 'dangerous dyad' argument). For Israel, the difference is

+1.14, which is substantial.

However, for the Greece-Turkey dyad, the mean level of severity is in the

opposite direction. Each state experiences a majority of its crises with the other state;

around 60 percent of each other's total. The mean severity of the intra-dyad crises is

2.82, while the mean of Greece's extra-dyad crises is 4.81, a substantial difference of

-1.99. For Turkey, the difference is -1.59 (the negative meaning that the difference is

against expectations). There are 2 *ex-post* reasons I propose for this difference. First,

for this rivalry, the extra-dyadic crises were fought with European great powers. By

contrast, the Greece-Turkey crises are local crises. Turkey had crises with France and

Germany; Greece also had crises involving Germany in WW II, and the United States

and Britain at the onset of the Cold War. Thus, the non-rival dyadic crises involved

attributed (such as great power/superpower involvement) which raised the severity

level of these crises. Second, this long-time rival dyad may have 'learned' to manage

their conflict. The later crises among them (the 3 Aegean Sea crises in the late 70s and

80s) were 2 full points lower in severity than previous crises involving them. This is

consistent with Hensel's (1995) findings regarding the evolution of rivalries.

The Ethiopia-Somalia dyad is mixed. As previously mentioned, a large

majority of each of these states' crises are with each other. The mean severity of

intra-rival-dyad crises is 2.96. Ethiopia experiences one crisis more severe than this

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with Sudan, at 3.02,[10] for a difference of -0.06--against expectations. But Somalia

supports my expectations, with an extra-dyadic crisis severity mean of 2.10, for a

difference of +0.86. In sum, the existence of a rivalry should raise severity levels, but

I found mixed results.

In sum, the graphs of the diplomatic reputation scores of randomly selected

enduring rivals yielded interesting visual results; we could see in all the dyads

examined, including the dyads examined in Chapter Five (UK-Germany, and

China-Japan) that there was a "mirror-image" effect. Also, I show in TABLE 11 that

members of rival dyads have a greater frequency of crisis participation; presumably,

most of this increased crisis activity is with the other member of this rival dyad, and

indeed in TABLES 12-14, I show that the number of crises experienced among rival

dyads tends to be higher than with others. Finally, the expectation that the crises

fought among enduring rivals were more severe was not supported. However, the

analysis of rivals using crisis data definitely should proceed.

Third Puzzle: Reputations and Embroilment

In Chapter Four I argue that reputations are formed by a combination of four

factors: (1) crisis activity; (2) time since past crises; (3) crisis outcomes; and (4)

severity of past crisis activity. I also argue that crises are signals states use to convey

information about their preferences. Because of the inherent risk in becoming

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[10] In the 1930s, Ethiopia experiences crises with Italy that reach 3.56, and 4.90. I am considering only the post-1960 period, consistent with the earlier diplomatic reputation graph for this dyad.

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involved in crises--each crisis carries a risk of war--resolve and preferences about issues are manifest. States that have frequent crisis involvement, that win crises, and that escalate crises to higher levels of severity build reputations as strong defenders of their interests. Finally, I argue that crisis outcomes matter; other states in the system observe the event and know who the victor is. The victor demonstrated resolve and communicated a strong signal to all other actors in the system.

I point out in Chapter Four that I expect winners would develop a strong reputation, then would become involved in fewer crises as other states stopped challenging them; the empirical results in Chapter Five are mixed on this point. However, I also pointed out that I cannot account *a priori* for states that engage in crises, lose, yet keep on entering into crises only to lose again. I called these states "Quarrelsome states that lose but keep on challenging." In this section, I examine two interesting cases of "Quarrelsome States" that both support the reputation-building hypothesis, in spite of the fact that they behave oddly. While I was gathering data on crises, outcomes, and severity, and then calculated diplomatic reputation scores, I encountered two states that were extremely active in crisis activity, well beyond what we would expect given their share of global power and limited scope of activity. They account for more than their fair share of crisis activity, in spite of the fact that they keep losing. The two states build large negative reputations and keep on fighting--belligerent states. These are **South Africa** and **Iraq**, whose crisis behavior I examine further below. How often do these states become embroiled in crises

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compared with other states in the system? I offer an *ad hoc* operational definition of embroilment.

Embroilment. I operationalize *embroilment* as *the sum of the absolute raw values of diplomatic reputation.* I do so to capture what embroilment implies: to be implicated, or entangled in dangerous situations. Since the raw values of diplomatic reputation contain the sum of all previous crisis activity, along with the time discount * the severity of each crisis, by adopting the absolute value I capture all this crisis activity without controlling for defeats. Therefore, the embroilment measure captures the total conflict involvement of states, controlling for the severity of each crisis. In other words, a state involved in a few high-stake crises will have a higher embroilment score than a state involved in a few, but less severe, crises. Since severity is a measure that itself captures crisis attributes such as the number of great power actors, and the level of violence, this measure captures a total level of embroilment in crisis.

This is a raw and simple measure, but it capture quite nicely the total crisis activity of states with severity in the international system, as shown in FIGURE 19.[11] Notice that the top-10 belligerent states are, in descending order, (1) the USA; (2) the USSR; (3) Israel; (4) Britain; (5) France; (6) Turkey; *(7) Iraq; (8) South Africa;* (9) Egypt; and (10) Belgium.

The list is surprising in that Iraq and South Africa are seventh and eighth, respectively, despite their lack of systemic reach. The top five are not surprising;

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[11] Again, the readers are urged to see APPENDIX B for a discussion of severity.

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some might argue that Egypt and Israel are surprising cases, but the main difference is

that Egypt is and has been a leader of the entire Arab world for several decades, and

Israel is surrounded by threatening states and just about the single locus of antagonism

in the region. Belgium makes the list because of a series of high-severity crises related

to WWII, and later with Congo/Zaire in the 1960s and 70s. Furthermore, another

major difference is that South Africa and Iraq *lose almost every crisis in which they*

are involved, continue engaging in crises. Together, they lose 27 of the 31 crises they

are involved in! The other states are not as unsuccessful. For example, the average

diplomatic reputation for the other 8 states on the list is 1.25, while Iraq's mean

diplomatic reputation score is -1.19, and South Africa's is -0.72. Considering these are

Z-scores, the difference is large.

To show graphically what I mean, I plot Iraq's and South Africa's embroilment

graphs relative to their neighbors in their respective subsystems (Middle East and

Sub-Saharan Africa) in FIGURES 20 and 21. I describe each country in turn.

Iraq. We see in Figure 20, representing Middle East emboilment, that Iraq is

third, behind Israel and Turkey, consistent with the "top-10 list" of the world's most

belligerent nations. (In close 4th place is Egypt, another top-10 belligerent nation.).

The striking feature about Iraq is its crisis activity, summarized in TABLE 15.

Contrary to earlier findings about the behavior of triggering entities, Iraq, while

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
Figure 19: World Embroilment, 1918-1988

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triggering 43 percent of the crises in which it is involved, loses 5 of the 6 crises it triggers, a difference that is significant at the p<0.1 level (chi-square = 3.17, 1 d.f.). Overall, Iraq loses 13 of its 14 crises (93 percent). Iraq fights 43 percent of its crises against Iran.

It is interesting that despite such a poor record, Iraq keeps coming back. This historical pattern is seen again today. After fighting a bitter war with Iran, Iraq comes back less than two years later to challenge the US-backed *status quo* in the Persian Gulf region. It loses over half its military capability in Desert Storm only to challenge the US-UN imposed "No-fly zone" soon afterwards. Recently, Iraq again challenged the no fly zone, and the US responded with Cruise Missile attacks on its air defense systems. Iraq thus "lost" at least 3 other crises that are outside the time scope of this study. It will be interesting to see how these events are recorded in future crisis data bases.

So again, Iraq presents an interesting case of a quarrelsome state. It does not build a "strong" reputation, since it loses most of its crises. It might develop, however, a belligerent reputation with its neighbors and the US. To what extent is this attributable to Iraq's leadership, namely, to Saddam Hussein? Saddam became Iraq's official leader in 1979 (although he had been in the shadows, as chief of the secret police since 1973), so 5 of the 14 ICB crises can be attributed to his leadership. Thus, there is something else about Iraq that contributes to this record. Verily, I have no

Figure 20: Middle East Embroilment

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TABLE 15

IRAQ'S CRISIS ACTIVITY

Year	Crisis Name	Main Opponent	Severity	Outcome	Initiator?
1941	Mid-East Campaign	Britain	6.1	loss	no
1947	Palestine Partition	UN/Britain	4.09	loss	no
1948	Israel Independence	Israel	5.7	loss	no
1958	Formation of UAR	Egypt/Syria	1.55	loss	no
1959	Shatt-al-Arab I	Iran	3.02	loss	no
1961	Kuwaiti Independence	Kuwait/Britain	3.42	loss	yes
1969	Shatt-al-Arab II	Iran	2.35	loss	yes
1973	Kuwait Invasion	Kuwait	1.95	loss	yes
1976	Iraqi Threat to Syria	Syria	1.55	loss	yes
1980	Onset of Iran-Iraq War	Iran	3.29	loss	yes
1981	Iraqi Nuclear Reactor	Israel	3.29	loss	no
1982	Khorramshahr	Iran	3.29	loss	no
1984	Basra-Kharg Islands	Iran	5.7	loss	no
1988	Iraq Recaptures Fao	Iran	3.29	victory	yes
Sum	14 crises	43% with Iran	$\bar{x}$= 3.47	93% loss	43% trig

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answers to this interesting puzzle, and more study is required to explain why Iraq developed such a quarrelsome reputation.

South Africa. South Africa's embroilment in relation to its Sub-Saharan neighbors is shown in FIGURE 21. As we can see, South Africa is way ahead of its nearest competition, which happens to be Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. And South Africa is even more interesting than Iraq in one sense: all but one of South Africa's ICB crises were fought since 1971, as shown in TABLE 16.

We see that South Africa fought against most of its immediate neighbors, especially Angola, where South Africa battled the Marxist MPLA group (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which eventually took control of the Angolan government with Cuban and Soviet aid), on at least four occasions (Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988, Vol. 1: 307-308).

South Africa also "loses" most of its crises (83 percent), despite the fact it initiated 88 percent of them, a highly significant difference from what would be expected ($p<0.01$, chi-square $=10.12$, 1 d.f.). So once again, we have another state that did not build a "strong" reputation, but rather, a quarrelsome reputation, since it fought a lot of crises and lost most of them. South Africa's mean number of crises per year is 0.25, while the average for the general population is 0.15; since 1971, its per year average is 0.89 percent![12]

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[12] Iraq's mean number of crises/year is 0.25.

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
Figure 21: Sub-Saharan Africa Embroilment

TABLE 16

SOUTH AFRICA'S CRISIS ACTIVITY

Year	Crisis Name	Main Opponent	Severity	Outcome	Initiator?
1939	Entry WWII	Germany	8.92	victory	no
1971	Caprivi Strip	Zambia	2.75	loss	yes
1973	Zambia	Zambia	2.22	loss	yes
1975	Angola	Angola (internal)	7.84	loss	no
1978	Cassinga Incident	Angola	3.96	loss	yes
1978	Angola Invasion Scare	Angola	2.62	loss	yes
1979	Raid on SWAPO	Angola (internal)	2.75	loss	yes
1979	Angola	Angola (internal)	2.75	loss	yes
1980	Operation Smokeshell	Angola	2.89	loss	yes
1981	Mozambique Raid	Mozambique	3.82	loss	yes
1981	Operation Protea	Angola	3.96	loss	yes
1982	Lesotho Raid	Lesotho	3.29	loss	yes
1983	Operation Ashkari	Angola	3.42	victory	yes
1985	Raid on Botswana	Botswana	3.29	loss	yes
1985	Raid on Lesotho	Lesotho	3.02	loss	yes
1986	Cross-Border Raids	Zimbabwe	3.29	loss	yes
1987	Intervention in Angola	Angola	3.42	victory	yes
Sum	17 crises	53% with Angola	$\bar{x}$= 3.78	82% loss	88% trig

How does this belligerent reputation manifest itself graphically? Iraq, South Africa, and Turkey's respective diplomatic reputation scores are presented in FIGURE 22.[13] For virtually its entire history, Iraq is below zero in its diplomatic reputation. South Africa is above zero between 1939 and 1958, a result of its participation in WWII on the allied side. After 1958, South Africa's reputation plummeted and reached -4.6 in the early 1980s. Iraq hovered at about -1.5 for most of its history, then dropped to -2.6 in the mid-80s. This is very low, considering that these are Z-scores.

If we put this in perspective, Iraq's average diplomatic reputation score for its entire period of independence is -1.19 (Z); thus, it is in the 12th percentile of states if we ranked them by increasing mean diplomatic reputations. South Africa's mean is -0.72 since 1920; and -1.75 since 1959, when the effects of its participation in World War II abated. If we take the latter number, South Africa's average diprep score would place it in the 4th percentile. These numbers are a raw guide; since the data are not presented this way—that is, by increasing mean diplomatic reputation scores for all countries, these may not actually be the rankings of these states. However, they are suggestive of how negative their reputations are.

What this section showed is that some states act as reputation-builders in the perverse sense. Since many of Iraq's and South Africa's crises were with a regional

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[13] I chose Turkey because it was #6 on the belligerent list. I only chose to put one other state to compare Iraq and South Africa in order to maintain clarity in the graph. When more than 3 states are graphed in SPSS, it is difficult for the reader to make out the mix of lines in the graph, especially with a black and white printer.

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
Figure 22: Iraq, South Africa, and Turkey's Diplomatic Reputation

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rival (Iran and Angola, respectively), further analysis should concentrate on why a rivalry persists in spite of the fact that one of the dyad members continues to lose. For example, Iraq loses 5 of the 6 crises with Iran. How do we account for this in a model of protracted conflict? Shouldn't Iraq have an incentive to back off from further confrontations with Iran? These are interesting questions uncovered here which relate to the evolution of protracted conflicts.

Summary

In this exploratory chapter, I examine how diplomatic reputations might illuminate three puzzles in the study of international conflict. I show how diplomatic reputation can help up understand the selection effect problem. The results are that while, as expected, a majority of crises are eventually won by the initiator, the difference is not statistically significant, unless we control for regime type; then, we see that the major finding is that democracies not only win slightly more crises than would be expected, but more significantly, *democracies lose a lot less frequently than they should.*

The second puzzle I examined within the context of diplomatic reputation is how we can approach the important phenomenon of enduring rivalries using diplomatic reputation scores of rivals. There are two major finding here. First, in all the graphs shown, enduring rivals exhibit a *mirror-image* shape to their reputation scores. This might allow us to see which rival has the diplomatic upper hand.

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Incidentally, in these three states taken together, the state with the higher diplomatic reputation at the time triggered 15 of the 24 crises (62%), which was the opposite of the findings from the previous chapter, where 51 percent of the crises had been triggered by the state with the *lower* diplomatic score. Rivals seem to behave differently from the average state in terms of diplomatic reputation.

The second finding in this exploration of the use of diplomatic reputation in the study of enduring rivals is that, as expected based on the definition of enduring rivalries, the three randomly selected cases of rivals exhibited a significantly higher average number of crises than the general population. In other words, the ICB data set also can be used to discover protracted conflicts like enduring rivalries. The mean severity of these crises also was higher, but not at a statistically significant level. In sum, while more study is needed, enduring rivalry is a concept that was uncovered empirically using a different data set (COW-based MID data), and I find that rivals do show some distinct behavioral patterns in this ICB-based data set as well.

Finally, the third puzzle I examined is the belligerent nature of some members of the international system. Some states keep fighting, lose, and fight again, building a strong *negative* reputation. Iraq and South Africa are singled out as states deserving more attention as "belligerent states." They lose more often than they should, even when controlling for the triggering entity status. I showed in the discussion earlier that their mean diplomatic score was far lower than the other top-10 states on the embroilment scale.

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It is interesting to note that these two states' low points came in the late 1970s and 1980s. This corresponds roughly to (1) Saddam's rise to power in Iraq; and (2) South Africa's international condemnation for its policy of *apartheid*, respectively. Although the diplomatic reputation score does not in any way measure these factors, it is an interesting coincidence that, for South Africa, the 1980s meant a low point in its diplomatic reputation at the same time that most states were increasing their international pressures and boycotts against the racist regime. Iraq's low point in the 1980s coincides with reports of poison gas use against civilians, among other atrocities.

Thus, in this exploratory chapter, I consider areas promising for future research using the diplomatic reputation model developed here. I eagerly anticipate future exploration.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In this dissertation, I propose that a variety of incentives imposed by the structure of the international system, and the requirements of remaining in power, an incentive arises to cause state leaders to build a diplomatic reputation in order to insure their state's security. Furthermore, since change is an inherent part of the human condition, such reputations have to be maintained and periodically reacquired. Thus, reputation-building behavior should be cyclical: a period of reputation-building behavior followed by a respite, followed by a period of reputation 'maintenance'.

The way in which reputations are secured for states is by their performance in international crises. This is the case because crisis participation sends a strong signal: the actors in the international system can get a serious real-time look at the belligerents' true preferences and type. Thus, because crisis is an inherently high-risk activity, states can show their true preferences as well as the intensity of these preferences.

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I evaluate my hypotheses using a data set of international crises based on the international Crisis Behavior Project. The empirical results are decidedly mixed, but I do find support for many of the hypotheses presented in Chapter Two. In sum, I find that states definitely behave *as if* they were building reputations. There are cycles of crisis activity observable at the nation-state level occurring every generation—as predicted. Hypotheses predicting diminished crisis activity once a strong reputation was earned do not find empirical support.

The strongest support was found for hypotheses concerning different reputation-building behavior for democracies. I argue that the expected difference in behavior is due to the different type of audience costs democracies face, coupled with established empirical observations showing democracies tend to win the conflicts in which they engage. The findings support the hypotheses presented in Chapter Two concerning the behavior of democracies. Democracies do have higher diplomatic reputations. Also, democracies engage in less crisis activity. We can thus infer that democracies build their reputations more efficiently.

I conclude the analysis portion with a chapter exploring the possible applications of the diplomatic reputation model for three puzzles of international conflict studies. I find that diplomatic reputation helps to capture the selection effect problem, especially when controlling for regime type. I find that diplomatic reputation also shows nicely the graphic evolution of enduring rivals, a relatively new puzzle in international relations. Finally, I pick out two states that exhibit outlying behavior, in

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the sense that they engage in many crises yet lose most of them. They are anomalies, and these two states, South Africa and Iraq, warrant special attention when examining the crisis behavior of states because of their quarrelsome nature.

Thus, in addition to the potential application of the diplomatic reputation model to resolution of the three puzzles discussed above, there are other areas in which the model may prove useful in understanding conflict processes. I offer two further implications below.

Implications of Diplomatic Reputation for International Relations

The implications of this study are two-fold. First, it produces empirical support for the notion that crisis involvement at one period in time affects crisis involvement in the future, as argued in Chapter Six. Second, we may be closer than ever to being able to model concepts such as "reputation" and "diplomatic costs" of crisis and the variable measuring "credibility" and "resolve" in the aforementioned deterrence literature *(e.g.* Snyder and Diesing 1977 and Huth and Russett 1984).

For example, in *War and Reason*, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) develop an expected-utility model of war and conflict among states that performs quite well empirically, and which contains intuitively important variables such as expected domestic political costs and diplomatic costs of initiating a war. However, as one reads their Appendix 1 on the Measurement of the Variables, one discovers that the authors "have not yet devised a way to estimate [the cost terms], so we do not

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distinguish between them" (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992: 298). I suggest that distinguishing among them is important, and that a measurement for the diplomatic cost term might take the form of the diplomatic reputation formula presented in equation [1].

The advantage of this measure is that it derives a state's "objective" diplomatic reputation as a function of past crisis performance while discounting for time; past crisis performance weighs less—impresses less— than recent crisis performance in the minds of leaders because of the elapsed time. This is consistent with psychological research demonstrating that memory decays exponentially (Wickelgren 1967). Furthermore, the reputational measure is sensitive to elapsed time (since reputations must be maintained), to the nature of one's previous adversaries (the severity index takes into account superpower involvement and geostrategic location of the crisis), and the past performance of the states during crises (habitual winners of more severe crises will be rewarded with a stronger reputation than losers of crises). This score can be used to show the potential costs of entering into a conflict situation with another state; the diplomatic cost incurred by state i (the initiator) is j's (the target) reputation at time t.

In sum, while more research is needed, the preliminary results are encouraging and suggest that the concepts of 'reputation' and 'credibility' can be measured and applied to a variety of other models of international relations.

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More Suggestions for Further Research

In this dissertation, I argue the frequency of crisis involvement by states does affect the international system because of the reputations developed as a result. The empirical evidence demonstrate that states do act *as if* they build reputations. The remaining task, an important one not addressed in this dissertation, is to determine whether the acquisition of a diplomatic reputation was made purposefully, and if other states are aware of their opponent's diplomatic reputation.

Unquestioningly, US Presidents have spoken on many occasions of the need to maintain the United States' reputation (Mercer 1996: 2). Moreover, it is clear that the United States conducted its Cold War foreign policy with an eye towards impressing and/or countering the Soviet Union in particular (Schelling 1966; Ostrom and Job 1986; Huth 1988; Hopf 1994). In this respect, it is reasonable to assume that US and Soviet policy-makers acted to build their state's reputation with their respective adversary. But to what extent is this the case generally, among state leaders around the world? How "aware" are leaders of each others' diplomatic reputation?

Also, it would be interesting to examine other ways that states build reputations, other than the security-based definition proposed here. Economic unions, alliance structures, and diplomatic exchanges among countries might be other ways to build reputations for states. Reputation should form in non-security related aspects of international interactions.

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Finally, it would be perhaps more fruitful to examine reputation-building efforts of states as a function of domestic politics. In other words, domestic regime changes might be better predictors of reputation-building efforts than the uniform 20-year period chosen here. The major weakness of my operationalization of diplomatic reputation is that I do not explicitly link reputation forming with domestic politics, as I should have based on the discussion in Chapter Two.

Addressing these questions represents a natural next step in this project.

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APPENDIX A

LIST OF STATES EXCLUDED FROM THE DATA SET

Here is the list of the 35 countries excluded from the data set. They were excluded because they never reached a population of 1 million. In all, they represent less than 10% of the total possible cases of country-years.[1] Stars indicate that the country was involved in a crisis; the number of stars equals the number of crises. In all, these 35 states account for 13 out of 900 (less than 1.5 %) crisis-actors in my data set.

Bahamas	Gambia*	Solomon Islands
Bahrain	Grenada	St. Vincent & the Grenadines
Barbados	Guinea Bissau	St. Lucia
Belize	Guyana**	Surinam
Brunei	Iceland**	Swaziland
Cap Verde	Lesotho**	Tonga
Commoros	Luxembourg**	Trinidad
Cyprus***	Maldives	Tuvalu
Djibouti	Malta*	Vanuatu
Dominica	Qatar	Western Samoa
Equatorial Guinea	Sao Tome e Principe	Zanzibar
Fiji	Seychelles	

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[1] This is because most of these states are island-nations that did not achieve independence until the 1960s, 70s, and 80s.

APPENDIX B

THE MEASUREMENT OF SEVERITY

In Chapter Four, Operationalizations, I introduced the measure of severity of a

crisis developed by Brecher and James (1986). In sum, Severity represents the highest

level of disruptions in the international system caused by a crisis.

The six variables that compose Severity, and their range of values, are:[1]

1. **Actors**: the number of states that are involved in the crisis, 1 point for one

actor, and 6 points for six or more actors;

2. **Involvement**: how involved are the great power in the crisis, 1 point for no

great power involvement to 6 points for when more than 2 powers are crisis actors;

3. **Geostrategic Salience**: the location of the crisis, 1 point for a subsystem

such as South America to 5 points for a global crisis;

4. **Heterogeneity**: how different are the actors from each other in terms of

their military capabilities, economic development, type of political regime, and

culture. The more different the adversaries are, the more chances for issue cleavages

there are, so 1 point for no cleavages to 5 points for differences among all four

attributes;

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[1] The following explanation is borrowed from Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988, Vol.1: 119-127.

5. **Issues:** what are the issues under dispute. The most important issue is military-security, followed by diplomatic, economic, and lastly, cultural issues, from 1 point for one issue other than military-security to 5 points for three or more issues under dispute;

6. **Violence:** how extensive is the use of violence in the crisis. When a crisis becomes a war, then it reaches the maximum level of violence (4 points), and the continuum goes to the other extreme, where no violence is used by either side (1 point).

Each indicator is weighted according the number of linkages it is expected to have with others, in other words, the weight of the "input" the indicator brings to the overall severity of a crisis. The weight of the indicators is assigned as such: Actors=4; Involvement= 4; Geostrategic Salience=2; Heterogeneity=2; Issues=2; and Violence=1. The composite index of severity is obtained by summing the weighted indicators:

$$S' = \sum w_k s_k \qquad [1]$$

Where:

S' = 'Raw' Severity score;

s_k = score of kth indicator;

w_k = weight of kth indicator

The composite score is then transformed to a 10-point scale to make it easier to interpret with the following formula:

$$S = 0.134(S') - 1 \qquad [2]$$

Therefore, 10 represents the maximum severity and 1 the minimum. For example, Brecher and James (1986; 1989) calculate the severity of the October 1973 Yom Kippur crisis to illustrate how the index works. This crisis featured five crisis actors of which two were involved superpowers; the location was geostrategically important because of oil; the heterogeneity among the actors was high; the issues were security-related, and violence ensued. Therefore, the severity is calculated as such:

Severity indicators:	Weight:	Score:
1. Actors	4	5
2. Involvement	4	6
3. Geostrategic Salience	2	5
4. Heterogeneity	2	5
5. Issues	2	4
6. Violence	1	4

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The Severity Index $= 0.134 \left(\sum w_k s_k \right) - 1$

$= 0.134 \left(4[5] + 4[6] + 2[5] + 2[5] + 2[4] + 1[4] \right) - 1$

$= 9.18$

The fact that the Yom Kippur crisis scores close to ten gives the index a certain measure of internal validity. By contrast, the crisis for the United States over the hostages in Iran scores a lower 5.16 because there was only one involved power, and there was little violence.

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APPENDIX C

CALCULATING DIPLOMATIC REPUTATION

In this appendix, I illustrate how the independent variable Diplomatic Reputation is calculated. Recall that Diplomatic Reputation has four components: (1) crisis frequency; (2) time; (3) the outcome of the crisis, that is, whether one side won or lost; and (4) the severity of the crisis. The formula is:

$$\sum_{j,i=1}^{n_{ji}} (-1)^{V_{ji}}(.3338*\ln t_j)(S_i) \qquad [1]$$

Where:

n_{ji} = The number of crises j experienced by state i over the last 20 years;

V_{ji} = Outcome of each crisis j for state i, where $V=1$ if loss, 2 if victory. This is an exponent, therefore countries that experience mostly victories will have a positive number when summed over all cases because of the (-1) constant, while frequent capitulators will have a negative value when summed over all cases;

t_j = Time of the crisis j where 20 years is the present, and 1 is 20 years ago; this is the discount parameter for a state's reputation over time, bounded to 20 years to correspond with the approximate length of a generation of citizens in major leadership

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roles. The constant (**.3338**) makes the discount parameter **ln t$_j$** reach zero (0) at the

twenty year mark;

S$_j$ = Severity of crisis j on a ten-point interval scale with 10 being the most severe.

Here is how **Spain's** Diplomatic Reputation from 1918-1988 is figured. Spain

experienced four ICB crises in this period: (1) Spanish Civil War I in 1936 and (2)

Spanish Civil War II in 1938--both "losses;" (3) the Ifni crisis in 1957 and (4) the

Moroccan March crisis in 1975, both "victories:"

Year	Crisis	Severity	$(-1)^{V1^*}$ $(.3338^*$ ln t$_1$)(S$_1$)	$(-1)^{V2^*}$ $(.3338^*$ ln t$_2$)(S$_2$)	$(-1)^{V3^*}$ $(.3338^*$ ln t$_3$)(S$_3$)	$(-1)^{V4^*}$ $(.3338^*$ ln t$_4$)(S$_4$)	Dip Rep (raw)
1918	(None)	0					0
1919	(None)	0					0
1920	(None)	0					0
1921	(None)	0					0
1922	(None)	0					0
1923	(None)	0					0
1924	(None)	0					0
1925	(None)	0					0
1926	(None)	0					0
1927	(None)	0					0
1928	(None)	0					0
1929	(None)	0					0
1930	(None)	0					0
1931	(None)	0					0
1932	(None)	0					0
1933	(None)	0					0
1934	(None)	0					0

Year	Crisis	Severity	$(-1)^{V1*}$ (.3338* ln t_1)(S_1)	$(-1)^{V2*}$ (.3338* ln t_2)(S_2)	$(-1)^{V3*}$ (.3338* ln t_3)(S_3)	$(-1)^{V4*}$ (.3338* ln t_4)(S_4)	Dip Rep (raw)
1935	(None)	0					0
1936	Spanish Civil War I	8.38	-8.38				-8.38
1937	(None)	0	-8.24				-8.24
1938	Spanish Civil War II	8.38	-8.09	-8.38			-16.46
1939	(None)	0	-7.93	-8.24			-16.16
1940	(None)	0	-7.76	-8.09			-15.84
1941	(None)	0	-7.58	-7.93			-15.5
1942	(None)	0	-7.38	-7.76			-15.14
1943	(None)	0	-7.17	-7.58			-14.75
1944	(None)	0	-6.95	-7.38			-14.33
1945	(None)	0	-6.71	-7.17			-13.88
1946	(None)	0	-6.44	-6.95			-13.39
1947	(None)	0	-6.15	-6.71			-12.85
1948	(None)	0	-5.82	-6.44			-12.26
1949	(None)	0	-5.44	-6.15			-11.59
1950	(None)	0	-5.01	-5.82			-10.83
1951	(None)	0	-4.5	-5.44			-9.95
1952	(None)	0	-3.88	-5.01			-8.89
1953	(None)	0	-3.07	-4.5			-7.58
1954	(None)	0	-1.94	-3.88			-5.82
1955	(None)	0	0	-3.07			-3.07
1956	(None)	0		-1.94			-1.94
1957	Ifni (North Africa)	2.89		0	2.89		2.89
1958	(None)	0			2.84		2.84
1959	(None)	0			2.79		2.79
1960	(None)	0			2.73		2.73
1961	(None)	0			2.67		2.67
1962	(None)	0			2.61		2.61

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Year	Crisis	Severity	$(-1)^{V1*}$ $(.3338*$ $\ln t_1)(S_1)$	$(-1)^{V2*}$ $(.3338*$ $\ln t_2)(S_2)$	$(-1)^{V3*}$ $(.3338*$ $\ln t_3)(S_3)$	$(-1)^{V4*}$ $(.3338*$ $\ln t_4)(S_4)$	Dip Rep (raw)
1963	(None)	0			2.55		2.55
1964	(None)	0			2.47		2.47
1965	(None)	0			2.4		2.4
1966	(None)	0			2.31		2.31
1967	(None)	0			2.22		2.22
1968	(None)	0			2.12		2.12
1969	(None)	0			2.01		2.01
1970	(None)	0			1.88		1.88
1971	(None)	0			1.73		1.73
1972	(None)	0			1.55		1.55
1973	(None)	0			1.34		1.34
1974	(None)	0			1.06		1.06
1975	Moroccan March	3.42			0.67	3.42	4.09
1976	(None)	0			0	3.36	3.36
1977	(None)	0				3.3	3.3
1978	(None)	0				3.23	3.23
1979	(None)	0				3.17	3.17
1980	(None)	0				3.09	3.09
1981	(None)	0				3.01	3.01
1982	(None)	0				2.93	2.93
1983	(None)	0				2.84	2.84
1984	(None)	0				2.74	2.74
1985	(None)	0				2.63	2.63
1986	(None)	0				2.51	2.51
1987	(None)	0				2.37	2.37
1988	(None)	0				2.22	2.22

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These numbers—in the right hand column—represent only the raw score. In and of themselves, they do not mean much. Once the raw numbers for all states in the international system are obtained for a given year, these raw scores are then *standardized* to show a state's diplomatic reputation *relative* to the other states.

Therefore, we may reasonably assert that states with a diplomatic reputation score of above (+1) are "strong," and states scoring below (-1) are "weak."

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Jean Sebastien Rioux was born in Baltimore, Maryland, and raised in Québec City, Canada. After High School, Sebastien enlisted in the U.S. Army (Infantry), serving from 1987 to 1990. He was stationed at Fort Campbell, KY, with the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT), attaining the rank of Sergeant.

After the Army, Sebastien moved to Los Angeles, California, with his wife Sophie Marcil. He majored in Political Science at California State University at Los Angeles, while Sophie majored in Film at Columbia College-Hollywood. Sebastien was active in student government, student publications, and was president of the College Republicans. He was awarded the 1992 Alumni Certificate of Honor for Outstanding Achievement, and profiled in the CSULA yearbook.

Sebastien then went to graduate school at The Florida State University, beginning in the Fall of 1992. He served as teaching assistant, research assistant, and taught independently. He also worked as broadcaster and host on WTAL Talk Radio in Tallahassee, and served as Press Secretary for Carole Griffin's campaign for US Congress in 1994. His hobbies are reading, viewing movies, and the outdoors. His e-mail address is 71055.2066@compuserve.com.

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